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"The brain is more than an assemblage of autonomous modules, each 
crucial for a specific mental function. Every one of these functionally specialized 
areas must interact with dozens or hundreds of others, their total integration 
creating something like a vastly complicated orchestra with thousands of 
instruments, an orchestra that conducts itself, with an ever-changing score and 
repertoire"           
                  Oliver Sacks 
 
As human beings, we usually do not think about the utter 
complexity of the most trivial things we do in daily life. We take it for 
granted that we will wake up when the alarm goes off, we are not 
surprised that we manage to simultaneously eat breakfast, read the 
newspaper and check our emails, and find it normal that we are able to 
navigate our way through rush hour traffic. As cognitive 
neuroscientists, we do think about all these ‘simple’ skills and put a lot 
of time and effort into studying them. Cognitive neuroscience therefore 
deals with the underlying mechanisms of higher-order cognition and 
tries to understand how exactly these mechanisms are brought about, 
how they are based on and influenced by more basic processes like the 
processing of sensory events that furthermore interact with internal 
drives, needs, and goals in bringing about behavior. As such, the field of 
cognitive neuroscience can be situated somewhere between neurobiology 
and neurophysiology on the hand and neuropsychology and cognitive 
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psychology on the other hand. Besides analyzing behavioral 
performance in cognition-related tasks, the most common methodologies 
to study neural mechanisms are fMRI, EEG/ERP and TMS.   
 In this dissertation, we present research on early sensory 
attention and pupil size in cognitive control. Because each chapter has 
its own introduction and we did not want to repeat ourselves too often, 
we mainly tried to sketch the bigger picture in this general introduction, 
defining concepts (in italics) and presenting classic theoretical 
frameworks. First, we will discuss the most prominent findings and 
models in the field of attention and cognitive control. Additionally, we 
will focus on adaptations in cognitive control and the interaction 
between cognitive control and the reward system. Next, we will focus on 
a well-known indirect marker of attentional processing, arousal and 
mental effort, namely pupil size. We will discuss the role of pupil size in 
basic vision and set the stage for one of the main research questions in 
this dissertation: what is the effect of pupil size on early sensory 
processes? This will lead us to discuss initial sensory processing in 
visual cortex, more specifically the primary visual cortex (V1) and its 
electrophysiological counterpart, the C1. We will end this general 
introduction with an outline of the different chapters in this 
dissertation. 
ATTENTION 
One of the oldest and most fundamental questions in cognitive 
neuroscience has been related to how humans deal with the overload of 
information that is picked up by their senses. For example, when you 
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are reading this dissertation right now, you have to focus on the book in 
your hands while ignoring almost everything in your surroundings. 
From pop-up windows on your computer screen to your office mate 
talking on the phone, you will have to allocate all your attentional 
resources to the book and block out all other stimuli. Thus far, it could 
be argued that we just need some kind of general sensory filter. 
However, things become interesting when the same office mate 
suddenly mentions your name during his conversation and you look up. 
Phenomena like this so-called “cocktail party effect” led to the 
development of attention models, which differed with respect to when 
exactly attentional selection occurred. The filter model of Donald 
Broadbent (Broadbent, 1958) suggested the existence of a filter 
mechanism deciding which incoming sensory signals could proceed to 
the next processing stage. Unfortunately, this model could not deal with 
the aforementioned attentional pop-up of words of semantic importance 
and was soon replaced by later selection models, who argued that all 
stimuli are non-selectively processed (e.g. Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963). 
However, late selection models could not deal with the limited 
attentional capacity and were soon replaced by the seminal attenuation 
model of Anne Treisman (Treisman, 1964). This model proposed 
attenuation of irrelevant stimuli as the main mechanism of attention, in 
which stimuli associated with arousal (by semantic meaning or 
intensity) would have a lower threshold to reach consciousness and 
further processing than non-arousing stimuli. Furthermore, Kahneman 
(1973) suggested that the level of arousal and the amount of mental 
effort required in a specific context determines how much attentional 
capacity there is to process a stimulus. Ten years and many different 
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models later, Treisman and Gelade (1980) proposed their feature 
integration theory, in which they also accounted for the complexity of 
stimuli in a visual search context. Basically, stimuli that are unique 
from all other stimuli in one discriminative feature would be processed 
pre-attentively and 'pop-out' (feature search), whereas stimuli that can 
only be identified as a combination of features would need to be 
searched for by serial processing (conjunction search), increasing the 
search time linearly with the number of distractor items.   
 It goes beyond the scope of this introduction to review all attention 
models (for a review, see Pashler, 1999), but it is important to note that 
attention researchers did not only theorize about when attentional 
selection occurs, but also about how it exactly operates. Here, a 
distinction can be made between spatial attention on the one hand and 
feature- or object-based attention on the other hand (for a comparison, 
see Soto & Blanco, 2004). The first, spatial attention, assumes that 
attention is directed to a specific location in the visual field. Already in 
the 19th century, William James (1890) suggested that attention 
operates as a spotlight, with a central focus, a fringe and a margin. 
Stimuli falling into the central focus are processed with high-resolution, 
whereas stimuli falling into the fringe are processed with low-
resolution. The margin would reflect the outer border of the attentional 
spotlight, meaning that everything outside of it would not be processed. 
According to this model, the spotlight has to move across space to 
process other parts of the visual field (e.g. Posner, 1980). The zoom-lens 
model added the possibility to increase the spatial extent of the 
attentional focus (Eriksen & St. James, 1986). Assuming a fixed amount 
of attentional resources, this model predicts slower attentional 
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processing for large, "zoomed-out", visual areas compared to small areas 
(Castiello & Umilta, 1992). The second form of attention, feature- or 
object-based attention assumes that attention is directed to a specific 
stimulus feature (e.g. color or shape) or object (e.g. lines forming a 
cubicle), independently from its location in the visual field. Since we 
often look for a specific object without knowing where it exactly is (e.g. 
finding your keys on your desk), this is a particularly important form of 
attention (Theeuwes, 2013).   
 Unfortunately, using behavioral measurements to study attention 
has some significant limitations (Luck, Woodman, & Vogel, 2000). First, 
a reaction time on a single trial is typically measured as the response 
time to a stimulus. Although this reaction time says something about 
the duration of the process of interest, it is impossible to know the exact 
time course of the process. Furthermore, without a response it is even 
impossible to use reaction time or error rates as dependent variable. 
Hence, because it can deal with all the problems above, attention 
researchers have been interested in electroencephalographic (EEG) 
recordings and the use of event-related potentials since the 1960s (see 
Box 1 for an introduction to the basics of the EEG and ERP technique). 
Not only can the continuous ERP waveform be used to directly observe 
neural activity between a stimulus and a response, it can also provide 
information about inhibitory processes or the neural suppression of 
certain stimuli, which is impossible with behavioral measures (Luck et 
al., 2000).   
With respect to spatial attention, it was found that both the P1 
(posterior positivity around 100 ms post-stimulus) and N1 (posterior 
negativity around 150-200 ms post-stimulus) have a larger amplitude in 
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validly cued trials compared to invalidly cued trials in paradigms 
(Posner, 1980) where stimuli are presented on the left or right side of 
the screen (Mangun & Hillyard, 1991). Other studies showed that the 
P1 was primarily smaller for invalid cued trials, whereas the N1 was 
primarily larger for valid cued trials, indicating that the P1 mainly 
reflects the suppression of unattended stimuli and the N1 the 
enhancement of attended stimuli (Luck et al., 1994; see also Slagter, 
Prinssen, Reteig, & Mazaheri, 2016). Another related distinction is the 
fact that the P1 primarily reflects whether a target is present or not, 
whereas the N1 is more related to stimulus discrimination (Vogel & 
Luck, 2000). When selecting stimuli based on non-spatial features like 
color and shape (i.e. feature-based attention), the selection negativity 
(SN) component is often observed (Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998). This 
component appears between 140 and 180 ms post-stimulus and can 
have a duration of up to 200 ms. The onset of this waveform indicates 
when a certain feature is discriminated from the others and attention is 
solely attributed to it.   
 Taken together, all these ERP findings support early attentional 
selection, since differences in attentional allocation to stimuli can be 
observed as early as 100 ms (and sometimes even earlier; for a review, 
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Box 1 - Electroencephalographic recordings and event-related potentials 
Electroencephalography (EEG) has been around for a long time. Although the 
first animal experiments on electrical brain activity date back to the end of the 
nineteenth century, it was the German physiologist Hans Berger who recorded the first 
human EEG in 1924. Basically, EEG is a noninvasive technique in which conductive 
metal electrodes are placed on various locations on the scalp (see Figure 1). When 
neurons in the cortex are activated, the synaptic excitations of their dendrites produce 
local current flows that can be picked up by external electrodes as potential differences 
between a given electrode and a reference site. It is important to note that only large 
populations of neurons can generate a measurable current flow and that this current 
flow has to travel through a thick layer of cerebral fluid, skull and skin, which leads to 
significant attenuation and spatial blurring. Therefore, the EEG signal is only a rough 
reflection of the underlying brain activity. Conducting electrode gel is injected between 
the electrode and the skin of the scalp in order to make a connection, and the impedance 
(which basically reflects the alternating-current counterpart of a resistance) of this 
connection is lowered as much as possible to increase the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and 
an effort is made to minimize the disturbing influence of electronic devices that send out 
signals that can be picked up by the scalp electrodes. After amplifying the recorded 
signal and digitizing the analog signal into a digital one, an online EEG signal can be 
digitally stored and presented on a computer monitor (e.g. allowing clinicians to monitor 
epileptic episodes of patients with epilepsy) 
 
Figure 1. EEG acquisition. Image taken from: https://twitter.com/Psych_Review 
In cognitive neuroscience, researchers usually present stimuli or task 
instructions to participants while recording the EEG signal. Whenever a stimulus is 
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presented or an event occurs, the computer displaying these stimuli sends a trigger code 
to the EEG acquisition computer. This allows researchers to time-lock the EEG signal to 
a certain event and average it over multiple occurrences or replications, leading to 
event-related potentials or ERPs (see Figure 2). Decades of research have led to a 
number of important event-related components that can be used as neural markers of 
certain cognitive processes. Components arising in the first 200 ms after stimulus 
presentation, like the C1, N1 and P1 are often called sensory/visual evoked potentials 
because they are related to sensory and attentional processes. Later components like the 
central N2, N450 or P300 are found to be related to higher-order cognitive processes like 
conflict processing or oddball detection. All these components are defined by their 
topographic location, onset latency, duration and polarity, often in comparison to 
another experimental condition.  
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COGNITIVE CONTROL 
Attention can be considered as one of the most important 
mechanisms behind the more general cognitive control construct and it 
is even debated if both constructs are separable or not (Cohen, 2017). 
Nevertheless, cognitive control can be defined as the flexible and 
adaptive regulation of behavior in the face of conflicting stimuli or 
responses (Cohen, 2017). For example, when you drive your car and 
arrive at a crossroad, you have to stop if the traffic light turns red. 
However, when the driver in front of you ignores the traffic light and 
drives on, you might be inclined to follow him. Another example would 
be to stick to your diet and choose for the healthy salad during lunch, 
although a billboard with a picture of delicious fries seduces you to do 
otherwise. In these situations, it is often crucial to orchestrate our 
behavior according to our internal goals or external task demands and 
to overcome habitual behavior and inhibit prepotent responses. In the 
following paragraphs, we will first discuss the classical paradigms in 
cognitive control research and what they exactly measure. Next, we will 
discuss cognitive control adaptations, with a focus on the conflict 
adaptation effect. Afterwards, we situate this effect within the dual 
mechanisms of control (DMC) framework. Finally, we review evidence 
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 Cognitive control paradigms 
In both the traffic and lunch situation described in the previous 
paragraph, there was goal-relevant information (the red traffic light and 
the salad) and goal-irrelevant information (the other driver and the 
billboard). The presence of both goal-relevant and goal-irrelevant 
information creates cognitive conflict that needs to be overcome in order 
to reach our goals. In a laboratory context, researchers have developed 
so-called congruency tasks in which participants have to respond to 
task-relevant information while ignoring task-irrelevant information 
(Box 2; see Egner, 2008, for different types of conflict). In the Stroop 
task (Stroop, 1992), for example, participants have to name the ink color 
of a color word string. Because word reading is the dominant response 
and overrules color naming, cognitive conflict emerges and participants 
respond more slowly and less accurately to incongruent ('GREEN' 
printed in yellow) compared to congruent ('RED' printed in red) trials. 
The same goes for the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), 
in which people have to respond to the direction of the task-relevant 
target arrow and ignore the task-irrelevant distracter arrows (with 
usually more distracters than target arrows). In the Simon task, in 
which people have to respond to the task-relevant shape and ignore the 
task-irrelevant side of presentation, conflict arises via incompatible 
activation of the corresponding response hand (Simon, 1969). In all 
these congruency tasks, the difference in RT or error rates is called the 
congruency effect, which has been used as a marker of effectiveness of 
cognitive control in thousands of publications by now. The congruency 
effect can have a different nature depending on the paradigm: there can 
be conflict because of overlap between the relevant and irrelevant 
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stimulus dimension (S-S overlap; Stroop and Flanker task) or between 
the stimulus dimension and the response dimension (S-R overlap: 
Simon task; for a detailed discussion, see Egner, 2007). Just like early 
attentional selection, the congruency effect is also reflected in the EEG 
signal, with specific components like the N450 and N200 signaling 
cognitive control processes for specific tasks and types of conflict (for an 
in-depth discussion, see Donohue, Appelbaum, McKay, & Woldorff, 
2016; Larson & Clayson, 2011; Larson, Clayson, Kirwan, & Weissman, 
2016; Larson, Kaufman, & Perlstein, 2009).  
Box 2 - Visual illustration of the most prominent paradigms in cognitive 
control research. From top to bottom: the Stroop task (respond to font color), 
the Flanker task (respond to central arrow head) and the Simon task (respond 
to stimulus color). 
  
  
The conflict adaptation effect 
Seminal cognitive control research has shown that the congruency 
effect on a given trial could be modulated by the congruency of the 
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previous trial (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). This effect, also known 
as the Gratton effect, the conflict adaptation effect or the congruency 
sequence effect (CSE), represents the finding that congruency effects are 
smaller on trials preceded by incongruent trials compared to trials 
preceded by congruent trials (for reviews, see Duthoo, Abrahamse, 
Braem, Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014b; Egner, 2007). In the years 
following the initial publication of this finding, different theoretical 
accounts were proposed that mainly differed in their focus on top-down 
control processes on the one hand and bottom-up  associative processes 
on the other hand (Egner, 2007, 2017).   
 With respect to top-down control accounts, Gratton himself 
interpreted his findings as evidence for a strategic effect based on 
expectations: encountering an incongruent trial would lead to the 
expectation to encounter another incongruent trial, so participants 
would strategically enhance their focus on the relevant stimulus 
information (e.g. ink color or target arrow). The RT and error rate for 
following incongruent trials would therefore be decreased because of a 
attenuated influence of distracters, whereas it would be increased for 
subsequent congruent trials since the benefit of attending congruent 
irrelevant information would disappear. The opposite is true for 
expecting congruent trials after encountering a congruent trial: 
decreased attentional allocation to the relevant information (since it 
feels redundant) benefits following congruent trials, but increases the 
RT and error rate of following incongruent trials (Gratton et al., 1992). 
The seminal conflict-monitoring model of Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter, and Cohen (2001) explained the CSE along the same lines, but 
also proposed a computational framework with neuroanatomical 
 
CHAPTER 1      23 
substrates accounting for these mechanisms. They discriminated 
between two phases of conflict processing: conflict detection and conflict 
resolution. When the cognitive control system detects conflict between 
task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimulus dimensions (through the 
simultaneous activation of different behavioral response tendencies), it 
triggers an up-regulation of attentional allocation to the first. From a 
neuroscientific perspective, the process of conflict detection was mapped 
onto the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), whereas conflict 
resolution would be associated with activity in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). This was supported by many studies showing 
increased dACC activation during incongruent trials compared to 
congruent trials (e.g. Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 
1999; Kerns et al., 2004), indicating that the amount of conflict was 
evaluated in that region. The dlPFC has not only been found to be more 
active in incongruent trials preceded by incongruent trials, but also to 
be associated with an increase of attention-related activity in sensory 
areas (Egner & Hirsch, 2005), reflecting top-down attentional control.
 The second category of models accounting for the CSE are usually 
referred to as associative or bottom-up models (Egner, 2017), because 
they assume that CSEs arise because of repetitions of stimulus features. 
The feature-integration account of Hommel, Proctor, and Vu (2004) 
argues that when a task-relevant (e.g. the ink color green) and a task-
irrelevant stimulus feature (e.g. the word yellow) are presented with a 
certain response (e.g. the response button related to the color green), an 
episodic memory trace is created via the process of binding (see the 
aforementioned feature-integration theory of Treisman & Gelade, 1980). 
Whenever one of the features is presented again on a following trial, 
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activation is propagated to the other features that were stored together 
with it, facilitating their attentional processing. This means that when 
there is a complete repetition or a complete alternation of features, RT 
and error rate decreases because an episodic memory trace can be 
retrieved or not (Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003). However, when there is 
partial repetition in which some features are repeated and others not, 
the episodic memory trace needs to be overwritten, resulting in an 
increased RT and error rate (Hommel et al., 2004). It goes beyond the 
scope of this introduction to discuss follow-up studies adapting cognitive 
control paradigms in order to discriminate between top-down and 
bottom-up accounts (for an in-depth discussion, see Duthoo, Abrahamse, 
Braem, Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014a). However, it is worth mentioning 
that increasing the number of stimulus features in order to 
experimentally control for repetitions has led to another possible 
confound in the CSE (Schmidt & De Houwer, 2011), namely contingency 
learning. The problem is that more possible combinations of stimulus 
features lead to relatively more unique incongruent trials compared to 
congruent trials, while it has been shown that higher-contingent trials 
(i.e. congruent trials) are responded to faster than low-contingent trials.
  
 Besides pure top-down (Botvinick et al., 2001; Gratton et al., 1992) 
and bottom-up models (Hommel et al., 2004) explaining the CSE, there 
is a third category featuring hybrid models combining ideas of the first 
two (Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 2009). In a nutshell, models like the 
adaptation-by-binding model of Verguts and Notebaert (2008) proposes 
that top-down mechanisms trigger an arousal response that binds the 
current stimulus and response features via Hebbian learning processes. 
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More specifically, Hebbian learning is increased on incongruent trials 
compared to congruent trials, making the task-relevant associations 
stronger. After an incongruent trial, control increases because of this 
increased connectivity.  
 
 Dual mechanisms of control  
 The dual mechanisms of control or DMC framework proposes two 
different operating modes of cognitive control: proactive and reactive 
control (Braver, 2012; Braver, 2015). Whereas proactive control can be 
considered as a strategic preparatory mechanism, reflected in 
preparatory and often sustained activation in control regions like the 
prefrontal cortex (e.g. Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009; Jimura, 
Locke, & Braver, 2010), reactive control is a more ad hoc correction 
mechanism that is triggered by the upcoming stimulus (for an in-depth 
discussion, see Chiew & Braver, 2017). Applied to our real-life example, 
proactive control would include preparing your foot to hit the brake 
when approaching the crossroads or thinking about the nutritional 
value of a salad before entering the restaurant. Reactive control would 
be to only move your foot to the brake when the light turns red or to 
only think about your health when you see the menu card. 
Unsurprisingly, both operating modes are not mutually exclusive and a 
great deal of cognitive control research investigates the interaction 
between the two and how they dynamically adjust control. Interestingly, 
the DMC framework can also be used to hypothesize about the effects of 
reward and motivation on cognitive control, which we will discuss in the 
following paragraphs.  
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 Reward-modulated cognitive control  
 The goal of resolving cognitive conflict is to adapt our behavior in 
line with our internal and external goals, which are constantly shaped 
by motivational factors (Krebs & Woldorff, 2017). You will hit the brake 
at the right time because your goal is to avoid a car accident with 
physical or material damage and you will (or at least might) eat the 
healthy salad instead of the fries because you do not want to gain 
weight. Motivation can be either intrinsic or extrinsic, with the first 
reflecting the desire to accomplish something in order to feel good and 
the latter reflecting the desire to gain a reward or to avoid a 
punishment (Ryan & Deci, 2000).  In a laboratory context, it is very 
difficult to study intrinsic motivation because people differ with respect 
to tasks or behavior they inherently like, and because intrinsic 
motivation is extremely difficult to modulate in a controlled way 
(DePasque & Tricomi, 2015). Therefore, cognitive neuroscientists have 
mainly studied how extrinsic motivation in the form of monetary 
incentives can modulate cognitive functions like attention and cognitive 
control (Botvinick & Braver, 2015). Although it is self-evident that the 
inclusion of reward will lead to repetitions of behavior and/or increased 
performance (Wise, 2004), it is less clear how this exactly happens in 
the brain.   
 With respect to reward modulations in cognitive control 
paradigms, Krebs and Woldorff recently made a distinction between 
pre-task reward cueing and stimulus-reward associations (Krebs & 
Woldorff, 2017). The first type reflects those situations in which a cue 
communicates reward availability ahead of the trial for which a 
response is needed. For example, participants are told that whenever 
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they see a centrally presented square, they can earn a monetary reward 
of 10 eurocents if they respond fast and accurate to a subsequent 
flanker trial. Moreover, this pre-task reward cueing cannot only be 
implemented on the trial level (transient form), but also on the block 
level (sustained form). In the latter case, participants are told 
beforehand that they will earn a monetary reward for fast and accurate 
responses on each trial in a specific block of trials. The second type, 
target-reward associations, reflects situations in which one of the 
stimulus features is related to reward. For example, participants are 
told that whenever the ink color of a word in a Stroop task is red or 
yellow, they can earn a monetary reward if they respond fast and 
accurate (Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010).  
 Obviously, the distinction between pre-task reward cueing and 
target-reward associations closely resembles the aforementioned 
distinction between proactive and reactive control. When you prepare to 
enhance your task performance because of an upcoming reward, a 
proactive control mechanism seems likely that would optimize 
attentional allocation. For example, it was found that in a Stroop 
conflict task rewarded cues led to increased attention for targets, as 
reflected in a larger CNV (attention-related ERP component) and 
decreased posterior alpha power (van den Berg, Krebs, Lorist, & 
Woldorff, 2014). Padmala and Pessoa (Padmala & Pessoa, 2011) also 
found that reward availability primarily increased performance on 
incongruent trials in a picture-word interference task, whereas yet 
another study showed that participants became better at detecting 
targets in the periphery (Engelmann & Pessoa, 2007). Moreover, the 
cue-target phase allows for a short time window in which the 
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underlying neural mechanisms of preparatory, proactive reward 
processes can be investigated in isolation. The observed activity pattern 
led to the identification of a reward system (including the ventral 
striatum, the medial midbrain and other dopaminergic areas) that 
interacts with the brain regions responsible for the task at hand in an 
experiment (Braver, 2015; Schmidt, Lebreton, Cléry-Melin, Daunizeau, 
& Pessiglione, 2012).  
  In contrast, when you cannot predict if an upcoming trial will be 
rewarded or not, reactive mechanisms will try to reorient attention as 
soon as possible in case a stimulus feature is associated with reward 
(e.g. Donohue, Hopf, et al., 2016; Harris et al., 2016).  Applied to 
cognitive control research, Krebs et al. (2010) showed general RT 
decreases and reduced congruency effects for trials with ink colors 
associated to reward in a classic four-color Stroop task, showing that 
reward can modulate conflict resolution in the absence of any global 
preparatory mechanisms. Follow-up fMRI and EEG experiments 
showed that this reactive reward processing was most likely based on 
early visual prioritization of reward-related features (Harris et al., 
2016; Krebs, Boehler, Appelbaum, & Woldorff, 2013; Krebs, Boehler, 
Egner, & Woldorff, 2011). Interestingly, they also observed that when 
the reward feature (a color in this case) was associated to the task-
irrelevant letter string, congruency effects increased. This probably 
means that the reward feature had a highly distracting effect, even 
when only conceptually relating to the reward color (i.e. the word 
meaning rather than font color), making it harder to overcome the 
stimulus conflict in incongruent trials.  
 Taken together, cognitive control is a broadly defined concept that 
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refers to the ability to pursue goal-directed behavior in the face of 
habitual or prepotent responses. Cognitive control research is closely 
linked to attention research and an entire research field focusses on 
control adaptations after experiencing conflict. Finally, motivation and 
reward are found to be important modulators of cognitive control. In the 
next section, we will discuss a widely known phenomenon that can also 
be observed in cognitive control paradigms, as well as during 
motivational manipulations: pupil size dilation. 
COGNITION-RELATED PUPIL DILATION 
An interesting finding in the field of cognitive control was that 
incongruent trials are associated with dilated pupils (Brown et al., 1999; 
Laeng & Endestad, 2012; Siegle, Ichikawa, & Steinhauer, 2008; 
Steinhauer, Siegle, Condray, & Pless, 2004). Assuming that the 
experienced conflict in an incongruent trial leads to an up-regulation of 
attentional control (Botvinick et al., 2001), the dilated pupil most likely 
reflects increased mental effort and arousal related to activity in the 
autonomic nervous system (Siegle et al., 2008).   
 However, using the pupil as an indirect marker of brain activity is 
nothing new, since Hess and Pold already showed in 1960 that the pupil 
not only responds to changes in light (i.e. the pupillary light reflex, see 
Box 3), but also to the emotional value of pictures. In fact, this finding 
led to an exponential increase in studies reporting pupil size 
adjustments as a proxy (or indirect marker) of a wide range of cognitive 
processes (for a review, see Sirois & Brisson, 2014). Most of these 
cognition-related pupil size changes can be explained by the high 
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temporal coupling between pupil diameter and activity in the locus 
coeruleus-norepinephrine system (LC-NE system; Costa & Rudebeck, 
2016; Joshi, Li, Kalwani, & Gold, 2016). It goes beyond the scope of this 
general introduction to elaborate on this well-known system (for a 
review, see Eckstein, Guerra-Carrillo, Miller Singley, & Bunge, 2016), 
but it is important to note that it is mainly built around the fact that 
the subcortical locus coeruleus (LC) releases norepinephrine (NE) 
throughout the brain (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Sara, 2009) and that 
it plays an important role in attentional state regulation. For example, 
according to the seminal adaptive gain theory of Aston-Jones and Cohen 
(2005), there is an inverted-U relationship between sustained LC 
activity and optimal performance with respect to attentional allocation. 
Similar to the classic Yerkes-Dodson arousal curve (Yerkes & Dodson, 
1908), high levels of sustained LC activity would be associated with 
distractibility and an explorative attentional state, whereas low levels 
of sustained LC activity would be associated with a drowsy and a more 
exploiting attentional state (Gilzenrat, Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, & Cohen, 
2010; Murphy, Robertson, Balsters, & O'Connell R, 2011). In the same 
way, it was found that task performance would be suboptimal for low 
and high levels of sustained LC activity, whereas it would be optimal for 
intermediate levels. Interestingly, the same inverted-U relationship was 
found between tonic pre-stimulus baseline pupil size and task 
performance (Gilzenrat et al., 2010; Hayes & Petrov, 2016; Jepma & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2011; Murphy et al., 2011), making pupil size 
measurements a useful tool when studying these attentional mechanics.  
 However, attentional regulation via the LC-NE system is not the 
only way in which pupil size is modulated. Also emotional arousal 
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(reflected by increased activity in the autonomic nervous system) can 
directly modulate the size of the pupil (for a review, see Lang, 2014). 
Furthermore, it was recently shown that pupil size is also modulated by 
a top-down mechanism protecting the retina to expected changes in 
lighting (Ebitz & Moore, 2017; Mathot & Van der Stigchel, 2015). When 
an ocular movement towards brighter or darker visual object is 
imminent, our systems already prepares for a pupil change in order not 
to over- or under stimulate the retinal cells. Taken together, the list of 
higher-order cognitive processes for which pupil size was measured as a 
proxy is quite extensive and identifying the nature of the driving 
mechanism behind cognition-related pupil size changes can sometimes 
be a challenge (e.g. reward-related processes with both increased mental 
effort and arousal).  
 
Box 3 - The pupillary light reflex 
“Man may either blush or turn pale...but his pupils always dilate.” 
     Irene Loewenfeld, pupillometry pioneer 
Visual perception starts with light being reflected off objects in our 
surroundings and visible light is nothing more than those waves of 
electromagnetic energy that can be picked up by retinal cells of the human eye. 
The regulation of the amount of light falling through the pupil onto the retina 
(i.e. the pupillary light reflex) is controlled by two antagonistic muscles called 
the sphincter pupillae and the dilator pupillae (see Fig.1), making the pupils 
respectively constrict in case of brightness (or high levels of light) and dilate in 
case of darkness (or low levels of light; Diamond, 2001; Eckstein et al., 2016; 
Loewenfeld & Lowenstein, 1999). These adjustments in pupil size do not just 
regulate how much light falls onto the retinal cells (affecting “sensitivity” to 
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light, i.e. the ability to detect dimly lit stimuli in the visual periphery), but 
thereby also have a direct influence visual acuity (i.e. the ability to see stimuli 
in detail), yielding a so-called sensitivity-acuity trade-off. When there is a lot of 
light and the pupil constricts, the image falling on the retina is sharper because 
the light beams coming from different depths are less refracted and are 
projected ‘correctly’ on the retinal plane. This visual acuity is sacrificed when 
there is little light and the pupil has to dilate to let in enough light to activate 
the retinal cells, increasing the sensitivity to weak stimuli in peripheral parts 
of the visual field (Campbell & Green, 1965; Hirata, Yamaji, Sakai, & Usui, 
2003; Laughlin, 1992; Loewenfeld & Lowenstein, 1999). The diameter of the 
pupil can measure between 1.5 and 9 mm, but has an average size of 
approximately 3 mm under normal lighting conditions (Loewenfeld & 
Lowenstein, 1999; Sirois & Brisson, 2014). 
 
Fig. 1. The sphincter and the dilator muscle controlling the pupil. Image taken from: 
https://www.thinglink.com/scene/498548908109070337  
 
With respect to cognitive control paradigms, the question arises if 
the mere change in pupil size also affects the sensory processing of the 
subsequent trial. Laeng, Orbo, Holmlund, and Miozzo (2011), for 
example, showed that the maximal difference in pupil size between 
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congruent and incongruent trials only appeared after 1400 ms and 
lasted for about 600 ms, making it highly likely that the difference in 
pupil size still persisted when the next trial was presented. From a 
wider perspective, this question also relates to the old question on how 
early in the processing hierarchy attention or higher-order cognition can 
affect sensory responses (Spence, 1999). In the following section, we will 
discuss this topic in more detail. 
THE FEEDFORWARD RESPONS IN PRIMARY VISUAL CORTEX 
When light enters the eye via the pupil and reaches the retinal 
cells, neural activation is propagated through the optic nerve and 
subcortical structures to the visual cortex in the occipital lobe, starting 
at the primary visual cortex (V1), situated at the back of the head 
(Remington, 2012). Although there are additional pathways 
circumventing it, primary visual cortex can be considered the first main 
stage of cortical visual processing, primarily reflecting bottom-up 
processing of visual input (e.g. Engel et al., 1994; Zhang, Zhaoping, 
Zhou, & Fang, 2012). Within the visual cortex, an anatomical and 
functional distinction can be made between the striate visual cortex 
(primary visual cortex or V1) and the extrastriate visual cortex (V2, V3, 
V4, V5). Regarding striate visual cortex, research has shown that the 
visual field is retinotopically mapped, meaning that there is a tight 
correspondence between a location in the visual field and its location on 
V1 (Engel et al., 1994; Wandell, 1999; Wandell, Dumoulin, & Brewer, 
2007; Wandell & Winawer, 2011). Importantly, light falling onto the 
fovea of the retina (the area with the highest visual resolution) occupies 
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more space on V1 than light falling on peripheral parts of the retina 
("cortical magnification", see Daniel & Whitteridge, 1961). With respect 
to its function, V1 has been found to be particularly sensitive to the 
orientation and spatial frequencies of stimuli and is therefore 
specialized in edge detection: when a black surface is situated adjacent 
to a white surface, the dividing line will be encoded in V1 (e.g. 
Nothdurft, Gallant, & Van Essen, 2000). In extrastriate visual cortex, 
the complexity of visual processing increases. In V2, for example, cells 
are not only responsive to orientation, spatial frequency or color, but 
also to foreground-background discrimination and attention (Roe & Ts’o, 
1997). This is reflected by the fact that V2 receives feedforward input 
from V1 and projects to other extrastriate parts of the visual cortex like 
V3, V4, MT or V5. It goes beyond the scope of this introduction to 
discuss all extrastriate subregions (for a review, see Bullier, 2001), but 
it is important to note that they all have their own specialties like, for 
example, color coding in V4 (Conway, 2009) and movement detection in 
V5 (Rokszin et al., 2010), and that this hierarchy is not a one-way 
street, with feedback loops and recurrent processes playing an active 
role in its functioning. 
 Whereas many researchers agree that top-down processes can 
modulate the extrastriate cortex (Boehler, Schoenfeld, Heinze, & Hopf, 
2008; Clark & Hillyard, 1996; Martinez et al., 1999; Noesselt et al., 
2002), which is important for the prioritization of visual information in 
the light of the limited capacity of perception (e.g. Lavie, Hirst, de 
Fockert, & Viding, 2004), it is still debated if the striate cortex (i.e. V1) 
can be modulated early on during visual processing. In this context, top-
down processes can be understood as attentional or emotional 
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modulations, broadly referred to as higher cognition. The debate has 
been mostly studied by means of EEG, with the C1 component (i.e. the 
first visually evoked potential) as index of V1 processing (Jeffreys & 
Axford, 1972). This component can be both negative and positive and is 
normally observed between 50 and 100 ms post-stimulus onset at 
posterior midline locations (typically measured at electrode POz). In 
fact, the polarity depends on the presentation location of the stimulus: 
when a stimulus is presented in the upper visual field (UVF), the C1 
will be negative, whereas it will be positive when the stimulus is 
presented in the lower visual field (LVF; see Box 4). This polarity 
reversal for upper vs. lower visual field stimulation is explained by the 
so-called "cruciform model" through a differential mapping of the input 
to the upper and lower bank of the calcarine sulcus (Jeffreys & Axford, 
1972). Methodologically, the C1 component is usually elicited by 
presenting probe stimuli with a high spatial frequency (for example, a 
checkerboard pattern or a large number of small horizontal lines) in the 
periphery of the upper- or lower visual field.   
Box 4 - The cruciform model and the C1 component.  
 
Fig. 1. The polarity reversal of the C1 component. Image taken from K. Rauss, Schwartz, 
and Pourtois (2011) 
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 On the one hand, there are researchers and research groups 
arguing that only extrastriate areas like V2, V3, V4 and MT/V5 can be 
modulated by psychological factors like attention (Clark & Hillyard, 
1996; Di Russo, Martinez, & Hillyard, 2003) and not striate areas like 
V1. Clark and Hillyard (1996), for example, observed attentional 
enhancements of ERP components that directly follow the C1 (the P1 
and N1), but not for the C1 itself. Rather, it has been suggested that V1 
activity is only modulated late during visual processing, presumably 
through delayed feedback signals (Boehler et al., 2008; Martinez et al., 
1999; Noesselt et al., 2002). On the other hand, there are also studies 
showing attentional (Rauss, Pourtois, Vuilleumier, & Schwartz, 2012; 
Rauss, Pourtois, Vuilleumier, & Schwartz, 2009) or emotional C1 
modulations (Pourtois, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2004; Rossi 
& Pourtois, 2013; Vanlessen, Rossi, De Raedt, & Pourtois, 2014) . 
 Importantly, some of these past studies demonstrating C1 
modulations did so in task contexts that very likely featured 
concomitant differences in pupil size. Especially those with a mood 
manipulation or attentional load manipulation on the block level will 
have likely showed sustained increased pupil dilation because of effects 
of emotional arousal and mental effort. Also studies with attentional or 
emotional manipulations on the trial level, in which the C1-elicting 
probe was only presented after 400 or 500 ms (i.e. the time the pupil 
needs to response), might have featured differences in pupil size. 
However, some of the reported studies did not allow for differences in 
pupil size (Bayer et al., 2017; Kelly, Gomez-Ramirez, & Foxe, 2008; 
Pourtois et al., 2004), so it would be inappropriate to argue that pupil 
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size always acts as a confound in this field of research.    
 To summarize this section, there is an on-going debate on whether 
psychological factors like attention and emotion can influence the initial 
feedforward response in primary visual cortex. One factor that has often 
been overlooked is pupil size, which might play a role in explaining at 
least some of the effects. 
OUTLINE OF THIS DISSERTATION 
Now we have introduced the most important concepts and 
theoretical frameworks related to early sensory processing, attention, 
cognitive control and cognition-related pupil dilation and tried to situate 
the work in this dissertation within the broad field of cognitive 
neuroscience, it is time to introduce the specific research questions we 
addressed in the following five chapters.  
In chapter 1, we focus on the underlying attentional mechanisms 
of the conflict adaptation effect. As explained earlier in this 
introduction, cognitive control accounts like the conflict monitoring 
theory (Botvinick et al., 2001) predict transient, conflict-induced 
modulations of selective attention, reducing congruency effects on the 
next trial. Previous research has often used fMRI to study this question, 
showing modulations in prefrontal structures, motor areas and sensory 
areas by looking at specialized sensory regions (e.g. Egner & Hirsch, 
2005). However, fMRI has a very low temporal resolution, whereas for 
EEG the possibility exists that the simultaneous enhancement of 
relevant and suppression of irrelevant information in a cognitive control 
task might camouflage each other. Therefore, we adopted the paradigm 
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of Appelbaum, Boehler, Won, Davis, and Woldorff (2012) in which 
irrelevant information (e.g. the color word) was presented 200 ms 
before, at the same time or 200 ms after the presentation of the relevant 
information (e.g. the ink color). The rationale was that this 200 ms time 
window would allow for an in-depth analysis of "isolated" markers of 
sensory processing or attention to the relevant or irrelevant stimulus 
dimension. We started with two experiments using the Stroop task, but 
ultimately extended our approach also to the Flanker task. Whereas 
Stroop conflict could involve both spatial and non-spatial attentional 
operations, Flanker conflict likely mostly relies on spatial attention 
(Luck & Kappenman, 2012) and previous research had already reported 
P1 (Scerif, Worden, Davidson, Seiger, & Casey, 2006) and N1 (Suzuki & 
Shinoda, 2015) modulations in the Flanker task. For each type of 
conflict task, we had one experiment in which the irrelevant stimulus 
dimension (word color in the Stroop task or distractor arrows in the 
Flanker task) was randomly presented before, after, or simultaneous 
with the relevant stimulus (ink color or target arrow), and one 
experiment in which the irrelevant information was always presented 
before the relevant stimulus. This set of experiments developed 
sequentially based on the fact that we had anticipated finding evidence 
for attentional adjustments related to conflict adaptation in our first 
experiment, but failed to do so for most experiments, hence prompting 
us to run a set of four experiments combining the factors of task (Stroop 
vs. Flanker) and temporal predictability. We expected that after an 
incongruent trial less attention would be deployed to the irrelevant 
stimulus dimension when presented shortly before the relevant 
dimension, whereas more attention would be deployed in case the 
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relevant dimension was presented before the irrelevant dimension, 
since previous fMRI studies found evidence for both mechanisms (Egner 
& Hirsch, 2005; King, Korb, von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2010; Polk, 
Drake, Jonides, Smith, & Smith, 2008). 
Although chapter 2 is not a follow-up on the work in chapter 1 
and might seem unrelated at first sight, it was inspired by it 
nonetheless, and was conducted partly in parallel. As explained earlier 
on, cognition-related pupil dilation is also observed in conflict tasks 
(Laeng et al., 2011) and therefore we hypothesized that a dilated pupil 
on trial n-1 could still play a role in the processing of trial n and hence 
affect control adjustments like the conflict adaption effect. But in order 
to study this potential effect in a more systematic way, we decided to 
focus on low-level visual processing first and design an experiment to 
study the effect of pupil size on the initial feedforward response without 
the involvement of higher-order cognition. As far as we know, the rather 
basic question whether pupil size could have an effect on feedforward 
V1 activity or not has never been addressed before. Methodologically, 
we experimentally manipulated pupil size using validated procedures 
that do not involve differences in luminance or other basic sensory 
confounds. Specifically, in a first experiment, we used the 
aforementioned procedure of Binda, Pereverzeva, and Murray (2013) in 
which participants have to covertly attend either a black or white disk 
(i.e. central fixation), which has been shown to dilate and constrict the 
pupils. In a second experiment, we used visual illusions of perceived 
brightness in order to evoke pupil dilation and constriction (Laeng & 
Endestad, 2012). In both experiments, we presented a typical C1-
eliciting probe (Rossi & Pourtois, 2012) after some delay to allow for the 
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pupil to change size. Previewing the findings we will present further on 
in this dissertation, we found that pupil size can indeed directly affect 
the initial feedforward response in human primary visual cortex (V1), as 
reflected by a decreased C1 response. 
In chapter 3, we tried to replicate this effect and to distinguish it 
further from possible alternative explanations related to the attentional 
manipulation (attending a dark or bright stimulus in the lateral 
periphery) that triggered the pupil-size change. We did this by making 
use of the slow response characteristic of the pupil by presenting a C1-
eliciting probe stimulus at a time point that briefly preceded the pupil 
response (T1) and a time point that followed it (T2). In addition, we 
report EEG alpha-power lateralization as an index for attentional 
lateralization in order to demonstrate that the effect we found was 
driven by mere pupil size and not by alternative explanations like 
differential attentional deployment.  
Chapter 4 returns to the cognitive control topic and describes 
another combined EEG/eyetracking study in which we report an 
experiment on sustained or proactive reward effects and their 
interaction with pupil dilation and attention-related ERP components. 
As previously mentioned, sustained reward effects have been found to 
increase task performance and enhance control-related brain activity, in 
particular in prefrontal cortex in various task domains (e.g. Jimura et 
al., 2010). In this study, we wanted to extend these findings of sustained 
effects of rewarded contexts to conflict processing in a typical cognitive-
control task like the Eriksen Flanker task. This had been done before in 
an fMRI context in which a context of potential gain was compared with 
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a context of potential loss (Paschke et al., 2015), but just like in chapter 
1, we wanted to take advantage of the high temporal resolution of EEG 
and discriminate between the relevant and irrelevant stimulus 
dimensions (Appelbaum et al., 2012). Participants performed a four-
choice Flanker task in which they received monetary rewards for fast 
and accurate performance in half of the blocks (i.e. rewarded blocks or 
rewarded context). We hypothesized that in a reward-related context, 
less attention would be allocated to the distracter arrows, reflected by a 
decreased attention-related N1 component time-locked to the distracter. 
In contrast, we expected a larger N1 time-locked to the target arrow in 
the reward context, as far as this could be measured given the overlap of 
the preceding distracter processing. With respect to pupil dilation, we 
expected that a rewarded context should be associated with a sustained 
increase in pupil dilation, reflected in baseline pupil size. Another 
hypothesis was that the difference in pupil size between rewarded and 
non-rewarded blocks could be a marker of the amount of mental effort 
or attentional allocation, predicting the success of attentional inhibition 
and potentially the size of the N1 component. 
Chapter 5 is the only non-empirical chapter in this dissertation 
and can be both considered a review and opinion paper. In this chapter, 
we first give an overview of how higher-order cognitive processes like 
attention, control and emotion have an effect on the size of the pupil. 
Next, we refer to some studies showing effects of mere pupil dilation on 
perceptual processes (including our own work described in chapter 2 
and 5) and try to make the point that pupil dilation can play a direct 
and possibly functional role in human cognition. We do this by also 
incorporating studies from the field of optics and ophthalmology and 
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argue that the aforementioned sensitive-acuity trade-off might play a 
larger role than previously appreciated. 
In the final chapter of this dissertation, the General Discussion, 
we will give a brief overview of the results and try to relate them to each 
other. Moreover, we will try to situate the findings within the existing 
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE ROLE OF TEMPORAL PREDICTABILITY FOR 
EARLY ATTENTIONAL ADJUSTMENTS AFTER 
CONFLICT1 
A frequently-studied phenomenon in cognitive control research is conflict 
adaptation, or the finding that congruency effects are smaller after 
incongruent trials. Prominent accounts suggest that this adaptation 
effect can be explained by transient conflict-induced modulations of 
selective attention, reducing congruency effects on the next trial. In the 
present study, we investigated these possible attentional modulations in 
four experiments using the Stroop and Flanker tasks, dissociating 
possible enhancements of task-relevant information from suppression of 
task-irrelevant information by varying when this information was 
presented. In two experiments, the irrelevant stimulus information was 
randomly presented shortly before, at the same time, or briefly after the 
presentation of the relevant dimension. In the other two, irrelevant 
information was always presented first, making this aspect fully 
predictable. Despite the central role that attentional adjustments play in 
theoretical accounts of conflict adaption, we only found evidence for such 
processes in one of the four experiments. Specifically, we found a 
modulation of the attention-related posterior N1 event-related potential 
component that was consistent with paying less attention to the 
irrelevant information after incongruent trials. This was accompanied 
by increased inter-trial mid-frontal theta power and a theta-power 
conflict adaptation effect. We interpret these results as evidence for an 
adaptive mechanism based on relative attentional inhibition. 
Importantly, this mechanism only clearly seems to be implemented in a 
very specific context of high temporal predictability, and only in the 
Flanker task.  
                                                     
1 Bombeke, K., Langford, Z. D., Notebaert, W., & Boehler, C. N. (2017). The role 
of temporal predictability for early attentional adjustments after conflict. 
PlosOne, 12(4). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive control involves the ability to detect conflicting cues in 
the environment and to adjust our information processing system in 
order to optimize behavioral responses. These control adjustments 
invoked by conflict have sparked a lot of scientific interest (for a review, 
see Duthoo, Abrahamse, Braem, Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014b; Egner, 
2007). The “Gratton effect”, or conflict adaptation effect, is the hallmark 
of such research, describing the phenomenon that conflict effects are 
attenuated after incongruent trials (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). 
Despite alternative accounts (Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004; Mayr, Awh, 
& Laurey, 2003), the traditionally most accepted explanation for this 
effect comes from the  model of Botvinick and colleagues (Botvinick, 
Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), explaining it through a 
monitoring operation wherein the detection of conflict triggers a 
transient increase in selective attention, reducing the amount of conflict 
experienced in the next trial (Botvinick et al., 2001; Kerns et al., 2004; 
Notebaert & Verguts, 2006; Ullsperger, Bylsma, & Botvinick, 2005). 
Although there has been an abundance of studies investigating 
psychological or pathology-related modulations of conflict adaptation 
effects (Clawson, Clayson, South, & Larson, 2011; Larson, Forrer, & 
Clayson, 2011), some procedural aspects remain unclear, especially 
regarding the role of sensory modulations as they unfold rapidly in 
time. Previous research on this question has predominantly used fMRI, 
revealing modulations in prefrontal control structures (Kerns et al., 
2004; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000), which trigger 
subsequent reductions in motor readiness (Danielmeier, Eichele, 
Forstmann, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011; King, Korb, von Cramon, 
& Ullsperger, 2010; Marco-Pallares, Camara, Munte, & Rodriguez-
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Fornells, 2008)  and/or modulations of sensory processing (Danielmeier 
et al., 2011; Egner & Hirsch, 2005; King et al., 2010). When 
investigating the role of sensory adjustments, anatomical distinctions 
between specialized sensory processing modules (e.g. faces, Danielmeier 
et al., 2011; Egner & Hirsch, 2005; King et al., 2010; Marco-Pallares et 
al., 2008; Polk, Drake, Jonides, Smith, & Smith, 2008) are usually used. 
Some of these studies have related this adaptation effect to enhanced 
processing of the relevant stimulus dimension on n+1 trials (Egner & 
Hirsch, 2005), whereas others also found inhibition of irrelevant stimuli 
(Polk et al., 2008).  
 However, fMRI studies are limited by their temporal resolution 
and EEG studies have not addressed this question to the same extent. 
Among the few studies to date, Scerif et al. (Scerif, Worden, Davidson, 
Seiger, & Casey, 2006) showed a selective enhancement of the visual P1 
component for incongruent trials when preceded by incongruent trials 
in a flanker task with simultaneously presented distractor and target 
arrows. Interestingly, for no-target flanker trials following incongruent 
trials, they observed a smaller P1 component. Assuming that conflict 
detection leads to increased suppression of flanker arrows, this smaller 
P1 component could be explained as more focused spatial attention. 
Later, Suzuki and Shinoda (Suzuki & Shinoda, 2015) observed 
decreased N1 amplitudes for Flanker trials preceded by incongruent 
stimuli compared to trials preceded by congruent stimuli. This decrease 
in attentional allocation was correlated with a larger increase in frontal 
alpha activity, most likely related to proactive frontal control 
mechanisms. Taken together, these two studies seem to be in line with 
attentional adjustments after conflict. Yet, these are the only two 
human EEG studies we are aware of that explicitly look at attentional 
mechanisms in a sequential conflict-adaptation context, which is 
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surprising given their theoretical prominence. Moreover, their results 
differ on the level of which ERP component is affected, and only one of 
them tried to tap into the specificity of enhancement of relevant vs. 
suppression of irrelevant information.  
 A possible pitfall when studying post-conflict adjustments is the 
possibility of simultaneous enhancement of relevant and suppression of 
irrelevant information, which might camouflage each other in the scalp 
EEG using standard paradigms not optimized for such distinctions. 
Here, we further investigate the nature of attentional modulations 
during conflict adaptation in a serial reaction time context with a 
paradigm that has generally been shown to index attentional allocation 
separately to the relevant and irrelevant stimulus dimension of a 
conflicting stimulus. The present paradigm was derived from a study 
employing Stroop stimuli wherein the word and the color component 
were presented with different stimulus-onset asynchronies (SOAs), 
varying between -200 ms (word first) to +200 ms (color first) 
(Appelbaum, Boehler, Won, Davis, & Woldorff, 2012). This study 
compared blocks where this temporal arrangement was constant versus 
random, which revealed dissociations for behavioral and EEG markers 
of conflict. More importantly for the present work, the comparison of the 
EEG data for the -200 ms condition between these blocks also yielded 
evidence for an attentional modulation that preceded the presentation 
of the relevant stimulus dimension, yielding a smaller negativity in the 
constant-SOA blocks starting approximately 150 ms after the onset of 
this stimulus dimension. This modulation, due to timing and spatial 
distribution, was related to a selection negativity (SN; Hillyard & Anllo-
Vento, 1998) and was thus interpreted as indexing the degree to which 
attention was deployed to the word component. Importantly, these data 
suggest that with temporal predictability, participants are better at 
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activating temporary selective filters in line with temporal orienting 
ideas (e.g. Nobre, 2001).  
  In the present study, we hypothesized that a similar posterior 
modulation could also be present as a neural marker of attentional 
adjustments in the conflict adaptation effect in conditions with temporal 
predictability (i.e., when the irrelevant information was systematically 
presented before the relevant information). This prediction fits with 
recent proactive accounts of conflict adaptation. Duthoo et al. (Duthoo, 
Abrahamse, Braem, & Notebaert, 2014) for instance demonstrated that 
participants’ predictions about the upcoming (in)congruency influence 
conflict adaptation. However, Jiménez and Méndez (Jimenez & Mendez, 
2013, 2014) came to a different conclusion, finding that conflict 
adaptation mostly depends on the average of experienced conflict in 
previous trials and not on the participants' expectancies.   
 Taken together our goals of studying neural attentional markers 
of conflict adaptation that can be both driven by reactive and proactive 
control processes, we conducted four experiments with different groups 
of participants. Based on Appelbaum et al. (Appelbaum et al., 2012), we 
started with two experiments using the Stroop task, but ultimately 
extended our approach also to the Flanker task, given the study of 
Scerif et al. (Scerif et al., 2006) and Suzuki and Shinoda (Suzuki & 
Shinoda, 2015) with a P1 and N1 modulation in the Flanker task, 
respectively. For each type of conflict task, we had one experiment in 
which the irrelevant stimulus dimension (word color in the Stroop task 
or distractor arrows in the Flanker task) was randomly presented 
before, after, or simultaneous with the relevant stimulus (ink color or 
target arrow), and one experiment in which the irrelevant information 
was always presented before the relevant stimulus. This set of 
experiments developed sequentially based on the fact that we had 
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anticipated finding evidence for attentional adjustments related to 
conflict adaptation in our first experiment, but failed to do so for most 
experiments, hence prompting us to run a set of four experiments 
combining the factors of task (Stroop vs. Flanker) and temporal 
predictability. Furthermore, we planned to explore the context of 
possible attentional modulations by looking at oscillatory activity before 
and after the second trial in a conflict adaption sequence, in order to 
relate to earlier work showing oscillatory power modulations between 
the two trials (Carp & Compton, 2009; Compton, Arnstein, Freedman, 
Dainer-Best, & Liss, 2011; Compton, Huber, Levinson, & Zheutlin, 
2012; Marco-Pallares et al., 2008) and conflict-related frontal 
modulations in consecutive trials (Clayson & Larson, 2011a, 2011b; 
Larson, Clayson, & Baldwin, 2012; Larson, Kaufman, & Perlstein, 
2009).   
METHOD 
Given the similarities between the four experiments with respect 
to design, acquisition and analysis, the sections below describe common 
aspects while explicitly pointing out differences.   
Participants 
For each experiment, participants (experiment 1: n = 23, 9 ♂, 14 
♀; experiment 2: n = 23, 10 ♂, 13 ♀; experiment 3: n = 22, 8 ♂, 14 ♀; 
experiment 4: n = 22, 10 ♂, 12 ♀, ranging between 18-26 years) were 
selected on the basis of a prescreening questionnaire via the 
Experimetrix scheduling system (https://experimetrix2.com/rug/). In 
these questionnaires, people only had to indicate their age, gender, 
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handedness and if they had abnormal vision or any neurological 
disorders. Every interested candidate below 30 years old without 
abnormal vision (corrected vision was allowed) and neurological 
disorders would be invited to subscribe for the experiment via the 
scheduling system. Before completing the experiment, participants 
signed an informed consent in which they were informed about their 
right to stop the experiment whenever they wanted. The procedures 
were approved by the ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences of Ghent University and participants received 
25€ for a session that lasted two hours. 
Stimuli 
In experiment 1 and 2, the paradigm was based on Appelbaum et 
al. (Appelbaum et al., 2012). In their variant of the Stroop task, red-, 
green-, blue- and yellow-colored rectangular boxes overlaid with the 
color-words "RED","GREEN","BLUE" or "YELLOW" were presented on 
a gray background with a small fixation dot at the center of the screen. 
The first independent variable was congruency, so trials could be either 
congruent (e.g., RED on a red box) or incongruent (e.g., RED on a blue 
box). In each block, half of the trials were congruent (four different 
pairings) and half of the trials were incongruent (twelve possible 
pairings, distributed evenly). The second independent variable was the 
SOA between the relevant and irrelevant information. In experiment 1, 
irrelevant information was presented either 200 ms before, at the same 
or 200 ms after the presentation of the relevant information 
("unpredictable timing"). In experiment 2, irrelevant word information 
was always presented 200 ms before the relevant color information 
("predictable timing"). Experiments 3 and 4 used a variant of the 
Flanker task with arrows pointing in four different directions (left up, 
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left down, right up, right down). White arrows were presented on a gray 
background with a small fixation dot at the center of the screen. Other 
than that, everything was exactly the same as in experiment 1 and 2, 
respectively, with experiment 3 using the temporal arrangement of 
experiment 1 and experiment 4 that of experiment 2. 
Procedure and design 
In experiment 1 and 2 (the Stroop experiments), participants were 
instructed to manually indicate the ink color of the rectangular box as 
fast and accurate as possible, while in experiment 3 and 4 (the Flanker 
experiments) they were instructed to respond to the direction of the 
target arrow (Fig 1). In the experiments with predictable timing, 
participants knew that the irrelevant word or distracting arrows would 
be presented first, while they could not foresee this in the experiments 
with unpredictable timing. They had to respond by manually pressing 
one of four keys on the keyboard corresponding to four possible colors or 
four different arrow directions and they had some time to memorize this 
response mapping before the start of the experimental phase. Responses 
were registered until 1300 ms after stimulus onset and there was a 
jittered inter-trial interval ranging from 900 to 1200 ms. Participants 
completed 16 pseudo-randomized blocks of 72 trials in experiment 1 and 
3 and 10 blocks with the same number of trials in experiment 2 and 4. 
Every two blocks, participant could take a break. Since we were 
interested in sequential effects, we chose to have a completely 
randomized sequence of trials. As a consequence, the proportion of 
congruent trials preceded by congruent trials (CC), incongruent trials 
preceded by congruent trials (CI), congruent trials preceded by 
incongruent trials (IC) and incongruent trials preceded by incongruent 
trials (II) was always 25%, resulting in 288 trials per cell in experiment 
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1 and 3 (irrelevant-first, simultaneous and relevant first trials) and 180 
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Fig 1. Design of the four experiments. In the Stroop experiments 
(experiments 1 and 2), participants were instructed to manually indicate the ink 
color of the rectangular box as fast and accurate as possible, while in the 
Flanker experiments (experiments 3 and 4) they were instructed to respond to 
the direction of the target arrow. In the experiments with unpredictable design, 
irrelevant information could be presented 200 ms before, 200 ms after or 
simultaneous with the relevant information, while the experiments with 
predictable design, irrelevant information was always presented first (again by 
200 ms). 
Behavioral data acquisition and analysis 
For RT analyses, the first trial of each block and incorrect or 
missed responses on trial n and n-1 were excluded and an outlier 
rejection criterion of 2 SDs was applied. RT and error rates were 
analyzed with repeated-measures ANOVAs (rANOVAs), with factors 
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SOA (3 levels), previous congruency (2 levels) and current congruency (2 
levels) in experiment 1 and 3, and factors  previous and current 
congruency (each 2 levels) in experiment 2 and 4. In case of significant 
interactions in experiment 1 and 3, additional rANOVAs and paired 
samples t-tests were performed on the conflict adaptation effect (i.e. the 
interaction between previous and current congruency) per SOA 
condition. The significance threshold was set to a p-value of .05 and, 
when applicable, adjusted using the Greenhouse–Geisser correction for 
non-sphericity. Additional outlier removal procedures and/or participant 
exclusions are described per experiment. 
EEG acquisition, preprocessing and analysis 
The EEG was acquired with a Biosemi ActiveTwo measurement 
system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands), using 64 Ag-AgCl scalp 
electrodes attached to a standard international 10-20 system cap. Six 
additional external electrodes were attached to the head: left and right 
mastoids, which were used for later offline re-referencing, a bilateral 
electro-oculogram (EOG) pair next to the outer canti of the eyes to 
measure horizontal eye-movements and two electrodes above and below 
the left eye to measure vertical eye movements. Signals were amplified 
and digitized with a sampling rate of 512 Hz. Next, EEG data was 
processed using EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and the ERPLAB 
plugin (Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014), both MATLAB-based. We used a 
bandpass filter of 0.01-30 Hz on the continuous EEG data. Epochs were 
always time-locked to the onset of the information that came first, 
depending on the condition (irrelevant distractors in irrelevant-first 
condition, both the irrelevant distractors and relevant target in the 
simultaneous condition and the relevant target in the relevant-first 
condition). Just like in the behavioral analyses, only trials with accurate 
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performance on trial N-1 and N were included. Epochs included a 200 
ms pre-stimulus period that was used for baseline correction and lasted 
1000 ms. Trials with drifts larger than -/+ 200 µV were rejected, leading 
to a rejection of 5% of the epochs on average. Next, epochs were 
averaged within and subsequently across participants.  
 To test for evidence for differential attentional processing of the 
stimuli between post-congruent and post-incongruent trials and the 
interaction with different SOA conditions in experiment 1 and 3, we 
probed for task differences in the -200 ms window in the relevant-first, 
simultaneous and irrelevant-first condition (time-locked to the onset of 
the relevant target). The first and third condition provided an 
uninterrupted window for 200 ms, during which no other overlapping 
stimulus response activity would be present. Based on previous 
research on attentional selection (Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998) and the 
study of Appelbaum et al. (Appelbaum et al., 2012), we probed the 
response amplitudes over ROIs comprised of left posterior sensors PO3, 
P3 and P1, and right posterior sensors PO4, P4 and P2. Since all stimuli 
were presented centrally, we did not expect lateralized effects and hence 
decided to collapse across the left and right posterior ROI for plotting 
and analyses purposes. Time windows for measurement were based on 
Appelbaum et al. (Appelbaum et al., 2012) and visual inspection of the 
averaged ERP.  
 In order to probe for theta power modulations, we also performed 
event-related spectral perturbation analyses. Epoched data (from -500 
to 2500 ms) was transformed to the frequency domain using EEGLAB's 
"newtimef" function (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and baseline correction 
was performed using the 500 ms window before the onset of trial n-1 for 
inter-trial analyses and the 500 ms window before trial n for the current 
trial analyses. Fifty frequencies between 1 and 30 Hz were sampled 
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uniformly between -250 and 2250 ms, with 200 sample points in 
between. We considered 4-8 Hz as the theta range and used the average 
across the different frequencies for all statistical analyses. In order to 
measure preparatory activity in the inter-trial interval, we took the 
interval between 500 and 1000 ms after the response as measurement 
window. By doing so, we measured oscillatory activity in the 500 ms 
window before the onset of the next trial (taking temporal jitter into 
account). Based on visual inspection of the average response across 
conditions and its temporal proximity to the onset of the response, we 
chose the 500-600 ms window after stimulus onset in trial n for the 
measurement of the theta power conflict adaptation effect. 
 Amplitudes, latencies and power measurements were statistically 
compared using repeated-measures ANOVAs in experiment 1 and 3 and 
paired samples t-tests in experiment 2 and 4. For selected analyses, we 
also reported Bayes factor in order to indicate how likely the absence of 
an effect was. Current congruency was not included in the analysis, 
because all measured activity in the window from 0 to 200 ms could only 
be related to previous congruency (the congruency status of the current 
trial was not yet determined, since the other dimension only appeared 
after 200 ms). At latencies beyond ∼250 ms, the processing of the second 
stimulus would begin and would overlap and distort the ERP activity 
evoked in response to the first one. 
RESULTS 
Exp 1 - Stroop task with unpredictable timing 
Behavior: reaction time 
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The main effects of SOA and current congruency were significant, 
F(2,44)=64.3, p < .001, r = .86 and F(1, 22) = 221.48, p < .001, r = .95, 
respectively, whereas the main effect of previous congruency was not, 
F(1, 22) = .1, p >.5, r = .06. As expected, trials in which irrelevant 
distracter information preceded the relevant target resulted in the 
fastest response, followed by simultaneous and relevant-first trials and 
participants responded in general faster to congruent trials than to 
incongruent trials. There was a significant interaction between SOA 
and current congruency, F(2,44)= 69.65, p < .001, r = .87, showing that 
the congruency effect on trial n was largest for trials in which the 
distracter preceded the target and smallest for trials in which the target 
preceded the distracter. The interaction between SOA and previous 
congruency did not reach significance, F(2, 44) = 1.27, p >.2, r = .22. An 
overall conflict adaptation effect, as reflected in the interaction between 
previous congruency and current congruency, was not present, 
F(1,22)=.68, p >.5, r = .17.  Importantly, the three-way interaction 
between SOA, previous congruency and current congruency was only 
marginally significant, F(2, 44) = 2.56, p = .09, r = .32. Because we were 
mostly interested in the conflict adaptation effect split out per SOA 
condition, we looked at the interaction between previous and current 
congruency per condition. The conflict adaptation effect was significant 
for trials in which the irrelevant word was presented first, F(1,22) = 
5.40, p < .05, r = .44, so the congruency effect was smaller after 
incongruent trials (99.15 ms) than after congruent trials (113.75 ms). 
Somewhat surprisingly, for trials where the relevant and irrelevant 
dimension were presented at the same time, the conflict adaptation 
effect was not significant, F(1,22) = .51, p > .4, r = .15. Also for the 
condition in which relevant information was presented first, we could 
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not find a significant conflict adaptation effect, F(1,22) = .73, p >.4, r = 
.18 (Fig 2A). 
Behavior: error rate  
On average, participants made an error in 9.23% of the trials. The 
main effects of SOA and current condition were significant, 
F(2,44)=6.26,  p = .004, r = .47 and F(1, 22) = 14.78,  p = .001, r = .63, 
respectively, whereas the main effect of previous congruency was not, 
F(1, 22) = 1.17,  p = .29, r = .23. Participants made the most errors in 
trials where the irrelevant information was presented first (8.65%), 
compared to trials with simultaneous (7.59%) and relevant first (6.59%) 
presentation. There was a significant interaction between SOA and 
current congruency, F(2,44)= 5.18,  p = .01, r = .44, showing that the 
congruency effect on trial n was largest for trials in which the distracter 
preceded the target and smallest for trials in which the target preceded 
the distracter,  but no interaction between SOA and previous 
congruency, F(2, 44) = .03,  p = .97, r = .03. An overall conflict 
adaptation effect, as reflected in the interaction between previous 
congruency and current congruency, was not present, F(1,22)=.71,  p = 
.41, r = .18.  Also the three-way interaction between SOA, previous 
congruency and current congruency did not reach significance, F(2, 44) 
= 2.04, p = .14, r = .29.   
ERPs 
 A repeated-measures ANOVA with factors previous congruency 
and current SOA performed over a 50-ms window between 150 and 200 
ms post-stimulus onset for the collapsed posterior ROIs revealed no 
significant main effects for current SOA and previous congruency, 
F(2,44)=.26, p > .1, r = .11 and F(1,22) = .58, p >.1, r = .16, respectively. 
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Also the interaction between SOA and previous congruency did not 
reach significance, F(2,44) = 1.26, p > .1, r = .23. Therefore, we did not 
look at the isolated effect of previous congruency per SOA condition. 
However, we did calculate inverse Bayes factors (BF01), allowing us to 
report the likelihood of the absence of the effect. The inverse Bayes 
factors for the effect of previous congruency on irrelevant-first (BF01 = 
11.82), simultaneous (BF01 = 3.78)  and relevant-first trials (BF01 = 
4.47) showed 'strong', 'substantial' and 'substantial' evidence for the null 
hypothesis, respectively (Jeffreys, 1998). As can be seen in Fig 2C, there 
was a difference in posterior activity between 25 ms and 75 ms between 
post-congruent and post-incongruent trials for irrelevant-first trials. 
Since it is highly unlikely that activation differences that early can be 
related to the time-locked event, we interpret this difference as an 
artifact in the grand average. Overall, it seems clear that there was no 
early posterior modulation in trial n related to the congruency of trial n-
1. 
Exp 2 - Stroop task with predictable timing 
Behavior: reaction time 
There was no main effect of previous congruency, F(1,22) = 1.77, p 
= .20, r = .27,  but a highly significant main effect of current congruency, 
F(1,22) = 236.33, p < .001, r = .96 (II trials= 622.17 ms; IC trials = 
532.72 ms; CC trials = 516.06 ms; CI trials = 621.72 ms).  Also the 
interaction between previous congruency and current congruency, 
F(1,22) = 5.09, p = .03, r = .42, was significant, indicating the presence 
of a behavioral conflict adaptation effect (Fig 2B). The congruency effect 
was smaller after incongruent trials (89 ms) than after congruent trials 
(105 ms).  
 
CHAPTER 2      69 
Behavior: error rate 
On average, participants made an error in 11.24 % of the trials. 
We both found a main effect of previous congruency and current 
congruency, F(1,22) = 9.07, p = .01, r = .54, and F(1,22) = 4.46, p = .05, r 
= .41, respectively (II trials=13.82%; IC trials = 6.91%; CC trials = 
8.52%; CI trials = 15.70%).   The interaction between previous 
congruency and current congruency was not significant, F(1,22) = .07, p 
= .80, r = .05, indicating the absence of an conflict adaptation effect for 
the error rates.  
ERPs 
T-tests performed over the averaged 50 ms window between 150 
and 200 ms post-stimulus onset for the collapsed posterior ROIs 
revealed no significant differences between post-congruent (M = -.90, SD 
= 3.03) and post-incongruent trials (M = -.73, SD = 2.89), t(22)= -0.88, p 
= .39. Just like in the unpredictable design, we could not observe a 
posterior attentional modulation as neural marker of conflict adaptation 
for any of the conditions (Fig 2D). An inverse Bayes factor of BF01 = 2 
supported 'anecdotal' evidence in favor of the null hypothesis.    
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Fig 2. Results of experiment 1&2 - Stroop experiments with predictable 
and unpredictable timing. (A)(B) Mean reaction times per SOA condition 
(irrelevant-first, simultaneous and relevant-first in experiment 1, (A); irrelevant-
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first in experiment 2, (B)) for current congruent (dark grey) and incongruent 
(light grey) trials as a function of the congruency level of the previous trial in the 
Stroop experiments (error bars represent 1 standard deviation around the 
mean). (C)(D) Early attentional ERP amplitudes (µV) per SOA condition as a 
function of the congruency level of the previous trial in the Stroop experiments 
with unpredictable (C) and predictable (D) timing. Measurements were 
performed for averaged activity over a 50-ms window between 150 and 200 ms 
post-stimulus onset for the collapsed posterior ROIs, indicated in red (left 
posterior sensors PO3, P3 and P1, and right posterior sensors PO4, P4 and P2). 
The irrelevant-first and relevant-first conditions provided an uninterrupted 
window for 200 ms, during which no other overlapping stimulus response 
activity would be present. The results show no significant ERP modulations by 
previous congruency. 
Exp 3 - Flanker task with unpredictable timing 
Behavior: reaction time 
The main effects of SOA and current congruency were significant, 
F(1.36,29.91)=134.51, p < .001, r = .93 and F(1, 21) = 554.01, p < .001, r 
= .98, respectively, whereas the main effect of previous congruency was 
not, F(1, 21) = .1, p >.3, r = .20. Participants responded faster to 
irrelevant-first trials compared to simultaneous and relevant-first 
trials. There was a significant interaction between SOA and current 
congruency, F(1.49,32.80)= 221.82, p < .001, r = .95, showing that the 
congruency effect on trial n was largest for trials in which the distracter 
preceded the target and smallest for trials in which the target preceded 
the distracter. The interaction between SOA and previous congruency 
did not reach significance, F(2, 42) = 1.65, p >.2, r = .26. An overall 
conflict adaptation effect, as reflected in the interaction between 
previous congruency and current congruency, was present, 
F(1,21)=.7.85, p < .05, r = .51. Importantly, the three-way interaction 
 
CHAPTER 2      72 
between SOA, previous congruency and current congruency was highly 
significant, F(1, 42) = 11.23, p < .001, r = .58. The conflict adaptation 
effect was significant for trials in which the irrelevant word was 
presented first, F(1,21) = 20.61, p < .001, r = .7: the congruency effect 
was smaller after incongruent trials (86 ms) than after congruent trials 
(101 ms). For trials where the relevant and irrelevant dimension were 
presented at the same time, the conflict adaptation effect was not 
significant, F(1,21) = 2.50, p >.1, r = .32. Also for the condition in which 
relevant information was presented first, we could not find a significant 
conflict adaptation effect, F(1,21) = 1.15, p >.2, r = .22 (Fig 3A a). 
Behavior: error rate  
On average, participants made an error in 5.18% of the trials.  The 
main effects of SOA, current condition and previous condition were 
significant, F(2,42)= 25, p < .001, r = .73, F(1, 21) = 40.89, p < .001, r = 
.81 and F(1,21) = 9.89, p = .005, r = .56, respectively. Participants again 
made the most errors in trials where the irrelevant information was 
presented first (8.06%), compared to trials with simultaneous (3.84%) 
and relevant first (3.63%) presentation. There was a significant 
interaction between SOA and current congruency, F(1.16,25.4)= 30.43, p 
< .001, r = .76, indicating that the congruency effect on trial n was 
largest for distracter-first trials, followed by target-first and 
simultaneous trials. The interaction between SOA and previous 
congruency did not reach significance, F(2, 42) = 2.73, p = .08, r = .33. 
An overall conflict adaptation effect, as reflected in the interaction 
between previous congruency and current congruency, was present, 
F(1,21) = 7.66, p = .01, r = .51.  Also the three-way interaction between 
SOA, previous congruency and current congruency did reach 
significance, F(1.50, 33.02) = 4.16, p = .04, r = .40. Splitting out this 
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conflict adaptation effect for the different SOA conditions resulted in a 
significant effect for trials in which the irrelevant word was presented 
first, F(1,21) = 9.24, p = .006, r = .54: the congruency effect was smaller 
after incongruent trials (10.74% errors) than after congruent trials 
(15.17% errors). For trials in which the relevant and irrelevant 
dimension were presented at the same time, the conflict adaptation 
effect was not significant, F(1,21) = .21, p = .65, r = .1. Also for the 
condition in which relevant information was presented first, we did not 
observe a significant conflict adaptation effect, F(1,21) = .28, p = .60, r = 
.11. 
ERPs  
A repeated-measures ANOVA with factors previous congruency 
and current SOA performed over the averaged 50 ms window between 
150 and 200 ms post-stimulus onset for the collapsed posterior ROIs 
revealed a significant main effect for current SOA, but not for previous 
congruency, F(2,42)=36.7, p < .001, r = .80 and F(1,21) = .43, p > .5, r = 
.14, respectively. The main effect of current SOA showed the largest 
ERP response for trials in which the distracter preceded the target, 
followed by simultaneous and target-first trials. The interaction 
between SOA and previous congruency did not reach significance, 
F(2,42) = .06, p > .5, r = .05 (Fig 3C). The inverse Bayes factors for the 
effect of previous congruency on irrelevant-first (BF01 = 11.82), 
simultaneous (BF01 = 3.78)  and relevant-first trials (BF01 = 4.47) all 
indicated 'substantial' evidence for the null hypothesis in all three 
conditions (Jeffreys, 1998). Visual inspection of the stimulus-locked 
ERP seems to suggest a P1 modulation in the irrelevant-first condition. 
However, when statistically comparing the average amplitude between 
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100 and 150 ms in this condition only, a paired samples t-test showed 
this modulation was not significant, t(21) = 1.32, p >.2. 
 
Exp 4 - Flanker task with predictable timing 
Behavior: reaction time 
There was a main effect of previous congruency, F(1,21) = 15.28, p 
< .001, r = .64 and current congruency, F(1,21) = 165.55, p < .001, r = 
.94. Also the interaction between previous congruency and current 
congruency was highly significant, F(1,21) = 56.234, p < .001, r = .85, 
indicating the presence of a behavioral conflict adaptation effect (Fig 
3B). The congruency effect was consistently smaller after incongruent 
trials (75 ms) than after congruent trials (102 ms)( Fig 3B)   
Behavior: error rate 
On average, participants made an error in 12.95% of the trials, 
and there were significant main effects of previous congruency and 
current congruency, F(1,21) = 15.93, p = .001, r = .65, and F(1,21) = 
20.49, p < .001, r = .70, respectively (II trials=18.91%; IC trials = 12.35 
%; CC trials = 5.22%; CI trials = 15.30%).  Also the interaction 
between previous congruency and current congruency was significant, 
F(1,21) = 5.20, p = .03, r = .44, indicating the presence of a conflict 
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ERPs 
A paired samples t-test performed over a 50 ms window between 
150 and 200 ms post-stimulus onset for the collapsed posterior ROIs 
revealed a significant difference between post-congruent (M = -3.09, SD 
= 2.97) and post-incongruent trials (M = -2.66, SD = 2.89), t(21)=-3.163, 
p < .01, indicating a decrease in negative posterior activity after trials 
with conflict. Based on timing and topography, we interpret this 
negative-going component as a visual N1 component (Fig 3D). The 
inverse Bayes factor (BF01 = .05) for the effect of previous congruency 
in this experiment had a value below 1, providing 'strong' evidence in 
favor of the alternative hypothesis (i.e. in favor of the modulation).   
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Fig 3. Results of experiment 3&4 - Flanker experiments with predictable 
and unpredictable timing. (A)(B) Mean reaction times per SOA condition 
(irrelevant-first, simultaneous and relevant-first in experiment 1, (A); irrelevant-
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first in experiment 2, (B)) for current congruent (dark grey) and incongruent 
(light grey) trials as a function of the congruency level of the previous trial in the 
Flanker experiments (error bars represent 1 standard deviation around the 
mean). (C)(D) Early attentional ERP component amplitudes (µV) per SOA 
condition as a function of the congruency level of the previous trial in the 
Flanker experiments with unpredictable (C) and predictable (D) timing. 
Measurements were performed for averaged activity over a 50-ms window 
between 150 and 200 ms post-stimulus onset for the collapsed posterior ROIs, 
indicated in red (left posterior sensors PO3, P3 and P1, and right posterior 
sensors PO4, P4 and P2). The irrelevant-first and relevant-first conditions 
provided an uninterrupted window for 200 ms, during which no other 
overlapping stimulus response activity would be present. Only the Flanker task 
with a predictable irrelevant-first temporal arrangement showed a significant 
posterior modulation reflecting a decreased negativity starting around 150 ms, 
likely representing decreased early attentional processing. 
Time-frequency decompositions: theta power  
Because we found evidence for an attentional involvement in 
conflict adaptation in the Flanker task with predictable design, we did a 
time-frequency decomposition on this data to study oscillatory activity 
preceding and following this attentional modulation, and also provide 
this data for the random Flanker task for reference. We focused on 
these two experiments for the sake of simplicity, and because 
corresponding exploratory analyses for both Stroop experiments did not 
reveal a consistent result pattern.    
 Many studies have found that increased oscillatory activity in the 
theta range (4-8 Hz), measured over fronto-midline scalp electrodes, 
reflects increased executive functioning during inhibitory processes 
(Brier et al., 2010; Kirmizi-Alsan et al., 2006; Kovacevic et al., 2012; 
Tang, Hu, & Chen, 2013). With respect to conflict adaptation, some 
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researchers found smaller mid-frontal theta power congruency effects 
after incongruent trials compared to congruent trials (Pastotter, 
Dreisbach, & Bauml, 2013), whereas others did not (Cohen & 
Cavanagh, 2011). Moreover, there is some evidence that higher parietal 
theta power during the inter-trial interval after incongruent trials can 
be interpreted as proactive adjustments of attentional control (Pastotter 
et al., 2013). First, we analyzed theta power in the response-stimulus 
interval after trial N-1, i.e. before conflict adaptation occurs. A two-
tailed paired samples t-test performed on mid-frontal theta power 
measurements over a 500 ms window between 500 and 1000 ms after 
the response on trial N-1 (measured at Fz) revealed a highly significant 
difference between post-congruent (M = -0.73, SD = 1.73) and post-
incongruent response-stimulus intervals or RSIs (M = .34, SD = 1.32), 
t(21)=-2.90, p = .008. On average, theta power increased significantly 
more after incongruent trials than after congruent trials. Next, we 
looked at conflict-related theta power in the current trial (Fig 4). A 
repeated-measures ANOVA with factors previous congruency and 
current congruency performed over a 100-ms window between 500 and 
600 ms after the onset of the irrelevant stimulus information (again 
measured at FCz) showed a marginally significant main effect of 
previous congruency, F(1,21) = 3.90, p = .06, r = .40, and a highly 
significant main effect of current congruency, F(1,21) = 21.48, p < .001, r 
= .72. Interestingly, there was a significant interaction between 
previous and current congruency, F(1,21) = 5.76, p = .03, r = .47, 
showing the presence of a conflict adaptation effect for mid-frontal theta 
power (CC trials = .43 dB ; CI trials = 2.21 dB; IC trials = .39 dB; II 
trials = 1.72 dB).  
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Although we could not identify a neural marker of an attentional 
contribution to conflict adaptation in the Flanker experiment with an 
unpredictable design we also probed those data for the above theta 
effects. For comparability, we only analyzed trials in which the 
irrelevant information was presented first (just like in the experiment 
with a predictable design). A two-tailed paired samples t-test performed 
on mid-frontal theta power in the response-stimulus interval after trial 
N-1 between 500 and 1000 ms after the response (measured at Fz) 
showed no significant differences between post-congruent (M = -.89, SD 
= .93) and post-incongruent RSIs (M = -.97, SD = 1.12), t(21)=.22, p = 
.83. With respect to the conflict-related theta power in the current trial, 
a repeated-measures ANOVA with factors previous congruency and 
current congruency performed over a 100-ms window between 500 and 
600 ms after the onset of the irrelevant stimulus information (measured 
at FCz) showed no significant main effect of previous congruency, 
F(1,21) = .01, p = .94, r = 0, but a highly significant main effect of 
current congruency, F(1,21) = 24.93, p < .001, r = .74 (more theta power 
for current incongruent trials). There was no significant interaction 
between previous and current congruency, F(1,21) = .03, p = .87, r = 
.001, showing the lack of a conflict adaptation effect for mid-frontal 
theta power (CC trials = .02 dB ; CI trials = 1.85 dB; IC trials = .05 dB; 
II trials = 1.85 dB). 
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Fig 4. Theta power conflict adaptation effect in experiments 3&4 - Flanker 
experiments with unpredictable and predictable timing. (A)(B) The theta power 
congruency effect (current incongruent trial minus current congruent trial) in 
irrelevant-first trials as a function of the congruency level of the previous trial in 
the Flanker experiments with unpredictable (A) and predictable (B) timing (4-8 
Hz as the theta range, measured at Fz). We found evidence for a theta power 
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DISCUSSION 
 The main objective of this study was to find early attentional EEG 
markers of conflict adaptation by looking at the effect of previous 
conflict on early attentional stimulus processing in an optimized 
paradigm to disentangle specific effects on task-relevant and -irrelevant 
information processing. Such modulations are generally expected based 
on theoretical accounts of cognitive control (for a review, see Duthoo, 
Abrahamse, et al., 2014b; Egner, 2007) , but evidence from techniques 
with high temporal resolution is scarce. Based on this background, we 
expected that after an incongruent trial less attention would be 
deployed to the irrelevant stimulus dimension when presented shortly 
before the relevant dimension, whereas more attention would be 
deployed in case the relevant dimension was presented before the 
irrelevant dimension, since previous fMRI studies found evidence for 
both mechanisms (Egner & Hirsch, 2005; King et al., 2010; Polk et al., 
2008). Yet, we found such modulations only in one out of four 
experiments, namely in a Flanker task with a predictable irrelevant-
first temporal arrangement. More specifically, we observed a posterior 
modulation reflecting a decreased negativity starting around 150 ms 
that could be viewed as a decreased visual N1 component based on 
timing and topography or a (conceptually related) selection negativity 
(Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998). It is important to note that this 
modulation took place before the processing of the relevant dimension 
(i.e. target arrow) began, making it a specific measurement of post-
conflict attentional inhibition of irrelevant information. Moreover, this 
attentional modulation was accompanied by modulations in inter-trial 
mid-frontal theta power and a theta-power conflict adaptation effect. 
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Therefore, we interpret these results as evidence for an adaptive 
mechanism based on relative attentional inhibition.  
 The fact that we found conflict-adaptation-related attentional 
modulations in only one of the four experiments was surprising given 
not just the role they play in theoretical accounts of conflict adaptation 
but also numerous fMRI findings that are consistent with such an 
account (Danielmeier et al., 2011; Egner & Hirsch, 2005; King et al., 
2010; Marco-Pallares et al., 2008; Polk et al., 2008). Given fMRI’s 
limited temporal resolution, however, data with a higher temporal 
resolution would be desirable, but the empirical wealth of fMRI work is 
not equaled in human EEG research, with only two studies explicitly 
looking at attention in conflict adaptation. Scerif et al. (Scerif et al., 
2006) found evidence for a selective enhancement of the visual P1 
component for incongruent trials when preceded by incongruent trials 
in a standard flanker task. More related to this study, when no-target 
flanker trials were preceded by incongruent trials, they observed a 
smaller P1 component, which they explained as more focused spatial 
attention. Similarly, Suzuki and Shinoda (Suzuki & Shinoda, 2015) 
showed decreased N1 amplitudes for regular Flanker trials after 
incongruent trials. The crucial difference between these previous 
studies and our study is our attempt to systematically disentangle 
modulations of task-relevant and task-irrelevant information by 
presenting irrelevant information randomly shortly before, at the same 
time, or briefly after the presentation of the relevant dimension. The 
fact that we only found the expected modulations in a Flanker task with 
a predictable irrelevant-dimension-first arrangement might, in part, 
relate to the fact that it has been suggested that conflict adaptation has 
a prominent proactive component (i.e., reflecting the expected nature of 
the n trial, rather than just reactively to that of the n-1 trial). This 
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would depend on the ability or tendency of predicting the features of the 
subsequent trial (Duthoo, Abrahamse, et al., 2014b; Duthoo, 
Abrahamse, Braem, & Notebaert, 2013), which is less possible in 
experiments with unpredictable timing in the present study. As for the 
experiments with predictable timing, we limited ourselves to the 
irrelevant-first condition for the reason that this set-up yields strong 
conflict adaptation, which relevant- first does not (Appelbaum et al., 
2012; Appelbaum, Meyerhoff, & Woldorff, 2009), and still splits out one 
aspect of stimulus processing, which simultaneous presentations do not. 
If attentional adjustments occur reactively, we hypothesized that such 
mechanisms would also be visible in the task variants with 
unpredictable timing, which, however, we did not observe. Yet, this 
choice obviously limits our ability to diagnose possible effects of 
attentional enhancement of relevant information to the random-SOA 
context, which by itself is rather atypical. Still, our results favor the 
notion that the attentional modulation we found in a predictable context 
probably does not occur in a purely reactive way and cannot easily be 
generalized to other contexts.  
 Interestingly, we did find a significant behavioral conflict 
adaptation effect in all four experiments, but only for trials in which the 
irrelevant flanker distractors or word names were presented 200 ms 
before the relevant target. The fact that there was a significant conflict 
adaptation effect in both experiments with predictable distracter-first 
trials is very much in line with the studies by Weisman and colleagues 
(Weissman, Egner, Hawks, & Link, 2015; Weissman, Jiang, & Egner, 
2014) who also found that conflict adaptation is larger when irrelevant 
distracter information is always presented before the target 
information. With respect to the lack of conflict adaptation in relevant-
first and simultaneous trials, it is possible that participants simply 
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ended up experiencing very little cognitive conflict on trial n, leading to 
an absence of conflict adaptation effects. This would be in line with the 
findings of Appelbaum and colleagues (Appelbaum et al., 2009), showing 
much larger congruency effects for trials in which irrelevant 
information was presented first (but see (Roelofs, 2010) for alternative 
findings). Therefore, the absence of conflict adaptation on the behavioral 
level for trials with simultaneous and relevant-first presentation in both 
Stroop and Flanker experiments seems to reflect a context effect, which 
abolishes conflict adaptation in a standard condition with simultaneous 
presentation of relevant and irrelevant stimulus information, likely 
through a shift from reactive to proactive control processes. However, it 
is important to note that the behavioral measures of conflict adaptation 
were of limited interest to this study, since they are also determined by 
the current congruency status of the trial and do not reflect the 
processing of irrelevant or relevant information in an isolated way.   
  A possible explanation why the attentional modulation only 
occurred in the Flanker task might be related to differences in 
attentional mechanisms. Specifically, the Flanker task emphasizes 
spatial attention, whereas the Stroop task would seem to be more 
related to feature attention (Polk et al., 2008). It might be the case that 
the modulation we found is only related to spatial filtering of the visual 
field (after conflict, less attention is allocated to the visual field on the 
left and right of the target location), which can explain its absence in 
the Stroop task. If we relate these considerations back to the much more 
developed area of fMRI evidence for attentional modulations, it is worth 
noting that a large number of these studies used variants of the Stroop 
task that present relevant information in the form of categories for 
which specialized processing modules exist (often faces). It seems 
possible that such a set-up is more amenable to attentional 
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modulations, although with fMRI it is impossible to determine their 
precise timing. Given that the Stroop task is likely more related to 
feature attention, it is possible that we simply failed to detect this kind 
of attention because it does not show up easily in the ERP. 
 When extending our analysis to theta power modulations, we 
found evidence for a theta power conflict adaptation effect in the 
predictable, but not in the unpredictable Flanker experiment. Notably, 
previous research has reported mixed findings on this issue. Pastotter 
et al. (Pastotter et al., 2013) conducted a response-priming task and did 
observe a current trial conflict adaptation effect in mid-frontal theta 
power. Moreover, they found that this theta power adaptation effect 
correlated with the behavioral conflict adaptation effect. In contrast, 
Cohen and Cavanagh (Cohen & Cavanagh, 2011) only found a theta 
power conflict adaptation effect on the single-trial level but failed to find 
it on the trial-averaged level. It was suggested that this effect might be 
harder to find in tasks with both stimulus and response conflict like the 
Stroop and Flanker task than in response-priming task with only 
response conflict. Nevertheless, we did find the effect and the fact that 
the theta power evidence for conflict adaptation is only present in the 
experiment with the attentional modulation supports the notion that it 
can indeed be a neural marker of the post-conflict adaptation 
mechanism (i.e. inhibition of irrelevant information) in a predictable 
context. This raises the possibility that features related to the 
predictability of stimulus features play a role in whether or not such a 
neural conflict adaptation pattern is observed or not. Furthermore, we 
observed increased post-conflict inter-trial theta power, time-locked to 
the response of trial n-1 in the predictable, but not in the unpredictable 
Flanker experiment. Pastotter et al. (Pastotter et al., 2013) also 
observed higher parietal theta power during the inter-trial interval 
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after incongruent trials, which they interpreted as proactive 
adjustments of attentional control. Our finding of such a modulation in 
the task context that also showed an attentional modulation of the 
attentional processing of the subsequent trial is therefore highly 
consistent with this notion.  
 Finally, not controlling for feature integration (Hommel et al., 
2004) and contingency learning (Schmidt & De Houwer, 2011) processes 
in the different experiments is likely a limitation of the present study, 
as far as disambiguation along such lines goes. The reason why we 
intentionally did not control for these confounds has to do with the fact 
that recent accounts of conflict adaptation argue against a strict 
distinction between feature integration, contingency learning, and other 
types of cue learning, as learning itself is considered the mechanism 
behind cognitive control (Abrahamse, Braem, Notebaert, & Verguts, 
2016; Egner, 2014). Within this new perspective, it would even be 
artificial to exclude all learning possibilities and design an experiment 
where trial n shares no features of trials n-1 (Duthoo, Abrahamse, 
Braem, Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014a). In other words, when taking 
away more learning possibilities, we would have reduced conflict 
adaptation, making it harder to find ERP markers of underlying neural 
processes. So although it is true the present findings cannot 
unambiguously discriminate between cognitive control and learning 
processes, we see those as inherently related, and we do not think this 
invalidates the conclusions we make on the underlying mechanisms of 
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CONCLUSION 
In sum, although we expected to find both a decrease in attentional 
allocation for irrelevant distractor information and an increase for 
relevant target information during conflict adaptation, we could only 
identify the former, and only in a very specific task context of a Flanker 
task with a temporal arrangement in which the irrelevant stimulus 
dimension was always presented first. Given this specificity, our 
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PUPIL SIZE DIRECTLY MODULATES THE 
FEEDFORWARD RESPONSE IN HUMAN PRIMARY 
VISUAL CORTEX INDEPENDENTLY OF ATTENTION1 
Controversy revolves around the question of whether psychological 
factors like attention and emotion can influence the initial feedforward 
response in primary visual cortex (V1). Although traditionally, the 
electrophysiological correlate of this response in humans (the C1 
component) has been found to be unaltered by psychological influences, a 
number of recent studies have described attentional and emotional 
modulations. Yet, research into psychological effects on the feedforward 
V1 response has neglected possible direct contributions of  concomitant 
pupil-size modulations, which are known to also occur under various 
conditions of attentional load and emotional state. Here we tested the 
hypothesis that such pupil-size differences themselves directly affect the 
feedforward V1 response. We report data from two complementary 
experiments, in which we used procedures that modulate pupil size 
without differences in attentional load or emotion while simultaneously 
recording pupil-size and EEG data. Our results confirm that pupil size 
indeed directly influences the feedforward V1 response, showing an 
inverse relationship between pupil size and early V1 activity. While it is 
unclear in how far this effect represents a functionally-relevant 
adaptation, it identifies pupil-size differences as an important 
modulating factor of the feedforward response of V1 and could hence 
represent a confounding variable in research investigating the neural 
influence of psychological factors on early visual processing.  
                                                     
1 Bombeke, K., Duthoo, W., Mueller, S., Hopf, J-.M., & Boehler, C. N. (2016). 
Pupil size directly modulates the feedforward response in human primary 
visual cortex independently of attention. Neuroimage, 127, 67-73. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A classic question in psychology and neuroscience is how early in 
the processing hierarchy attention can affect sensory responses (Spence, 
1999), a question that is also relevant for related processes like the 
influence of emotion on sensory processing (Vuilleumier, 2005). In 
humans, the earliest cortical response to visual stimuli arises in V1 
after around 60 ms, which is reflected in the C1 component of the 
human EEG (Jeffreys and Axford, 1972). Traditionally, it has been 
found that this component is not amenable to modulations by 
psychological factors like attention (Clark and Hillyard, 1996; Di Russo 
et al., 2003). Rather, it has been suggested that V1 activity is only 
modulated late during visual processing, presumably through delayed 
feedback signals (Boehler et al., 2008; Martinez et al., 1999; Noesselt et 
al., 2002). Clark and Hillyard (1996), for example, observed attentional 
enhancements of ERP components that directly follow the C1 (the P1 
and N1), but not for the C1 itself. Contrasting with this view, some 
recent studies have described attentional (Kelly et al., 2008; Rauss et 
al., 2012; Rauss et al., 2009) and emotional C1 modulations (Pourtois et 
al., 2004; Rossi and Pourtois, 2013; Vanlessen et al., 2014; Zhu and Luo, 
2012). For example, Rauss et al. (2009) varied attentional load between 
task blocks in a discrimination task and demonstrated decreased C1 
amplitudes for peripheral task-irrelevant stimuli under increased 
attentional load. Interestingly, often such modulations were limited to 
the upper visual field (VF), possibly stemming from the lower spatial 
resolution of the upper VF, which can hence profit more from 
attentional enhancements (Pourtois et al., 2008; Rauss et al., 2009). Yet, 
despite these recent observations, the general notion of attentional and 
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other psychological C1 modulations remains controversial (Ding et al., 
2014).  
 Intriguingly, one possibly important factor has thus far been 
completely overlooked in this controversy, namely pupil size. Pupil size 
is known to be modulated by numerous psychological factors, including 
many of the factors that were recently shown to affect feedforward V1 
activity like attentional load and different emotional states (Sirois and 
Brisson, 2014). This co-occurrence of pupil-size differences with these 
psychological factors is possibly very relevant since it is conceivable that 
modulations in V1 activity arise (at least in part) directly from 
differences in pupil-size rather than from e.g. attentional influences on 
neural processes in the visual system. Specifically, on a basic level, 
vision research has shown that pupil size alters the optical properties of 
the eye (Campbell and Green, 1965), affecting the amount and 
dispersion of light on the retina and consequently feedforward 
processing of visual information. This suggests that some of the 
controversy regarding cognitive-affective differences in early visual 
processing could depend on the size of the pupil at the moment when 
the C1 is elicited. In this context it is particularly relevant that in the 
majority of studies reporting psychological C1 effects, the psychological 
process of interest is engaged some time before a C1-evoking stimulus is 
presented, leaving enough time for pupil-size changes to occur, and 
comparisons are often made between trial types that differ in 
attentional load or emotional state, or even between different 
experimental blocks, or different participants (e.g., Rauss et al., 2012; 
Rauss et al., 2009; Rossi and Pourtois, 2012a; Vanlessen et al., 2014). 
This overview suggests that it is quite likely that these studies indeed 
featured different pupil sizes for the different experimental conditions 
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at the moment when the C1 was elicited. Here, we test whether pupil-
size variations can directly affect early feedforward visual processing, as 
indexed by the C1 component.  
 To address this question, we simultaneously recorded EEG and 
pupil-size data of human observers in two complementary experiments 
that modulated pupil size in a fashion devoid of differences in 
stimulation luminance, attentional load, emotional state, or effort 
allocation. In Experiment 1, participants covertly attended to a white or 
a black disc, which were simultaneously presented in the left and right 
VF (Figure 1A). Covert attention to these discs modulates pupil size, 
despite the display being physically identical (Binda et al., 2013; see 
also Mathot et al., 2013). In Experiment 2 we presented visual illusion 
stimuli that elicit an illusory brightness perception despite equal overall 
physical luminance (Figure 2A; Laeng and Endestad, 2012). 
Importantly, in both experiments, there was enough time for the pupil 
to dilate or constrict (roughly 2 seconds on average) before presenting 
the C1-eliciting stimuli in the upper VF or lower VF, as modeled after 
earlier work investigating the C1 (Rauss et al., 2011). Based on this set-
up, we hypothesized that pupil size would affect the amplitude of the C1 
despite the fact that pupil size was modulated in a fashion that was 
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METHOD 
Participants 
Twenty-six participants (between 19 and 25 years of age; 8 males, 
18 females) participated in one session comprising both experiments. All 
procedures were approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of 
Psychology and Education Sciences of Ghent University. All of them 
reported perfect vision (no glasses or contact lenses) and no history of 
psychiatric or neurological disorders. They provided written informed 
consent and received a monetary compensation of 25 euros. Due to 
communication failures between the EEG machinery and the 
eyetracker, the data of one participant in Experiment 1, and that of two 
participants in Experiment 2, had to be excluded from the analysis. 
Procedure and design 
Experiment 1 
For this experiment, the procedure of Binda et al. (2013) was 
adopted (Figure 1A). In each trial, three arrows pointing left or right 
(e.g., <<<) were presented at fixation. After 300 ms, a white and a black 
disc (11.3° in diameter, centered 10.4° left and right of fixation) were 
presented against a middle grey background. Depending on the 
orientation of the arrows, participants had to covertly orient their 
attention to the white or black disc on a given trial. Participants were 
told to keep accurate fixation and to minimize blinking. Their gaze was 
closely monitored based on the online signal of the eyetracker (see 
Supplementary Material for average fixation durations across the 
display), which participants were informed about to further reduce their 
tendency to move their eyes. During disc presentation, task-irrelevant 
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stimulus arrays (“probes”) with 22 columns of 6 white horizontal lines 
were presented in the periphery for 200 ms in order to elicit the C1 
component (27.6° x 5.1° of visual angle, vertical distance from closest 
edge to fixation 6.6°). This general set-up was modeled after earlier 
work investigating the C1 component (Rossi and Pourtois, 2012a). 
These probes were either presented in the upper VF or in the lower VF. 
This separation into upper VF and lower VF stimulation is standard for 
C1 experiments since an important identifying feature of the C1 is its 
polarity reversal for upper vs. lower VF stimulation, explained through 
a differential mapping of these inputs to the upper and lower bank of 
the calcarine sulcus (see the "cruciform model", Jeffreys and Axford, 
1972). Direction of attention (attend left or attend right), position of the 
white and black disc (white left/black right or white right/black left) and 
probe location (top or bottom) were randomized and fully 
counterbalanced across trials. With reference to the start of the trial, 
the C1-eliciting probes were presented either after 1800 ms, 2200 ms, or 
2600 ms. These different SOAs were used to de-correlate the and the 
probe response, as well as to avoid exact predictability for when probes 
would be presented. Moreover, we included them in order to assess 
possible differential pupil-size modulations in different time frames, 
which however turned out to be quite stable across this time range, so 
that the data was ultimately collapsed across the different SOAs. The 
white and black discs disappeared 3200 ms after trial onset, followed by 
a randomly jittered inter-trial interval ranging in duration between 
1000 to 1500 ms. Experiment 1 consisted of two blocks of 168 trials, 
separated by a break. Each block contained 24 (14.3%) rare targets and 
144 (85.7%) regular trials. Rare targets were color changes (light blue to 
yellow, chosen such that the discrimination was similarly difficult in the 
CHAPTER 3  101 
black and the white disc) in the center of the disc that participants were 
covertly attending. For such events, which never occurred in the 
unattended disc, participants had to press the space bar. This color 
change could occur before or after the presentation of the C1-eliciting 
probe, ensuring attentional orienting to the attended disc during the 
entire duration of the trial. Because rare targets and regular trials were 
randomly intermixed, participants could not predict target trials.  
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Fig 1. Experiment 1. (A) Trial examples specifying durations of the 
different events. Note that C1-eliciting stimuli were presented in the upper VF 
and lower VF in different trials (upper VF in this example). Pupil size was 
modulated by orienting participants’ attention covertly to the white or black 
disc. (B) Time course of absolute pupil size change. (C) Pupil-size averages 
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quantified around the moment of C1 stimulation as used in the statistical 
analysis (*p < .05, ***p < .001). 
 
Experiment 2 
The second experiment was based on the experimental set-up of 
Laeng and Endestad (2012), using visual illusion stimuli (“Asahi 
illusion”; Figure 2A). Observers usually report an impression of 
brightness when looking at the Asahi illusion on the left in Fig. 2A, in 
that it is perceived to have a bright center point, while the Asahi 
illusion on the right is perceived as rather dark in the middle. However, 
it is important to note that the two illusions only differ in terms of 
perceived brightness, while their overall physical luminance is constant. 
In this experiment, participants were asked to fixate a small dot at the 
center of two possible visual illusions in the absence of any other 
immediate task. Again, participants were told to keep accurate fixation 
and to minimize blinking. In order to motivate participants to stay 
focused and to actively perceive the illusions, they were told they would 
get a questionnaire about the subjective brightness of the illusions, but 
otherwise there was no behavioral task. Each trial started with a 
fixation dot presented for 100 ms, followed by the bright or dark illusion 
(presented full screen). While fixating the middle of the illusion, C1-
eliciting probes with the same number of line segments as in 
Experiment 1 (24.07° x 4.15° of visual angle, vertical distance from 
closest edge to fixation 3.69°) were presented for 200 ms in the upper or 
lower VF, following a variable interval of 1800 ms, 2200 ms or 2600 ms 
(as in Experiment 1). Again, results were quite stable across these 
SOAs, leading us to collapse across them again. Note that the spatial 
arrangement was different from Experiment 1 for configuration 
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reasons, but that also this experiment was successful in eliciting C1 
components for the two hemi-fields. Yet, the probe responses in both 
experiments are not directly comparable as a consequence of these 
differences. The illusion remained on screen for 400 ms after probe 
offset, followed by a randomly jittered inter-trial interval ranging 
between 1200 to 1500 ms. Visual illusion (bright illusion or dark 
illusion) and probe location (top or bottom) were again counterbalanced 
in a randomized fashion across trials. The experiment consisted of three 
blocks of 112 trials, separated by two self-paced breaks. Each block 
contained 16 (14.3%) illusion-only trials and 96 (85.7%) regular trials. 
The only difference between illusion-only and regular trials was the 
absence of C1-eliciting probes in the former. We included this type of 
trials as a manipulation check, to obtain a clean estimate of pupil-size 
effects, which pilot experiments had shown to be less pronounced than 
the ones in Experiment 1.  
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Fig 2. Experiment 2. (A) Trial example specifying durations of the 
different events. Again, the example shows a trial with C1 stimulation for the 
upper VF. Below the trial example, iillustrations of the bright and dark illusion 
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are shown. (B) Pupil-size averages around the moment of C1 stimulation as 
used in the statistical analysis (*p < .05, ***p < .001). 
Pupil measurements and preprocessing 
A 300 Hz Tobii table-mounted eye tracker (TX300; Tobii 
Technology AB – www.tobii.com, Danderyd, Sweden) was used to 
measure pupil size during the experiments. The set-up included a 17-
inch computer screen with a built-in camera and infrared LED optics. A 
chinrest was used to minimize head movements and to maintain a fixed 
distance of 62 cm from the screen, which is the optimal viewing distance 
for this type of eyetracker. Each experiment started with a calibration 
procedure in which participants had to follow a moving red dot to nine 
locations on a white background. The EEG chamber was dimly lit 
constantly throughout the experiments. Missing data points due to 
blinks or recording errors were corrected for by means of a linear 
interpolation procedure. Trigger codes in both the pupil and EEG data 
were synchronized. Pupil size was initially recorded at a sampling rate 
of 300 Hz, but then downsampled to 256 Hz to match the sampling rate 
of the EEG. 
Electrophysiological recordings and preprocessing 
EEG data were collected by means of a Biosemi ActiveTwo system 
(Biosemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands) using 64 Ag-AgCl scalp electrodes 
positioned according to the standard international 10-20 system. 
Additional electrodes were attached to the left and right mastoids and 
electrodes were placed at the outer canthi of both eyes and directly 
above and below the left eye for acquiring a horizontal and vertical 
electrooculogram. Signals were recorded with a sampling rate of 256 Hz. 
During preprocessing, data was re-referenced offline to the average of 
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the left and right mastoid. Next, a low-pass filter of 30 Hz was applied. 
Blinks were corrected using independent component analysis (ICA). The 
data were epoched from -100 ms to 300 ms, time-locked to the onset of 
the probe stimuli. Automatic artifact rejection was performed on these 
epochs, removing a small number of trials with extreme values (larger 
than -/+ 200 µV) or extreme sample-to-sample differences (larger than 
150 µV). 
Analyses 
The absolute pupil diameter in millimeters was used in all 
analyses, but similar results were obtained with baseline-corrected data 
(-200 ms pre-stimulus period with reference to disk/illusion onset). Pupil 
size was measured as the average diameter in the window starting 50 
ms before (C1-eliciting) probe onset and ending 50 ms after it. Note that 
due to the slow dynamics of the pupil response, this time window does 
not reflect any response to the C1-eliciting probe stimuli yet. Rather the 
chosen time window captures the pupil size at the moment these probes 
were presented. The pupil size data were collapsed across the three 
different SOAs and the two possible probe locations in both 
experiments. Those values were analyzed using two-tailed paired-
samples t-tests to compare pupil size for the respective bright and dark 
conditions in both experiments.   
 The C1 component was defined as negative or positive deflections 
peaking between 70 and 110 ms over occipito-parietal sites (measured 
at electrode position POz) following probe onset. In order to increase 
comparability, we chose this measurement window and electrode 
position based on previous studies showing attentional modulations of 
the C1 component (Rauss et al., 2012; Rauss et al., 2009; Rossi and 
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Pourtois, 2012a). EEG data was baseline-corrected using the 100 ms 
period preceding probe onset. For the statistical analysis, the mean 
amplitude between 70 and 110 ms was used, but similar results were 
obtained with peak amplitude measures. Two-tailed paired-samples t-
tests were used to compare C1 amplitudes and average pupil sizes 
between the bright and dark conditions separately for the upper and 
lower VF, given that C1 modulations have been reported in the upper 
VF but not the lower VF (Pourtois et al., 2008; Rauss et al., 2009). 
RESULTS 
Behavior 
For experiment 1, the proportion of correct responses for detecting 
color changes while covertly attending the white or black disc was 0.84 
and 0.82 respectively, which did not differ significantly, t(23)= -.58, p > 
.5. The reaction time was on average 1575 ms for change detection in 
white discs and 1590 ms for change detection in black discs, again not 
yielding a significant difference, t(23)=.47, p > .5. Both behavioral 
parameters hence suggest similar task difficulty and mental effort 
allocation in both conditions. Experiment 2 did not have a task 
component.  
Pupil size 
Pupil size was successfully manipulated in both experiments. In 
Experiment 1, a two-tailed paired-sample t-test comparing average 
pupil size while attending covertly to the white or black disc was 
conducted. On average, participants' pupils measured 3.474 mm (SD = 
0.402 mm) in diameter at probe onset when covertly attending the white 
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disc, and 3.629 mm (SD = 0.380 mm) when covertly attending the black 
disc, t(24) = 6.65, p < .001 (Figure 1B and Figue 1C). For Experiment 2, 
participants’ average pupil size measured 3.347 mm (SD = 0.321 mm) in 
diameter at probe onset for the bright illusion, and 3.366 mm (SD = 
0.325 mm) for the dark illusion (Figure 2B). While small in amplitude, a 
two-tailed paired-sample t-test indicated that the difference was 
significant, t(23) = -2.23, p = .04. Collectively, these results indicate that 
both experiments modulated pupil size successfully and in the expected 
direction.  
C1 response 
In line with our hypothesis, these pupil-size differences at the 
moment when the C1 was elicited indeed modulated the amplitude of 
the C1 response. In Experiment 1, significant occipito-parietal C1s were 
evoked in both the upper and lower VF (Figure 3A). Given the fact that 
some earlier studies have often only found C1 modulations for the upper 
VF, two-tailed paired-sample t-tests were conducted separately to 
compare the effect of disc color in each VF, using the time-range of 
interest from earlier studies that have shown attentional C1 
modulations (Rossi and Pourtois, 2012a). C1 amplitudes were 
significantly different for probes in the upper VF (-0.75 µV and -0.10 µV 
on average for bright and dark discs, respectively), t(24) = -2.77, p = .01, 
with larger amplitudes when participants attended the bright disc, but 
not for probes in the lower VF (2.50 µV and 2.57 µV for bright and dark 
discs, respectively), t(24) = -.30, p >.5, which parallels earlier 
observations that reported C1 modulations exclusively in the upper VF 
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(Pourtois et al., 2008; Rauss et al., 2009)2.  
 In Experiment 2, we again analyzed C1 amplitudes for the upper 
and lower VF separately. For the upper VF, a two-tailed paired-sample 
t-test again showed a significant difference between the bright and dark 
condition (on average -2.37 µV and -1.51 µV for bright and dark illusion, 
respectively), t(23) = -3.21, p < .01, but no significant effect for the lower 
VF (on average 4.52 µV and 4.32 µV for bright and dark illusion, 
respectively), t(23) = .68, p > .5 (Figure 3B). Just like in Experiment 1, 
mean C1 amplitudes for the upper VF were smaller when the pupil was 
large compared to when the pupil was small. Again, no such 
relationship was found in the lower VF. 
                                                     
2 Since the positive overshoot between approximately 90 ms and 110 ms might 
create the erroneous impression of a 7-fold C1 amplitude modulation, we also 
compared the C1 component in a more narrowly focused window around the 
peak (from 60 ms to 90 ms). A two-tailed paired-sample t-test for the C1 
elicited in the UVF showed a border-significant difference between the bright 
and dark condition based on values that might better represent the amplitude 
relationship between the two conditions (-2.18 µV and -1.53 µV peak 
amplitudes for bright and dark discs, respectively), t(24) = -2.04, p = .05. 
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Fig 3. C1 results. Grand-average C1 components (at POz, see black circle in 
topographical maps) for Experiment 1 (A) and Experiment 2 (B). The 
topographical distributions show the bright-minus-dark difference in the upper 
VF condition, averaged between 70 and 110 ms post probe onset. UVF = upper 
visual field, LVF = lower visual field.  
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DISCUSSION 
Our study addressed the important and unresolved question 
whether pupil size can influence the initial feedforward response in 
human V1 (as reflected by the C1 component of the EEG) independently 
of psychological factors like attentional load and emotion. To this end, 
we used spatial cuing of covert attention to a dark vs. a bright disk 
(Experiment 1) and stimuli that elicit illusory differences in brightness 
perception (Experiment 2) in order to modulate pupil size, which was 
then followed by task-irrelevant probes in the upper or lower VF 
eliciting the C1. This orthogonality of our pupil-modulating procedure to 
psychological factors like attentional load and emotional content was 
critical in order to demonstrate the pure effect of pupil size on the C1 
component. 
  In line with our hypothesis, we found a significant inverse 
relationship between pupil size and C1 amplitude in both experiments, 
albeit only for probe stimuli presented in the upper VF; a visual field 
specificity that was also found in studies that demonstrated 
psychological modulations of the C1 (Pourtois et al., 2008; Rauss et al., 
2009). The general finding of a relationship between pupil size and C1 
amplitude raises the question whether earlier findings of C1 
modulations by psychological factors like attentional load or emotional 
state might not have also, at least in part, reflected pupillary rather 
than neural mechanisms. This possibility also relates to typical design 
features in the majority of these earlier studies. As discussed already in 
the introduction, most of these studies could well have entailed 
differential pupil size between conditions of interest at the moment 
when the C1 was elicited. On the one hand, those studies manipulated 
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psychological factors that are known to affect pupil size, like attentional 
load, and on the other hand often compared trials from different blocks 
or even participants. Rauss et al. (2009), for example, implemented a 
detection task with an experimental design featuring blocks with high 
attentional load and blocks with low attentional load, finding an 
attenuated C1 amplitude for the high attentional load blocks. It is quite 
likely that on average the mean pupil size was higher in the high 
attentional-load blocks, suggesting that their findings could have at 
least partially been driven by differences in pupil size. Therefore, it 
seems generally important that both past and future studies 
investigating psychological effects on V1 activity are considered in the 
light of possible contributions from pupil-size differences in different 
conditions.   
 A likely explanation for its effects on V1 activity refers to how 
varying pupil size affects the optical transmission of the eye and its 
consequences on early cortical processing. Classic work by Campbell 
and Green (1965) documented an inverse relationship between pupil 
size and contrast sensitivity. The larger the pupil, the more optical 
aberrations of light transmission appear, and hence visual resolution 
decreases. Given V1’s sensitivity for sharp edges (e.g., Nothdurft et al., 
2000) and the fact that our C1-eliciting probes consisted of horizontal 
lines with a relatively high spatial frequency and sharp luminance 
contrasts (as is typical for stimuli designed to elicit a C1), decreased 
contrast resolution is a very plausible cause for the reduced C1 
amplitude in the conditions with larger pupils in our study. 
Importantly, this relationship between pupil size and contrast 
sensitivity is only clearly present in the upper VF. It has been shown 
that at a given spatial frequency, contrast sensitivity is substantially 
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higher for lower VF stimuli (Skrandies, 1985), which in turn might 
make the lower VF immune to pupil-related optical effects on the order 
of magnitude studied here. Nevertheless, in theory, other combinations 
of exact stimulation parameters and pupil size differences would 
probably also produce differences in the lower VF. Yet, it is also 
important to note that the effect of pupil-size on the C1 (in the upper 
VF) does not seem to scale linearly with the size of the pupil-size 
modulation. Specifically, the change in pupil size was much more 
pronounced in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2, but C1 modulations 
were quite similar, suggesting a non-linear relationship in which 
already small size deviations can have a significant effect.   
 We assume that the mechanism behind the present C1 
modulations is directly related to varying pupil size rather than to 
neural mechanisms. Yet, the pupil-size modulation is still brought about 
in a fashion that depends on prior neuro-cognitive processes, so that we 
cannot fully exclude other possible contributions. For example in 
experiment 1, attention was generally involved in the sense of spatial 
attention (attending to a white or black disc on the left or on the right); 
yet, this attentional cuing was spatially orthogonal to the locations of 
the C1-eliciting stimuli, which were presented in the upper and lower 
visual field. Therefore, it seems very unlikely that such lateralized 
attention to a dark or a bright disc would have an effect on the 
processing of a task-relevant probe stimulus in the upper or lower 
visual field.  Moreover, we made sure that the rare targets present in 
those discs were equally easy to detect in either disc. Importantly, it has 
been suggested that the pupil-size adjustment in this task context 
represents an anticipatory process preparing an eye-movement to a 
location that differs in brightness from what you are currently looking 
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at, hence starting a light reflex before the eye is even moved (Mathot 
and Van der Stigchel, 2015). This suggests a functional role for such 
pupil-size adjustments that is independent of processes like attentional 
load and such a mechanism seems very unlikely to globally affect V1 
responsiveness on a neural level. In addition, the pupil-size modulation 
was brought about in a rather different fashion in Experiment 2, where 
it was based on the mere visual perception of stimuli with different 
illusory brightness, without even featuring a task component. 
 Despite all of these considerations, it is theoretically still possible 
that neural processes, rather than optical ones, have directly 
contributed to our C1 modulation. Specifically, the mere fact that one is 
perceiving a stimulus as bright, or attending a bright surface, is likely 
coded in the visual system (despite overall physical luminance being 
identical with its respective counter conditions), which could entail 
differential baseline firing rates in the early visual system. Such a 
signal might in some way interact with the response to the C1-eliciting 
probe on a neural level. Although it seems unlikely that such an effect 
would exclusively drive the modulation of the subsequently-evoked C1 
component (and that this would be exclusive to the upper visual field), 
the current data cannot fully rule out such a possibility. An alternative 
approach that would have circumvented any such interpretational 
ambiguity could have been the use of an artificial pupil or dilating eye 
drops. Although such procedures could involve additional subtle optical 
effects and would possibly decrease the comparability with the 
aforementioned studies on attentional C1 modulations, such studies 
could well represent fruitful extensions of this line of research. 
 Although our results hence strongly suggest that fluctuations in 
pupil size can affect C1 amplitudes in a fashion that is independent of 
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psychological factors like attentional load and emotion, these effects 
might well co-exist with influences that are implemented on a neural 
level in early visual cortex, or even on earlier subcortical stages 
(McAlonan et al., 2008). While it is the case that many studies showing 
attentional C1 modulations allow for differential pupil sizes between 
conditions (e.g. Rauss et al., 2009; Rossi and Pourtois, 2012b; Vanlessen 
et al., 2013), some of them probably did not. For example, one study 
modulated and probed spatial attention rather than attentional load 
(Kelly et al., 2008), for which the pupil should not be sensitive as long as 
both sides of the screen have a similar luminance. In another study that 
is also unlikely to have featured contributions from differential pupil 
size, the time between a target stimulus requiring e.g. different levels of 
attentional load (in an unpredictable event sequence) and the C1-
eliciting probe stimuli was too short for the pupil to dilate or contract 
significantly before the C1 was elicited (Pourtois et al., 2004). 
 Our demonstration of pupil-size effects on early visual processing 
raises the question of the functional significance of pupil-size changes 
that are not just related to mere changes in brightness of the physical 
stimulation (i.e., the pupillary light response). Previous studies have 
shown that such cognitive/affective pupil-size changes reflect the tonic 
and phasic modes of the locus coeruleus (LC) and the norepinephrine 
system (for a review, see Sirois and Brisson, 2014). In the phasic mode, 
dilated pupils support a state of focus and exploitation, whereas in the 
tonic mode, dilated pupils enable task disengagement and exploration. 
Mechanistically, it has been suggested that such adjustments in pupil 
size relate to exploration and exploitation through a balance between 
visual acuity and visual sensitivity. Larger pupils would favor 
exploration, being more sensitive to weak (and peripheral) sensory 
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input at the cost of reduced visual acuity. Smaller pupils would favor 
exploitation, by processing objects at fixation in more detail at the cost 
of reduced sensitivity for faint peripheral stimuli (Mathot and Van der 
Stigchel, 2015). As such pupil-size changes would relate to an 
evolutionary adaptation that allows to adjust visual processing 
dependent on situational demands (Lee et al., 2014). Large pupils and 
an expanded field of vision would be more beneficial in life-threatening 
situations than small pupils and a sharpened focus. Although our data 
only speak to this question to a limited extent, they do show that pupil 
size indeed has a direct influence on visual processing, and that this 
effect already affects the earliest stage of cortical sensory processing in 
humans.  
CONCLUSION 
To summarize, we have shown that pupil size has a direct effect on 
the feedforward response in V1 that is independent of psychological 
factors like attentional load and emotion, which in turn are themselves 
believed to also affect V1 activity, but also likely entail differences in 
pupil size. We think our findings are particularly relevant because 
pupil-size changes are found in an increasing number of contexts, 
ranging from arousal, to attentional load, to emotional states, as well as 
being described in aging and pathological conditions like attention-
deficit hyperactivity disorder and autism (Fried et al., 2014; Karatekin 
et al., 2009; Nuske et al., 2014; Sirois and Brisson, 2014). Our results 
indicate that in all these conditions and contexts it is important to also 
consider pupil size when looking at effects on early visual processing. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
 
Supplementary Fig 1. Heat maps showing individual overall fixation 
duration across the visual display (expressed as percentage of overall fixation 
duration) for all participants in Experiment 1. The black box represents the full 
presentation screen, and the disc locations are indicated in the panel for 
participant 1. Relating the heat maps to these positions indicates good fixation 
quality for all participants. 
 
CHAPTER 4: 
REVISITING THE INFLUENCE OF THE PUPIL ON 
FEEDFORWARD PRIMARY VISUAL CORTEX ACTIVITY: 
DISCRIMINATING EFFECTS OF ATTENTIONAL STATE 
AND PUPIL SIZE1 
We recently demonstrated that pupil size influences the feedforward 
response in V1 as reflected by the C1 component of the human EEG. This 
finding is potentially relevant to studies about psychological influences 
on early visual processing in so far that attentional, emotional, or other 
psychological modulations often simultaneously dilate or constrict the 
pupil. In the current study, we tried to replicate this effect and to 
distinguish it further from possible alternative explanations related to 
the attentional manipulation (attending a dark or bright stimulus in the 
lateral periphery) that triggers the pupil-size change. We did this by 
making use of the slow response characteristic of the pupil by presenting 
a C1-eliciting probe stimulus at a time point that briefly preceded the 
pupil response and a time point that followed it. Results showed a 
replication of the inverse relationship between pupil size and C1 
amplitude for probe stimuli at the late time-point but no such 
modulation at the early time point. Moreover, posterior lateralization of 
alpha-band oscillatory activity indicative of attentional orienting 
supported the notion that attention was already deployed to the cued side 
at the early time point. Together, the present results replicate a recently-
described influence of pupil size on feedforward V1 activity, and further 
support the notion that this effect is indeed directly driven by the 
modulation of pupil size.  
                                                     
1Bombeke, K., Hopf, J-M., & Boehler, C. N. (under review). Revisiting the 
influence of the pupil on feedfoward primary visual cortex activity: 
discriminating effects of attentional state and pupil size. Psychophysiology  
 
CHAPTER 4     124 
INTRODUCTION 
 Primary visual cortex (V1) in the occipital lobe forms the first 
stage of cortical processing of visual information (Remington, 2012), 
with its activity strongly reflecting bottom-up processing of visual input 
(e.g. Engel, et al., 1994; Zhang, Zhaoping, Zhou, & Fang, 2012). 
Although many studies have shown that feedback signals coming from 
higher cortical structures also affect activity in this region (Boehler, 
Schoenfeld, Heinze, & Hopf, 2008; Martinez, et al., 1999; Noesselt, et 
al., 2002), a long-standing debate concerned how early top-down 
influences of higher cognitive processes can influence processes in the 
visual cortex (Spence, 1999). In particular, it is still debated whether 
the initial feedforward signal through V1 is amenable to top-down 
influences like attention (Ding, Martinez, Qu, & Hillyard, 2014). Most 
studies in humans have used EEG to study this question, with the C1 (a 
central occipito-parietal component between 50 and 90 ms post-probe 
onset) as an index of V1 processing (Jeffreys & Axford, 1972). Although 
many studies showed C1-modulating effects of attention (Kelly, Gomez-
Ramirez, & Foxe, 2008; Rauss, Pourtois, Vuilleumier, & Schwartz, 2012; 
Rauss, Pourtois, Vuilleumier, & Schwartz, 2009) or emotional stimuli, 
states or mood (Pourtois, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2004; 
Rossi & Pourtois, 2013; Vanlessen, Rossi, De Raedt, & Pourtois, 2014; 
Zhu & Luo, 2012), others did not (Clark & Hillyard, 1996; Di Russo, 
Martinez, & Hillyard, 2003), and maintain that the C1 is not amenable 
to such influences (Ding, Martinez, Qu, & Hillyard, 2014).  
 Recently, we have demonstrated that the C1 might be modulated 
by a very early peripheral effect, namely differential pupil size 
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(Bombeke, Duthoo, Mueller, Hopf, & Boehler, 2016). Notably, many past 
studies demonstrating attentional and related modulations of the C1 
did so in task contexts that might have featured concomitant differences 
in pupil size, which is known to be modulated by a large number of 
psychological factors, including attention, effort, emotion, motivation or 
performance monitoring (for a review, Sirois & Brisson, 2014). In order 
to demonstrate that pupil size could, in principle, directly modulate the 
C1 component, we experimentally manipulated pupil size using 
validated procedures that do not involve differences in luminance or 
other basic sensory confounds. Specifically, in a first experiment, we 
used the procedure of Binda, Pereverzeva, and Murray (2013b) in which 
participants have to covertly attend either a black or white disk (i.e. 
central fixation), which has been shown to dilate and constrict the 
pupils. According to Mathot and Van der Stigchel (2015), when covertly 
attending a white disk, the visual system basically prepares for a 
saccade towards a brighter image part by triggering pupillary 
constriction, and the opposite for attending to a dark stimulus. In a 
second experiment, we used visual illusions of perceived brightness in 
order to evoke pupil dilation and constriction (Laeng & Endestad, 2012). 
In both experiments, we presented a typical C1-eliciting probe (Rossi & 
Pourtois, 2012) after some delay to allow for the pupil to change size. 
We found in both experiments that the C1 response for upper-visual-
field stimulation was smaller for large pupils compared to small pupils. 
Given that the conditions were matched also for task difficulty, we took 
this as evidence for a direct influence of pupil size on the C1 response, 
and suggested basic optical processes as the explanation, in which large 
pupils are associated with more light aberrations leading to less visual 
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sensitivity for peripheral stimuli with a high spatial frequency 
(Campbell & Green, 1965).  
 Being the first study describing this effect, it still left open a 
number of possible alternative explanations. Most importantly, 
although we controlled for luminance differences of stimuli and 
lateralization of covert attention in our version of the Binda, 
Pereverzeva, and Murray (2013b) paradigm, one cannot fully exclude an 
effect of stronger attentional focusing on either the white or black 
surface of the disk. Here we sought to provide further evidence that 
pupil size itself affects the C1 component directly. For this, we make use 
of the sluggish response of the pupil that always responds with a 
significant delay after the stimulus that prompted a size change (e.g., in 
the Binda task, attention will have been lateralized already for some 
time until the pupil-size change occurs), capitalizing on the fact that 
pupil-size effects would have to follow this slow pace. Based on this, we 
use two time-points to evoke a C1 response in another version of the 
Binda task. We selected a relatively early moment (400 ms after disk 
onset) when attention should already be oriented towards either the 
dark or bright stimulus but the pupil is not showing a size difference, 
and a later one (2200 ms after disk onset) at which attention is still in 
place and pupil size is modulated according to which disk is being 
attended. We chose the late time-point based on the earlier work 
showing clear pupil size modulations at this time (Binda, Pereverzeva, 
& Murray, 2013b; Bombeke, Duthoo, Mueller, Hopf, & Boehler, 2016; 
Mathot, van der Linden, Grainger, & Vitu, 2013). The choice for the 
early time point was guided by earlier work showing that the pupil size 
is not modulated yet, while there is already ample time to orient 
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attention in a pre-cued display (Duncan, Ward, & Shapiro, 1994; Green 
& Woldorff, 2012; Ristic & Kingstone, 2006; Tipples, 2002). Yet, given 
the importance that attention is indeed deployed at this time, we 
planned to further corroborate this through looking at alpha-power 
asymmetry, which has been reliably linked to lateralized attention 
(Gould, Rushworth, & Nobre, 2011; Kelly, Lalor, Reilly, & Foxe, 2006; 
Limbach & Corballis, 2017). Based on this set-up we hypothesized that, 
if pupil size indeed directly modulates the C1 response, we would find 
such a modulation for the late time point of probe presentation but not 
the early one.  
METHOD 
Participants 
We recruited 25 right-handed participants for this experiment (19 
♀). Their ages ranged from 18-26 (mean = 21.64 years, sd = 2.27 years). 
All of them reported perfect vision (no glasses or contact lenses) and no 
history of psychiatric or neurological disorders. They provided written 
informed consent and received a monetary compensation of 25 Euros for 
an experimental session that lasted two hours in total. Due to technical 
communication failures between the EEG machinery and the eyetracker 
or technical problems with one of the two (broken electrodes, overall low 
signal-to-noise ratio or loss of pupil tracking), data of five participants 
had to be excluded from analysis. This exclusion took place before any 
analyses. All procedures were approved by the ethics committee of the 
Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences of Ghent University. 
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Procedure and design  
The task was implemented using Presentation® software (Version 
18.0, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA, www.neurobs.com) 
on a Microsoft Windows 10 PC with a 24-inch LCD screen. A photo-
sensor was used to measure a possible timing delay of the video system, 
which was found to be constant (1 refresh rate or 16.7 ms). For this 
experiment, we adjusted our own paradigm (experiment 1 in Bombeke, 
Duthoo, Mueller, Hopf, & Boehler, 2016), which in turn was based on 
the procedure of Binda, Pereverzeva, and Murray (2013a). Every trial 
started with three arrows pointing left or right (e.g., <<<) at fixation, 
followed by the simultaneous lateral presentation of a white and a black 
disk (11.3° in diameter, centered 10.4° left and right of fixation and 
presented against a middle grey background) after 300 ms (see Fig. 1). 
Participants had to covertly orient their attention to the cued side (and 
hence either the white or the black disk). They were told to keep 
accurate fixation and to minimize blinking. The online signal of the 
eyetracker and an additional camera outside the participant room 
allowed us to closely monitor their gaze, which participants were 
informed about to discourage their tendency to move their eyes. 
Nevertheless, when participants made eye movements during the first 
trials, the experimenter would interrupt the session and restart the 
experiment after emphasizing the need for accurate fixation. While 
presenting the disks, task-irrelevant stimulus arrays (“probes”) with 22 
columns of 6 white horizontal lines were presented in the periphery for 
200 ms in order to elicit the C1 component (27.6° x 5.1° of visual angle, 
vertical distance from closest edge to fixation 6.6°). In order to maximize 
the number of trials per condition, we exclusively stimulated the upper 
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VF, which is often the exclusive location to show C1 modulations, both 
in our earlier work (Bombeke, Duthoo, Mueller, Hopf, & Boehler, 2016) 
and in studies investigating attentional and related modulations of the 
C1 (Pourtois, Rauss, Vuilleumier, & Schwartz, 2008; Rauss, Pourtois, 
Vuilleumier, & Schwartz, 2009). The upper VF is represented on the 
lower bank of the calcarine sulcus (see the "cruciform model", Jeffreys & 
Axford, 1972), yielding a negative-going C1 components. We randomized 
and fully counterbalanced the direction of attention (attend left or 
attend right) and position of the white and black disk across trials (left 
or right VF). With reference to the onset of the disks, C1-eliciting probes 
were presented either after 400 ms (50% of trials) or 2200 ms (50% of 
trials). After 3200 ms, the white and black disks disappeared and were 
followed by a randomly jittered inter-trial interval ranging in duration 
between 1000 to 1500 ms.   
 The experiment consisted of four runs with 240 trials each, 
separated by breaks (three breaks within a run and one in between 
runs). Because we anticipated that presenting a C1-eliciting probe 
shortly after the onset of the black and white disk would result in 
overlapping vision-related activity, in particular at T1, we tried two 
different strategies for dealing with such overlap in different blocks. 
The first two runs had fixed latencies (from now on called 'fixed blocks'), 
in which the T1 and T2 probe were exactly presented after 400 and 2200 
ms, respectively, which was aimed at temporal precision of the two 
stimulation time-points. Since such a set-up likely entails overlap from 
the processing of the previous stimuli, we included 80 (1/6) no probe 
trials. The last two runs had included some temporal jitter of 100 ms 
around T1 and T2 (uniform distribution; from now on 'random blocks'). 
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In addition to the no-probe trials in the fixed blocks, there were two 
types of trials: regular and target trials. Regular trials were trials with 
C1-eliciting probe presentation on T1 or T2. Target trials were trials in 
which a color change in the center of the disk that participants were 
covertly attending could occur (change from light blue to yellow, chosen 
such that the discrimination was similarly difficult in the black and the 
white disk). For such events, which never occurred in the unattended 
disk, participants had to press the space bar. This color change could 
occur before or after the presentation of the C1-eliciting probe, ensuring 
attentional orienting to the attended disk during the entire duration of 
the trial. Because the different types of trials were randomly 
intermixed, participants could not predict target trials. The two fixed 
blocks jointly contained 320 (4/6) regular trials, 80 target trials (1/6) and 
80 (1/6) no probe trials. In contrast, the random blocks contained a total 
of 400 (5/6) regular trials, 80 target trials (1/6) but no no-probe trials, 
since we hoped that overlap would be attenuated through the temporal 
jitter. Both fixed and random blocks lasted 16 minutes, so the 
experiment had a total duration of 64 minutes.  
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Fig 1. Trial examples specifying durations of the different events. Pupil 
size was modulated by orienting participants' attention covertly to the white or 
black disk. 
Pupil measurements and preprocessing 
We used a 250 Hz SMI eye tracker (RED250 mobile system; 
SensoMotoric Instruments, Teltow, Germany) to measure pupil size 
during the experiment. A mobile camera with infrared optics was 
attached to a standard 17-inch computer screen and a chinrest was used 
to minimize head movements and to maintain a fixed distance of 65 cm 
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from the screen. Each block of the experiment started with a calibration 
procedure in which participants had to follow a moving red dot to nine 
locations on a grey background. The EEG chamber was dimly lit 
constantly throughout the experiment. Missing data points due to 
blinks or recording errors were corrected for by means of a linear 
interpolation procedure. Trigger codes in both the pupil and EEG data 
were synchronized with the EYE-EEG Matlab toolbox (Dimigen, 
Sommer, Hohlfeld, Jacobs, & Kliegl, 2011). Pupil size was initially 
recorded at a sampling rate of 250 Hz, but then up-sampled to 500 Hz to 
match the sampling rate of the EEG. The following steps in the pupil 
analysis were similar to those in EEG analysis. The data was epoched 
from -500 ms to 2500 ms, time-locked to the onset of the disks and 
averaged afterwards. Absolute pupil size in millimeters was used in the 
statistical analysis. 
Electrophysiological recordings and preprocessing  
EEG data were collected using a Brain Products actiCHamp 64-
channel system (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany) with 64 active 
scalp electrodes positioned according to the standard international 10-
20 system, two of which were attached to the left and right mastoids. 
Signals were recorded with a sampling rate of 500 Hz. During 
preprocessing, data was re-referenced offline to the average of the 
mastoids. Next, a band-pass filter of 0.01-30 Hz was applied. The data 
were epoched from -200 ms to 800 ms, time-locked to the onset of the 
probe stimuli and baseline-corrected using the 200 ms period preceding 
probe onset. Automatic artifact rejection was performed on these 
epochs, removing a small number of trials with extreme peak-to-peak 
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activity (50 µV) in a subset of posterior electrodes (CPz, Pz, POz, Oz, P1, 
PO3, P2, PO4). For each participant, less than 10% of trials were 
excluded, equally distributed across conditions. Next, these epochs were 
averaged within-subject and a grand average across subjects was 
calculated for plotting purposes. 
Analyses 
Pupil size measurements were based on previous work (Bombeke, 
Duthoo, Mueller, Hopf, & Boehler, 2016). We took the average diameter 
in the window starting 50 ms before (C1-eliciting) probe onset and 
ending 50 ms after it. It is important to note that the chosen time 
window captures the pupil size at the moment these probes were 
presented. The data was split out for early probes (T1; 400 ms after disk 
presentation) and late probes (T2; 2200 ms after disk presentation). In 
order to identify the time course and topographic location of the elicited 
C1, we collapsed the data across all blocks, conditions and participants, 
leading us to quantify the C1 as the average between 50 and 90 ms over 
occipito-parietal sites (POz, CPz, Pz, P1, P2) following probe onset. For 
alpha-band oscillatory activity, we performed a time-frequency analysis 
on the continuous data using Brain Vision Analyzer's (Brain Products, 
GmbH, Munich, Germany) complex demodulation function (see Worden, 
Foxe, Wang, & Simpson, 2000 for a similar approach), which was later 
epoched (from -200 to 2200 ms, time-locked to the onset of the cue) and 
baseline-corrected using the pre-stimulus time-range. The same 
automatic artifact rejection as in the EEG analysis was performed. 
Depending on the analyses, repeated-measures ANOVAs or two-tailed 
paired-samples t-tests were used to statistically compare average pupil 
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sizes, C1 amplitudes and alpha-band oscillatory activity across the 
experimental conditions. Finally, we calculated Bayes factors for the C1 
data at T1 and T2, in particular in order to quantify the support for the 
null hypothesis for the C1 at T1. Given that we did not find any 
significant interactions between block type (fixed vs. random) and the 
experimental conditions for all behavioral, pupil, and EEG measures, 
the data was collapsed across blocks. 
RESULTS 
Behavior 
In order to compare task difficulty across the different conditions, 
we ran a repeated-measures ANOVA with factors probe latency (T1 vs. 
T2) and attended disk color (attending white vs. attending black). For 
the proportion of correct change detections, both main effects of probe 
latency and attended disk color were not significant, F(1,19) = 1.85, p = 
.19, r = .3, and F(1,19) = 1.11, p = .30, r = .23, as was the interaction 
between probe latency and attended disk color, F(1,19) = 1.52, p = .23, r 
= .27. The proportion of correct responses was 90% for both change 
detection in white and black disks at T1 and 88% and 86% respectively 
for change detection in white and black disks at T2, respectively.  
 With respect to RT, the main effect of probe latency was non-
significant, F(1,19) = .20, p = .65, r = .10, whereas the main effect of 
attended disk color was, F(1,19) = 6.77, p = .02, r = .51. Yet, the 
interaction was not significant, F(1,19) = 2.44, p = .14, r = .34. The RT 
was on average 489 ms and 538 ms for change detection in white and 
black disks presented at T1, respectively. For probes presented at T2, 
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the RT was on average 515 ms for change detection in white disks and 
528 ms in black disks. Hence, whereas the accuracy parameter suggests 
similar performance in all four conditions, RT shows slightly faster 
response times for change detection trials presented while attending the 
white disk. Although this likely reflects a small difference in task 
difficulty that we would have liked to avoid (see also Bombeke, Duthoo, 
Mueller, Hopf, & Boehler, 2016), it is important to note that there did 
not seem to be a significant difference for this effect between T1 and T2. 
Pupil size 
Cuing participants to attend the white vs. black disk successfully 
manipulated pupil size and the pattern of results was highly similar to 
that of our previous work (Bombeke, Duthoo, Mueller, Hopf, & Boehler, 
2016). Consistent with our earlier work, we first ran a repeated-
measures ANOVA with factors probe latency (T1 vs. T2) and attended 
disk color (attending white vs. attending black) on the mean absolute 
pupil size in the 100 ms window surrounding the time of probe onset. 
Both main effects of probe latency, F(1,19) = 9.59, p = .01, r = .58, and 
attended disk color, F(1,19) = 61.90, p < .001, r = .87, were highly 
significant, as was the interaction, F(1,19) = 70.08, p < .001, r = .79. 
Follow-up two-tailed paired-sample t-tests comparing average pupil size 
while attending covertly to the white or black disk were conducted for 
probes at T1 and T2 separately. For T1, participants' pupils measured 
3.52 mm (SD = .43 mm) in diameter when covertly attending the white 
disk, and 3.52 mm (SD = .42 mm) when covertly attending the black 
disk, t(19) = .63, p = .54. For T2, pupils measured 3.53 mm (SD = .44 
mm) when covertly attending the white disk, and 3.64 mm (SD = .44 
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mm) when covertly attending the black disk, t(19) = 8.57, p < .001 (see 
Fig. 2).  
  
Fig 2. Time course of absolute pupil size in millimeters. Pupil-size was 
quantified in the 100 ms window surrounding the time of C1 stimulation, 
indicated by T1 (400 ms) and T2 (2200 ms), showing no difference at T1 and a 
strong difference at T2. 
C1 response 
At both T1 and T2, occipito-parietal C1s were evoked by 
presenting probe stimuli in the upper visual field. Time-range and 
electrode selection were based on the time course and topography of the 
overall C1 response, averaged across all conditions (see Fig. 3). This led 
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us to quantify the C1 with a measurement window of 50 ms to 90 ms 
post-probe at posterior electrodes POz, CPz, Pz, P1 and P2, after which 
the topography becomes a bit more anterior before the component 
completely subsides. Still, the overall C1 response seems to continue a 
little longer. Yet, exploration of the no-probe trials indicated that this 
was likely a consequence of the global overlap from disk processing (see 
below). Moreover, it has been argued that only the earlier parts of the 
C1 are in fact related to feedforward activity in primary visual cortex 
(Foxe & Simpson, 2002), so that an early quantification window seems 
desirable. 
   
Fig 3. The overall, condition-independent C1 response. Red box highlights 
the time-window in which the C1 was quantified. 
 
Because comparing the response to two stimuli (disk and probe) at 
T1 with the response to only one stimulus (probe) at T2 could be 
problematic due to the residual overlap at T1, we first sought to explore 
how far this residual overlap might have played a role in bringing about 
the present results. A strong indication of residual overlap is the 
sizeable main effect of probe latency that clearly shows that the C1 in 
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general is much larger at T1 compared to T2 (-3.64 µV vs. -1.41 µV), 
which seems unlikely to reflect a true difference in the C1 responses 
evoked by the same sensory stimulus at two different time points. 
Rather, the increased C1 at T1 is likely to reflect residual processing of 
the black and white disks, which were presented only 400 ms before T1 
in contrast to 2200 ms before T2. Such overlap would be fully preserved 
in the fixed blocks, and also the 100 ms jitter of T1 probes in the 
random blocks was probably insufficient to fully attenuate it. In order to 
corroborate this, we analyzed the 80 no-probe trials in the fixed block to 
discriminate between disk-related activity and probe-related activity, 
time-locked to T1 and T2 respectively. As Figure 4 shows, a steep 
negative-going slope is present for T1 even in the absence of a probe 
stimulus, but not for T2 (with a difference of 2.63 µV in the C1 window), 
which identifies residual overlap from disk processing as the likely 
cause of the large difference between probe latencies on C1 amplitudes. 
Running a repeated-measures ANOVA with factors probe latency (T1 
vs. T2) and attended disk color (attending white vs. attending black) on 
the mean posterior negative deflection between 50 and 90 ms after the 
time when the C1 would have been elicited (i.e., analyzing it as a C1) 
revealed a highly significant main effect for probe latency, F(1,19) = 
23.02, p <.001, r = .74 and a non-significant main effect for attended 
disk color and the interaction between the two, F(1,19) = .13, p = .72, r = 
.08 and F(1,19) = .52, p = .48, r = .16, respectively. This set of results 
indicates that residual overlap played a significant role in the overall C1 
amplitudes at T1, but not in a differential way across the experimental 
conditions. Given this clear lack of a differential effect, and since we had 
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only a limited number of no-probe trials, we decided against using them 
further for condition-wise overlap removal. 
  
Fig 4. No-probe trials (measured at posterior electrodes POz, CPz, Pz, P1 
and P2) time-locked to T1 (without probe stimulation) in the fixed block show a 
slow decrease in posterior activity, presumably related to the preceding visual 
processing of the disks. 
   
The above analysis of the residual overlap makes it clear that the 
evoked response at T1 represents more than just the response to the 
probe. This basic lack of comparability concerning not just amplitude 
effects but also sources of variance, led us to perform two-tailed paired-
sample t-tests for probes at T1 and T2 separately. Measurements were 
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performed on the mean posterior negative deflection between 50 and 90 
ms post-probe onset. For T1, the C1 measured -3.63 µV (SD = 1.39 µV) 
when covertly attending the white disk, and -3.64 µV (SD = 1.69 µV) 
when covertly attending the black disk, t(19) = -.08, p = .94. For T2, the 
C1 response was -1.59 µV (SD = .98 µV) when covertly attending the 
white disk, and -1.23 µV (SD = 1.14 µV) when covertly attending the 
black disk, t(19) = 2.15, p = .04. Hence, we find our hypothesized data 
pattern of a significant C1 modulation at T2 but not at T1 (Fig. 5). 
 
 
 Fig 5. C1 results. Grand-average C1 components (measured at posterior 
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While this data pattern is in line with our hypothesis, the mere 
demonstration that one statistical test is significant whereas the other 
one is not, is problematic (Nieuwenhuis, Forstmann, & Wagenmakers, 
2011). We therefore additionally estimated a Bayes factor using JASP 
software (JASP Team, 2016), in order to quantify in how far we could 
support the null hypothesis for T1 that there in fact was no difference. 
This analysis yielded an inverse Bayes factor (BF01) of 4.29 in favor of 
the null hypothesis for T1, indicating substantial support for the 
absence of a modulation in T1, according to the guidelines of Jeffreys 
(1998). Similarly, we found a BF01 of .32 that speaks in favor of the 
alternative hypotheses for T2, reflecting substantial support for the 
presence of the modulation. Yet another approach to deal with the 
problem of overlap at T1 was to apply a high-pass filter of 3Hz in order 
to get rid of the slow oscillations. Filtering T1 but not T2 led to similar 
C1 amplitudes for both time points, making them more comparible. 
Running a repeated-measures ANOVA with factors timing and pupil 
now resulted in a significant interaction between pupil size and timing 
(p = .02) with post-hoc paired samples t-tests showing a non-significant 
difference at T1 (p = .16) and a significant difference at T2 (p = .04). 
Taken together, although we are not sure yet what the approach is to 
analyze these C1 responses, we think the data seem to support the 
notion that there is no C1 modulation at T1, in contrast to the likely 
presence of such an effect at T2.  
Alpha-band oscillatory activity 
 In order to further dissociate between the effect of attentional 
state and mere pupil size, we measured oscillations in the alpha 
 
CHAPTER 4     142 
frequency range (8-12 Hz) which are known to index participants’ 
attentional state at T1 and T2. That is, lateralized attention to the left 
or right visual field results in an ipsilateral increase (Foxe & Snyder, 
2011) and contralateral decrease of posterior alpha-related activity (e.g. 
Gould, Rushworth, & Nobre, 2011; Kelly, Lalor, Reilly, & Foxe, 2006), 
enabling us to investigate if attention was already lateralized at the 
time of T1 probe stimulation and remained so at T2. Therefore, we 
performed a time-frequency analysis for which we considered 8-12 Hz as 
the alpha frequency range, based on previous research (Grent-'t-Jong, 
Boehler, Kenemans, & Woldorff, 2011; Limbach & Corballis, 2017). The 
data was binned following a two-by-two design with factors attended 
disk color (attending white vs. attending black) and attentional 
lateralization (attending left vs. attending right). Because we were 
primarily interested in alpha power related to lateralized attentional 
processing, we decided to only analyze the data from T2 trials in order 
to avoid sensory responses to T1 probes. Since participants did not know 
when a target stimulus (or probe stimulus) would be presented, we 
could look at the T1 and T2 time-points respectively in a fashion that 
was not confounded by sensory responses at T1. Furthermore, we now 
time-locked the epochs to the onset of the arrow cue instead of the onset 
of the disks, since it was likely that lateralized attention could be 
prepared in the absence of the disks as soon as the participant knew 
which side to attend. We measured the alpha power at 400 ms and 2200 
ms after the onset of the disks. Attention to the right visual field was 
measured at P3, PO3 and PO7, whereas attention to the left visual field 
was measured at the mirror locations P4, PO4 and PO8. Afterwards, the 
resulting left-right differences were collapsed to contra-ipsi differences 
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for statistical analyses and plotting purposes.  
 Given the aforementioned lack of comparability between T1 and 
T2 because of differential overlap from the disks, we again performed 
paired samples t-tests to check for statistical significance. Collapsing 
the data across probe latency and disk color showed a marginally 
significant difference between contralateral and ipsilateral attention, 
t(19) = 2.02, p = .06, but note that this two-tailed significance test is 
rather conservative given the presumed direction of the effect. Split out 
for T1 and T2, the difference between contralateral and ipsilateral 
attention was highly significant at T1, t(19) = -2.68, p = .01, and 
marginally significant at T2, t(19) = 1.71, p = .1 (Fig. 6; again note the 
two-tailed nature of the test). Hence, we find support for our hypothesis 
that attention is already in place at T1, and this effect seems to stay on 
quite consistently until T2.  
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Fig 6. Posterior oscillatory alpha activity measured at contra- vs. ipsilateral to 
the focus of attention, collapsed across attended disk color. Dotted lines indicate 
the onset of the disks, probes at T1 and probes at T2 (although no probes were 
presented at T1 for this subset of data to avoid a sensory response). The 
topographic scalp map shows the decreased alpha power collapsed across both 
contralateral and ipsilateral activity. 
 
DISCUSSION 
In the present work we replicate and extend our previous 
demonstration that pupil size can influence the feedforward response in 
V1 as reflected by the C1 component of the human EEG (Bombeke, 
Duthoo, Mueller, Hopf, & Boehler, 2016). In this earlier study we used 
stimuli creating a brightness illusion (Laeng & Endestad, 2012) as well 
as an attentional-cuing experiment (Binda, Pereverzeva, & Murray, 
2013b), in which participants either attended a bright or a dark lateral 
disk stimulus (while the other one was presented on the opposite side). 
In both cases a change of pupil size led to a C1 modulation, such that a 
large pupil was associated with a decreased amplitude response. 
Although this earlier work generally controlled well for differences of 
physical stimulation across experimental conditions, it was the first 
demonstration of such an effect, leaving open some alternative 
explanations. In the present work, we provide further experimental 
support for pupil size directly influencing the amplitude of the C1 
component. (i) We replicate the general effect of an inverse relationship 
between pupil size and C1 amplitude for probes presented at a time-
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point after stimulus onset, where the pupil shows a size difference. (ii) 
We find no such modulation at an earlier time-point at which pupil size 
was not modulated yet, but attention was already shifted to the cued 
side, as verified by a significant alpha-power lateralization at this 
moment (Limbach & Corballis, 2017).  
 The rationale of the present study was to investigate the mere 
effect of pupil size while excluding potential attentional (or related) 
confounds through dissociating the two processes across two time-points 
during the task. We decided to focus on the attentional-cuing 
experiment based on Binda, Pereverzeva, and Murray (2013b) because 
it yields reliable pupil-size differences and also has a rather well-
defined time-line for when they arise. First, we were successful in 
replicating the pattern of modulating pupil size seen before (Bombeke, 
Duthoo, Mueller, Hopf, & Boehler, 2016): covertly attending a white 
disk resulted in relative pupil constriction, whereas covertly attending 
the black disk led to relative pupil dilation. Second, this difference in 
pupil size was not present at T1. It started 500-600 ms after the 
presentation of the disks and showed a significant difference at T2. 
Third, we found evidence that attention was consistently lateralized 
across both possible probe time-points by looking at hemisphere –
lateralized alpha oscillations (8-12 Hz), which are known to index the 
deployment of attention to lateralized items in the visual field (Foxe & 
Snyder, 2011; e.g. Gould, Rushworth, & Nobre, 2011; Kelly, Lalor, 
Reilly, & Foxe, 2006). In line with our expectations, we did find a 
(small) effect of lateralization with decreased posterior alpha activity 
contralateral to the attended visual field. This effect did not interact 
with the pupil manipulation and seemed to continue rather consistently 
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until T2, indicating a similar attentional state across conditions and 
time-points.  
 One aspect we were not completely successful with was equating 
task difficulty across the different pupil-size conditions. Specifically, in 
a subset of the trials, participants had to detect color changes in the 
disk they were attending, and we had strived to make this task equally 
difficult in the white and the black disk, as was the case in our earlier 
work (Bombeke, Duthoo, Mueller, Hopf, & Boehler, 2016). Although in 
the present experiment performance was again highly similar in terms 
of detection accuracy, there was a slight difference in reaction time: 
people tended to be faster in detecting changes in white disks. While 
this is not optimal from the perspective of equating the attentional state 
for the two pupil-size conditions, the small difference in response speed 
still does not seem to pose a severe problem. On a basic level, since we 
emphasized accuracy rather than speed when instructing participants, 
it seems questionable whether participants indeed ended up paying 
more attention to the dark disks (also because a slight difference in 
difficulty does not necessarily trigger an increase in attention). More 
importantly, however, there was no interaction between probe latency 
and attended disk color, i.e. any subtle difference in attentional state 
should be similar for the two probe times, for which we find the key 
dissociation for the C1 (numerically, in fact, the difference is larger at 
T1, where we did not observe a C1 modulation). Finally, alpha power 
lateralization did not seem to be differentially modulated by which disk 
was attended, further suggesting a similar attentional state. 
  Another point worth discussing is that there was a general lack of 
comparability between the C1 component evoked at T1 and T2. 
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Specifically, the former is driven both in amplitude and in variance by 
an additional stimulus (the disks, and possibly even the preceding 
arrow stimuli). This was evident when looking at no-probe trials that 
showed significant residual overlap from these preceding stimuli. 
Specifically, the C1 was more than twice as large at T1 compared to T2, 
which seemed to rely strongly on overlap during T1. As such, we had to 
compare C1 amplitudes within T1 and T2. For T2, we found the 
expected replication of the effect that a smaller pupil goes together with 
a larger C1. For T1, we found that they were virtually identical. Yet, in 
order not to rely on an insignificant t-test alone to infer a null effect 
(Nieuwenhuis, Forstmann, & Wagenmakers, 2011), we additionally 
calculated the Bayes factors, which provided substantial support for the 
null hypothesis, and reported an analysis for which we high-pass 
filtered the T1 response, making the C1 amplitudes more comparable. 
Taken together, these results support our main hypothesis that there 
would be a C1 modulation at T2 but not at T1.  
 The present data provides critical support for the notion that pupil 
size directly influences feedforward processing in primary visual cortex. 
Specifically, the fact that the C1 modulation was present only at a time-
point when the pupil-size change had occurred, but not at an earlier 
time-point where attention was already deployed to the lateralized 
items, makes it highly unlikely that the C1 modulation reflects 
attentional state/lateralization, also not as a function of slight 
differences in task difficulty. Rather, we still deem our previously put 
forward explanation along the lines of a basic optical aperture effect 
with more optical aberrations at a large pupil likely (Campbell & Green, 
1965) to be most parsimonious. Yet, it is important to note that our 
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work cannot speak directly to earlier work concerning psychological 
effects on the C1 (for a review, see Rauss, Schwartz, & Pourtois, 2011), 
even if such studies might have featured pupil-size differences. Our 
work only shows in principle that pupil size can influence the C1. 
Importantly, there are a number of demonstrations of C1 modulations 
that are very unlikely to have been influenced by pupil size. This 
applies in particular to studies that, very much like T1 in the present 
work, elicited the C1 at times when a possible pupil response is unlikely 
to have happened yet (Kelly, Gomez-Ramirez, & Foxe, 2008; Pourtois, 
Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2004; Rossi, et al., 2017) or in which 
pupil size was measured and controlled for (Bayer, et al., 2017).    
 Finally, the question arises whether the modulation we observe 
here only reflects an indirect by-product of the locus coeruleus-
noradrenergic system (Jepma & Nieuwenhuis, 2011) or also an adaptive 
mechanism by itself (Mathot & Van der Stigchel, 2015). The present 
data only suggest that peripheral visual information is represented less 
accurately when the pupil is large, without it being obvious at this point 
that this could be adaptive.  
CONCLUSION  
 In the present study, we provide important additional 
support for the notion that pupil size can directly affect the feedforward 
flow of visual information through primary visual cortex as reflected by 
the C1. Specifically, we demonstrate that the C1 is not modulated before 
the pupil starts to show a size difference across conditions. Importantly, 
we show that alpha-power lateralization, which indexes attentional 
 
CHAPTER 4     149 
deployment to the cued side of the lateralized display, appears before 
and after the pupil shows an amplitude difference. This confirms that 
the C1 modulation associated with the pupil change does not reflect an 
effect of attention to the target side. In further supporting the 
observation that pupil size can directly influence C1 amplitudes, the 
present work further emphasizes the potential relevance of pupil size 
for the study of psychological influences on early visual processing.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
INCREASED EFFORT WITHOUT BEHAVIORAL PAY-OFF: 
SUSTAINED PUPIL DILATION AND INCREASED 
ATTENTIONAL PROCESSING IN A REWARDED 
CONTEXT1 
Reward manipulations, including sustained ones, have been found to 
increase task performance and enhance control-related brain activity, in 
particular in prefrontal cortex in various task domains. At the same 
time, reward leads to pupillary dilation, which is assumed to be related 
to neural activity of the locus coeruleus-norepinephrine system. In the 
present study, we focused on sustained effects of rewarded task contexts 
on conflict processing in a Flanker task. In half of the blocks, 
participants received monetary rewards for fast and accurate 
performance. In contrast to our expectations, we failed to find any 
behavioral benefits associated with rewarded contexts. Still, we did 
observe a significant larger posterior negativity related to distracter 
processing in the rewarded contexts, presumably reflecting a sensory 
gating mechanism generally boosting the incoming sensory information. 
Moreover, pupil size was significantly increased in a sustained fashion 
in rewarded contexts. We interpret the findings in terms of the adaptive 
gain theory and argue that there can be a dissociation between 
electrophysiological or pupil-related reward modulations on the one 
hand and actual task performance on the other hand.  
 
 
                                                     
1Bombeke, K., Kostandyan, M., Notebaert, W., & Boehler, C. N. Increased 
effort without behavioral pay-off: Sustained pupil dilation and increased 
attentional processing in a rewarded context. Manuscript in preparation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many studies have shown effects of monetary incentives on both 
behavioral performance and its underlying neural mechanisms in a 
variety of task contexts, including conflict processing (Braver, 2015). In 
paradigms measuring cognitive conflict, participants typically have to 
overcome stimulus and response conflict by allocating more attention to 
task-relevant stimulus features while simultaneously suppressing task-
irrelevant features (see for example the seminal conflict monitoring 
model of Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Importantly, 
reward availability can be communicated  in different ways: most 
studies employ cues predicting the potential of reward in the upcoming 
trial (e.g. Padmala & Pessoa, 2011), whereas other studies directly 
associate specific task features with reward (e.g. specific rewarded ink 
colors in Stroop task; Krebs, Boehler, Egner, & Woldorff, 2011; Krebs, 
Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010). However, reward can also have effects on a 
longer time scale by creating a motivational context (thereby benefitting 
all trials that are presented in a block-wise fashion). Comparing large 
blocks of trials in which reward can be obtained on every trial (given 
fast and accurate performance) with blocks in which there is no reward 
to earn, allows to study sustained reward effects (Chiew & Braver, 
2014; Jimura, Locke, & Braver, 2010; Langford, Krebs, Talsma, 
Woldorff, & Boehler, 2016; Massar, Lim, Sasmita, & Chee, 2016; 
Paschke, et al., 2015; Schevernels, et al., 2015; Small, et al., 2005; 
Soutschek, Stelzel, Paschke, Walter, & Schubert, 2015; Soutschek, 
Strobach, & Schubert, 2014). According to Notebaert and Braem (2015), 
these reward manipulations on the block level presumably influence 
motivational aspects, whereas performance contingent reward 
manipulations on the trial level would rather trigger learning responses 
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and performance non-contingent reward manipulations would lead to 
affective responses. Jimura, Locke, and Braver (2010), for example, 
found that a rewarding context in a working-memory task had a 
sustained effect on the maintenance of goal-related behavior, reflected 
by changes in behavioral performance (faster responses) and its 
underlying brain mechanisms (sustained increase in lateral prefrontal 
cortex activity). Other studies found similar findings, showing increased 
sustained attention performance in blocks with potential high reward 
compared to blocks with low and neutral reward (e.g. Massar, Lim, 
Sasmita, & Chee, 2016) and reward-related increases in parietal and 
prefrontal cognitive control regions (Locke & Braver, 2008).   
 In the present study, we wanted to extend these findings on 
sustained effects of rewarded contexts to conflict processing in a typical 
cognitive-control task like the Eriksen flanker task. This has been done 
before in an fMRI context in which a context of potential gain was 
compared with a context of potential loss (Paschke, et al., 2015). Making 
use of a flanker task with word stimuli, the authors showed specific 
patterns of stimulus- and task-related activity for congruent and 
incongruent trials in both contexts, without discriminating between 
task-irrelevant and task-relevant stimulus processing. Therefore, we 
were specifically interested in reward-modulated distracter- and task 
processing as reflected by attentional event-related EEG components. 
However, when presenting task-irrelevant (i.e. distracter arrows) and 
task-relevant (i.e. target arrow) information at the same time, a possible 
simultaneous enhancement of task-relevant and inhibition of task-
irrelevant processes might camouflage each other in the EEG signal. 
Therefore, we adopted the paradigm of Appelbaum and colleagues in 
which there was a 200 ms-stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between 
the task-irrelevant and task-relevant information (Appelbaum, Boehler, 
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Won, Davis, & Woldorff, 2012; Appelbaum, Meyerhoff, & Woldorff, 
2009). This 200-ms window allows for an analysis of irrelevant stimulus 
processing only, before processes related to target processing have 
begun. In a previous study with a similar paradigm and task design, we 
found a decreased attention-related visual N1 component in this 
irrelevant-only time window, which we related to strategic attentional 
filtering in a context of conflict adaptation (Bombeke, Langford, 
Notebaert, & Boehler, 2017). This modulation was associated with 
enhanced performance, since less attention was allocated to the 
distracting information. Here, we wanted to probe for reward 
modulation of this component when comparing a rewarded and non-
rewarded context.   
  Besides looking at attentional ERP components related to conflict 
processing, we were also interested in the effect of a 
rewarded/motivational context on pupil dilation and its possible role as 
marker of attentional control. It has been known for a long time that 
reward and motivation lead to pupillary dilation, presumably by effects 
on arousal, effort, and attention (Manohar & Husain, 2015; Massar, 
Lim, Sasmita, & Chee, 2016; Mitz, Chacko, Putnam, Rudebeck, & 
Murray, 2017). Furthermore, many studies have found that pupil 
dilation and constriction are inherently related to neural activity of the 
locus coeruleus-norepinephrine system (for a review, see Eckstein, 
Guerra-Carrillo, Miller Singley, & Bunge, 2016). According to the 
seminal adaptive gain theory (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005), there is an 
inverted-U relationship between LC activity and performance on tasks 
requiring focused attention. Performance would be optimal for moderate 
levels of LC activity and suboptimal for low and high levels, leading to a 
drowsy and distractible attentional state, respectively. Similarly, it has 
been shown that increases in LC activity and hence baseline pupil 
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diameter are associated with task disengagement or an explorative 
attentional state, whereas decreases and pupil constriction are 
associated with task engagement and a more exploitative attentional 
state (Gilzenrat, Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, & Cohen, 2010; Jepma & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2011; Unsworth & Robison, 2016; van den Brink, 
Murphy, & Nieuwenhuis, 2016). Together, this identifies pupil size as 
an interesting index of attentional state and it has been shown before to 
be modulated by reward (Massar, Lim, Sasmita, & Chee, 2016).  
 Hence, we planned to measure both electrophysiological markers 
of attentional filtering during distracter processing and the sustained 
effect of reward on pupil size to investigate whether they reflect related 
cognitive processes. Specifically, we hypothesized that in a rewarding 
context, less attention would be allocated to the distracter arrows, 
reflected by a decreased attention-related N1 component time-locked to 
the distracter. This would be in line with our previous work showing a 
decreased posterior attention-related N1 reflecting less attentional 
allocation to the irrelevant information after incongruent trials 
(Bombeke, Langford, Notebaert, & Boehler, 2017). In contrast, we 
expected a larger N1 time-locked to the target arrow in the reward 
context, as far as this can be measured given the overlap of the 
immediately preceding distractor processing. Second, we expected the 
distracter-related N1 modulation to be inversely related to the 
congruency effect, with larger differences in N1 components associated 
with smaller congruency effects in the rewarding context (and hence 
improved performance because of reward). Third, a rewarded context 
should be associated with a sustained increase in pupil dilation, as 
reflected by a difference in baseline pupil size. Finally, we expected this 
difference to be a marker of the amount of mental effort or attentional 
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allocation, predicting the success of attentional inhibition and 
potentially the size of the N1 component.  
METHOD 
Participants 
For this experiment, 23 participants (7 ♂, 16 ♀, M = 22.9 years) 
were selected on the basis of an online prescreening questionnaire via 
the Experimetrix scheduling system (https://experimetrix2.com/rug/). In 
these questionnaires, people had to indicate their age, gender, 
handedness and if they had abnormal vision or any neurological 
disorders. Every interested candidate below 30 years old without 
abnormal vision (corrected vision was not allowed) and neurological 
disorders would be invited to subscribe for the experiment via the 
scheduling system. Before completing the experiment, participants 
signed an informed consent in which they were informed about their 
right to stop the experiment whenever they wanted. The procedures 
were approved by the ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences of Ghent University and participants received 
25€ for a session that lasted two hours, plus a variable performance-
based monetary bonus of up to 5€. Due to technical problems with the 
EEG set-up, resulting in an high signal-to-noise ratio, we had to exclude 
the data of three participants. 
Stimuli 
In order to look at attentional processes in cognitive control, we 
used a variant of the Flanker task with arrows pointing in four different 
directions (left up, left down, right up, right down). White arrows were 
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presented on a gray background with a small fixation dot at the center 
of the screen. Timing was based on Appelbaum, Boehler, Won, Davis, 
and Woldorff (2012), presenting the irrelevant distracter arrows always 
200 ms before the relevant target arrows. This resulted in a "predictable 
timing" with respect to when the target arrow would be presented. The 
first independent variable was congruency, so trials could be either 
congruent (e.g., distracter and target both pointing upwards left) or 
incongruent (e.g., distracter pointing downwards left and target 
pointing upwards right). In each block, half of the trials were congruent 
(four different pairings) and half of the trials were incongruent (twelve 
possible pairings, distributed evenly). 
Procedure and design 
Participants were instructed to respond to the direction of the 
target arrow as fast and accurate as possible. Because of the predictable 
timing, participants knew that the irrelevant word or distracting arrows 
would always be presented first. They had to respond by manually 
pressing one of four keys on the keyboard corresponding to four 
different arrow directions and they had some time to memorize this 
response mapping before the start of the experimental phase. The 
distracter was presented for 200 ms, after which the target arrow was 
added for another 200 ms. Next, the fixation dot was presented again 
for 1000 ms in which responses were registered, followed by a jittered 
response-to-stimulus delay from 900 to 1200 ms (M = 1050 ms). 
Importantly, participants were informed they would get additional 
monetary rewards based on a point scheme (+10 points) for each trial 
when responding fast and accurate in reward blocks. In these rewarded 
blocks, cumulative reward feedback in the form of the sum of earned 
points was presented every 20 trials. After the experiment, the total 
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number of earned points was converted to a monetary reward 
(maximum of 5 Euros).  Participants completed four completely 
randomized blocks of 128 trials each (64 congruent and 64 incongruent 
trials) and got a reward for fast and accurate responses in two out of the 
four blocks (R = rewarded block, NR = non-rewarded block). The 
presentation order of blocks was counterbalanced across participants 
(R-NR-R-NR vs. NR-R-NR-R), in order to minimize the influence of 
training effects or spill-over effects. 
Fig 1. Design of the experiment. (A) On each trial participants were 
instructed to manually respond to the direction of the target arrow as fast and 
accurate as possible. Irrelevant distracter arrows would always be presented 
200 ms before the relevant target arrow (also presented for 200 ms). (B) Trials 
were presented in two rewarded blocks and two non-rewarded blocks, 
counterbalanced across participants. In the rewarded block, participants could 
earn additional monetary rewards by giving a fast and accurate response. 
Behavioral data acquisition and analysis 
For RT analyses, the first trial of each block and incorrect or 
missed responses on trial n were excluded and an outlier rejection 
criterion of 2 SDs was applied. RT and error rates were analyzed with 
repeated-measures ANOVAs (rANOVAs), with factors reward context 
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(rewarded block vs. non-rewarded block) and congruency (congruent vs. 
incongruent trial). The significance threshold was set to a p-value of .05. 
Pupil measurements and preprocessing 
We used a 250 Hz SMI eye tracker (RED250 mobile system; 
SensoMotoric Instruments, Teltow, Germany) to continuously measure 
pupil size during the experiment. A camera with infrared optics was 
attached to a standard 17-inch computer screen and a chinrest was used 
to minimize head movements and to maintain a fixed distance of 65 cm 
from the screen. Each block of the experiment started with a calibration 
procedure in which participants had to follow a moving red dot with 
their eyes to nine locations on a grey background. The EEG chamber 
was dimly lit constantly throughout the experiment. Missing data 
points due to blinks or recording errors were corrected for by means of a 
linear interpolation procedure. Trigger codes in both the pupil and EEG 
data were synchronized with the EYE-EEG Matlab toolbox (Dimigen, 
Sommer, Hohlfeld, Jacobs, & Kliegl, 2011). Pupil size was initially 
recorded at a sampling rate of 250 Hz, but then up-sampled to 500 Hz to 
match the sampling rate of the EEG. The following steps in the pupil 
analysis were similar to those in EEG analysis. The data was epoched 
from -500 ms to 2500 ms, time-locked to the onset of the distracter 
arrows and averaged afterwards. Absolute pupil size in millimeters was 
used in the statistical analysis, without applying baseline correction to 
capture block-level differences.  
EEG acquisition, preprocessing and analysis 
EEG data were collected using a Brain Products actiCHamp 64-
channel system (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany) with 64 active 
scalp electrodes positioned according to the standard international 10-
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20 system, two of which were attached to the left and right mastoids. 
Signals were recorded with a sampling rate of 500 Hz. The EEG data 
was analyzed using the EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and 
ERPLAB (Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014) toolboxes in Matlab. During 
preprocessing, data was re-referenced offline to the average of the 
mastoids. Next, a band-pass filter of 0.01-30 Hz was applied. The data 
were epoched from -200 ms to 1000 ms, time-locked to the onset of the 
distracter arrows and baseline-corrected using the 200 ms period 
preceding probe onset. Automatic artifact rejection was performed on 
these epochs, removing a small number of trials with extreme peak-to-
peak activity (150 µV). For each participant, less than 15% of trials 
were excluded, equally distributed across conditions. Next, these epochs 
were averaged according to conditions (within-subjects) and a grand 
average across subjects was calculated for plotting purposes.   
 The data was split out for rewarded and non-rewarded blocks (2 
blocks of 128 trials each). Although the N1 was the main component of 
interest was N1, we also report P1 measurements. In order to identify 
the time course and topographic location of the elicited P1 and N1, we 
collapsed the data across all blocks, conditions and participants, leading 
us to quantify the P1 as the average amplitude between 100 and 150 ms 
and the N1 as the average amplitude between 150 and 200 ms. Since 
there seemed to be both midline and lateral parietal activity, we 
included both regions in the analyses as a factor region-of-interest (ROI; 
midline: POz, lateralized: PO7 and PO8). Depending on the analyses, 
rANOVAs or two-tailed paired-samples t-tests were used to statistically 








A rANOVA with factors congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) 
and reward context (rewarded block vs. non-rewarded block) on the 
average RT showed a highly significant main effect of congruency, 
F(1,19) = 201.48, p < .001, r = .96 but a non-significant main effect 
reward context, F(1,19) = .05, p = .82, r = .05. The interaction between 
congruency and reward context was also not significant, F(1,19)= .57, p 
= .46, r = .17. With respect to accuracy, participants made on average an 
error in 12% of the trials. The main effect of congruency (congruent vs. 
incongruent) was again highly significant, F(1,19) = 40.32, p <.001, r = 
.82, whereas the effect of reward context (rewarded block vs. non-
rewarded block) was not, F(1,19) = .04, p = .85, r = .04. The interaction 
between congruency and reward context was also not significant, 
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 Fig 2. Behavioral analyses. Participants responded significantly faster (A) 
and more accurate (B) on congruent trials than on incongruent trials. For both 
RT and accuracy, there was no main effect of rewarded context or an interaction 
between rewarded context and congruency 
 
Because of the surprising lack of reward effects, we probed the 
behavioral data further by employing delta-plot analyses and 
conditional accuracy functions analyses to visualize and compare RT 
quantiles and to examine whether the experimental manipulation had a 
larger effect on the relatively fast responses or on the relatively slow 
ones (Speckman, Rouder, Morey, & Pratte, 2008). Delta plots (Fig 3A) 
showed that the difference between congruent and incongruent trials 
was mostly explained by the fast RT trials and that there was an 
inverse relationship between congruency effect size and RT. Just like in 
the main analyses, there was no effect of reward context. Conditional 
accuracy functions (Fig 3B) showed that accuracy for congruent trials 
was close to 100%, even for the slowest RT trials and that the difference 
in accuracy between congruent and incongruent trials was again driven 
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by the fast RT trials. Taken together, we observed no behavioral 
difference between rewarded or non-rewarded task contexts, neither for 
plain RT and accuracy measures nor for more detailed distributional 
analyses that could have revealed more subtle effects.  
  
Fig 3. Additional behavioral analyses. (A) Delta plots showing that the 
reaction time difference between congruent and incongruent trials was mostly 
explained by the fast RT trials and that there was an inverse relationship 
between effect size and RT. (B) Conditional accuracy functions primarily 
showing that the difference in accuracy between congruent and incongruent 
trials was driven by the fast RT trials. 
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Pupil size measurements 
Sustained pupillary response. In order to analyze the 
sustained pupillary response, we measured the absolute pupil size from 
-10 ms to +10 ms, time-locked to the presentation of the distracter 
arrows, thereby furthermore avoiding the light reflex triggered by the 
visual stimulation while providing a point estimate of sustained pupil 
size. Given the general sluggishness of the pupil response, pupil size in 
this interval could furthermore not be related to the neural processing 
of the current trial and reflected therefore the general effect of reward 
context only. Nevertheless, we decided to include the congruency of the 
current trial in the model for the sake of completeness. A rANOVA with 
factors congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and reward context 
(rewarded vs. non-rewarded) showed the expected non-significant main 
effect congruency, F(1,19) = .001, p = .97, r = 0, and a highly significant 
main effect of reward context, F(1,19) = 26.12, p < .001, r = .58. The 
interaction between congruency and reward context was not significant, 
F(1,19) = .81, p = .38, r = .20. As shown in Figure 4, absolute pupil size 
was consistently larger at trial onset in a rewarded context (M = 5.67 
mm, SD = 0.86 mm) compared to a non-rewarded context (M = 5.49 mm, 
SD = 0.84 mm).   
 Transient pupillary response. For the analysis of the transient 
pupillary response, we measured the mean evoked pupil dilation change 
for the entire duration of the trial (0 to 2000 ms). Importantly, for this 
purpose we employed a baseline correction (from -500 ms to distracter 
onset) in order to exclusively identify transient changes (i.e., Fig. 4 is 
not reflecting this data in the sense that it was not baseline-corrected). 
A rANOVA with factors congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and 
reward context (rewarded vs. non-rewarded) showed a significant main 
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effect congruency, F(1,19) = 5.64, p = .03, r = .48 and a non-significant 
main effect of reward context, F(1,19) = .40, p = .54, r = .14. The 
interaction between congruency and reward context was not significant, 
F(1,19) = .01, p = .91, r = .03. In contrast with the sustained pupillary 
response, the main effect of congruency reflects an increase in pupil size 
for incongruent trials compared to congruent trials, independently of 
the reward context. Descriptively, this congruency effect had the 
expected latency, starting about 800 ms after distracter onset. Since an 
effect of congruency could hence only show up during the second part of 
the trial (i.e. 1000 to 2000 ms), we performed an additional analysis on 
the mean evoked pupil dilation change between 1000 and 2000 ms post-
trial onset. A rANOVA with factors congruency and reward context 
showed a significant (but smaller) main effect of congruency, F(1,19) = 
4.49, p = .05, r = .05, and a non-significant main effect of reward 
context, F(1,19) = .40, p = .54, r = .14. The interaction between 
congruency and reward context was not significant, F(1,19) = .01, p = 
.92, r = .03. 
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Fig 4. Pupil response. Absolute pupil size (in mm) was consistently larger 
at trial onset in a rewarded context compared to a non-rewarded context. 
ERPs 
Distracter-related P1. A rANOVA with factors congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent), reward context (rewarded block vs. non-
rewarded block) and ROI (midline vs. lateralized) performed on the 
peak amplitude in a 50-ms window between 100 and 150 ms post-
distracter onset revealed no significant main effects for congruency, 
F(1,19) = 2.01, p = .17, r = .31, reward context, F(1,19) = 1.53, p = .23, r 
= .27, and ROI, F(1,19) = 2.04, p = .17, r = .31. This lack of congruency 
effect makes sense, given that the congruency status of the trial could 
only be determined after the presentation of the target arrow after 200 
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ms. The two-way interactions between congruency and reward context, 
F(1(19) = .21, p = .65, r =.10, and between congruency and ROI, F(1,19) 
= .59, p = .45, r = .17,  were also not significant, whereas the interaction 
between reward context and ROI was highly significant, F(1,19) = 36.14, 
p < .001, r = .81. Follow-up paired-samples t-tests on the data collapsed 
across congruency showed a highly significant difference between 
reward and non-rewarded contexts for the posterior midline ROI, t(19) = 
-3.12, p < .01 but not for the lateralized ROI, t(19) = .46, p = .65. For the 
posterior midline ROI, the P1 was larger in a rewarded context (M = 
2.01, SD = 3.65) compared to a non-rewarded context (M = 1.34, SD = 
3.71), whereas there was no clear difference in the lateralized ROI 
(rewarded context; M = 2.51, SD = 2.14, non-rewarded context, M = 
2.40, SD = 1.87). Finally, the three-way interaction between congruency, 
reward context and ROI was not significant, F(1,19) = 2.85, p = .11, r = 
.36.  
 Target-related P1. Since the central target arrow was presented 
only 200 ms after the four irrelevant distracter arrows, it was 
impossible to measure pure target-related EEG acitivity. Therefore, it is 
important to keep in mind that, whereas the distracter-related early 
attentional ERPs can only be distracter-related, the target-related ERPs 
can reflect both distracter and target processing. Nevertheless, a 
rANOVA with factors congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), reward 
context (rewarded block vs. non-rewarded block) and ROI (midline vs. 
lateralized) performed on the peak amplitude in a 50-ms window 
between 100 and 150 ms post-target onset revealed a highly significant 
main effect for congruency, F(1,19) = 20.07, p < .001, r = .72, but not for 
reward context, F(1,19) = .90, p = .35, r = .21, and ROI, F(1,19) = .08, p = 
.78, r = .06. The two-way interaction between congruency and reward 
context was marginally significant, F(1,19) = 4.43, p = .05, r =.42, 
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whereas the interactions between congruency and ROI and reward 
context and ROI were not, F(1,19) = 3, p = .1, r = .37, and F(1,19) = 2.02, 
p = .17, r = .31 were not. The three-way interaction between congruency, 
reward context and ROI also did not reach significance, F(1,19) = .66, p 
= .43, r = .18.  
 Distracter-related N1. A rANOVA with factors congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent), reward context (rewarded block vs. non-
rewarded block) and ROI (lateralized vs. non-lateralized) performed on 
the peak amplitude in a 50-ms window between 150 and 200 ms post-
distracter onset showed significant main effects of reward context and 
ROI, F(1,19) = 6.21, p = .02, r = .5, and F(1,19) = 6, p = .02, r = .49, 
whereas the main effect of congruency lacked significance, F(1,19) = .15, 
p = .70, r = .09. Again, the lack of congruency effect was expected 
because the congruency status of the trial could only be determined 
after the presentation of the target arrow after 200 ms. The two-way 
interactions between congruency and reward context, F(1,19) = .03, p = 
.87, r = .03, reward context and ROI, F(1,19) = 3.05, p = .1, r = .37, and 
congruency and ROI, F(1,19) = .68, p = .42, r = .19, were not significant, 
just like the tree-way interaction, F(1,19) = .36, p = .56, r = .14. Since 
there were significant main effects for reward context and ROI and the 
interaction between the two showed a tendency for significance, we ran 
some additional analyses. Paired samples t-tests showed a significant 
difference in N1 amplitude between the rewarded and non-rewarded 
context for the midline electrode, t(19) = -2.89, p = .01, but not for the 
lateralized electrodes, t(19) = -1.69, p = .11. As shown in Figure 5B, 
there was a more pronounced N1 amplitude (more negative) at POz 
when trials are presented in a rewarded context (M = -3.99, SD = 3.93) 
compared to a non-rewarded context (M = -2.90, SD = 3.35). 
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Target-related N1. A rANOVA with factors congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent), reward context (rewarded block vs. non-
rewarded block) and ROI (lateralized vs. non-lateralized) performed on 
the peak amplitude in a 50-ms window between 150 and 200 ms post-
distracter onset showed significant main effects of congruency and ROI, 
F(1,19) = 6.31, p = .02, r = .5, and F(1,19) = 14.26, p = .001, r = .65, 
respectively, whereas the main effect of reward context lacked 
significance, F(1,19) = .38, p = .55, r = .14. Since both distracter and 
target arrows were presented at this point, an effect of congruency was 
possible. The two-way interactions between congruency and reward 
context, F(1,19) = 2.14, p = .16, r = .32, reward context and ROI, F(1,19) 
= 2.30, p = .15, r = .33 were not significant, whereas the interaction 
between congruency and ROI was, F(1,19) = 6.29, p = .02, r = .50. The 
tree-way interaction did not reach significance, F(1,19) = .75, p = .40, r = 
.19. 
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Fig 5. ERP results. (A)(B) For distracter processing, there was a highly 
significant posterior N1 difference between reward and non-rewarded contexts 
for the posterior midline ROI (POz) but not for the lateralized ROI (PO7/PO8). 
(C)(D) For target processing, no significant modulations related to reward 
context were observed. 
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Conflict-related N2. Since we expected a shift in latency for the 
conflict-related N2 component due to the delayed presentation of the 
target arrow, we visually identified the N2 component using the 
topographic map across conditions and decided to measure it between 
400 and 500 ms post-distracter onset at its typically-found location, the 
frontal midline electrode FCz. A rANOVA with factors congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent) and reward context (rewarded block vs. 
non-rewarded block) revealed a highly significant main effect of 
congruency, F(1,19) = 43.80, p < .001, r = .83, and a non-significant 
main effect of reward context, F(1,19) = .91, p = .35, r = .21. The 
interaction between congruency and reward context did not reach 
significance, F(1,19) = .13, p = .72, r = .08.  
 Correlations. Because we found significant modulations of 
attention-related ERPs and the size of the pupil, we ran additional 
correlation analyses (pupil-EEG, pupil-behavior and EEG-behavior. 
Unfortunately, we failed to find any significant correlation after 
controlling for multiple testing (all ps > .05). Given the relative low 
number of participants (N=20), however, this should not be considered 
as strongly supporting the null hypothesis either. 
DISCUSSION 
In this study, our goal was to investigate sustained effects of 
reward contexts on basic conflict processing while measuring different 
neurophysiologic parameters at the same time. More specifically, we 
wanted to relate behavioral and electrophysiological markers of 
attention (P1 & N1 components) to reward-related differences in pupil 
size, since many studies have found a tight interplay between pupil 
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dilation and the attention-modulating LC-NE system (Aston-Jones & 
Cohen, 2005; Aston-Jones, Rajkowski, Kubiak, & Alexinsky, 1994; 
Eckstein, Guerra-Carrillo, Miller Singley, & Bunge, 2016; Gilzenrat, 
Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, & Cohen, 2010; Rajkowski, Kubiak, & Aston-
Jones, 1994). With respect to reward effects, previous research has 
shown that when fast and accurate performance in a block of trials is 
rewarded performance-contingently, there is a sustained increase in 
proactive control, reflected by enhanced performance and sustained 
increases in prefrontal cortex activity (Jimura, Locke, & Braver, 2010). 
The sustained nature of this effect sets it apart from the transient 
reward effect observed in studies employing reward cues that predict 
the potential of reward in the upcoming trial (Padmala & Pessoa, 2011) 
or studies directly associating specific task features with reward (e.g. 
specific rewarded ink colors in Stroop task; Krebs, Boehler, Egner, & 
Woldorff, 2011; Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010). 
In the current experiment, we only had rewarded and non-
rewarded blocks and used a Flanker task to present distracter arrows 
consistently 200 ms before the target arrows (Appelbaum, Boehler, 
Won, Davis, & Woldorff, 2012). We hypothesized that in a rewarding 
context, less attention would be allocated to the distracter arrows, 
reflected by a decreased attention-related N1 component. A decrease in 
attentional allocation was expected based on previous work of ours 
(Bombeke, Langford, Notebaert, & Boehler, 2017), showing strategic 
down-regulation of attention in blocks of trials in which presentation of 
irrelevant information is temporally predictable. Furthermore, we 
expected that this N1 modulation would be inversely correlated with a 
sustained increase in pupil dilation (difference in baseline pupil size), 
because many studies have found correlations between pupil diameter 
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and activity in the attention-related LC-NE system (Aston-Jones & 
Cohen, 2005; Aston-Jones, Rajkowski, Kubiak, & Alexinsky, 1994; 
Eckstein, Guerra-Carrillo, Miller Singley, & Bunge, 2016; Gilzenrat, 
Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, & Cohen, 2010; Rajkowski, Kubiak, & Aston-
Jones, 1994). This would make the difference in pupil size between the 
rewarded and non-rewarded block a marker of attentional allocation, 
potentially predicting the success of attentional inhibition, reflected by 
the size of the N1 component. With respect to the target arrow, we 
expected an increased N1 amplitude in the rewarded context compared 
to the non-rewarded context; yet, the fixed timing of events limited our 
capability of clearly attributing any activity after target presentation 
exclusively to target processing.  
  In contrast to our expectations, we failed to find the behavioral 
benefits that are usually observed when reward is a block-wise fashion 
(Chiew & Braver, 2014; Jimura, Locke, & Braver, 2010; Langford, 
Krebs, Talsma, Woldorff, & Boehler, 2016; Massar, Lim, Sasmita, & 
Chee, 2016; Paschke, et al., 2015; Schevernels, et al., 2015; Small, et al., 
2005; Soutschek, Stelzel, Paschke, Walter, & Schubert, 2015; 
Soutschek, Strobach, & Schubert, 2014). Participants were as fast and 
accurate on trials in the rewarded context as on trials in the non-
rewarded context and the congruency effect was equally large in both 
contexts. Follow-up distribution analyses visualizing and comparing RT 
quantiles suggests that this was partly because of a floor effect for 
congruent trials, meaning that the task might have been too easy to 
allow for additional increases in reaction time and accuracy. In line with 
this, we also failed to find reward modulations of the conflict-related N2 
component.  
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Interestingly, although the reward manipulation did not seem to 
have an effect on behavior, we did find highly significant effects for the 
attention-related components and the size of the pupil. More 
specifically, there was a significantly larger posterior negativity in the 
rewarded context between 150 and 200 ms after the presentation of the 
distracter arrows (i.e. before the target arrow was presented). Because 
of timing and topography, we identified this component as the visual 
attention-related N1. Somewhat surprisingly, this negativity was only 
significant at midline electrodes (POz) and not at lateralized channel 
locations (PO7 and PO8), although the visual N1 is considered to be 
more pronounced at lateralized regions (Luck, Woodman, & Vogel, 2000; 
Woodman, 2010). It is therefore possible that the classic N1 component 
related to selective attention was not modulated by reward context and 
the posterior midline modulation in fact reflects a more general sensory 
gating mechanism, in which an increase in attentional allocation results 
in a boost of the signal-to-noise ratio of incoming sensory information. 
This would be in line with studies on the role of NE in sensory 
processing, showing NE-related decreases in spontaneous firing rates 
(generating neural noise), while sparing stimulus-related signals 
(Eckstein, Guerra-Carrillo, Miller Singley, & Bunge, 2016; Foote, 
Freedman, & Oliver, 1975; Waterhouse, Moises, & Woodward, 1980). 
Moreover, previous research on the relation between the LC-NE system, 
pupil size and attention (for a review, see Laeng, Sirois, & Gredeback, 
2012) has shown that a decrease in sustained LC activity (and hence 
pupil size) is associated with engaging in a demanding task in which the 
attentional focus is narrowed down to task-relevant stimuli. In contrast, 
an increase in sustained LC activity and hence pupil dilation would be 
associated with a broad attentional focus that is susceptible of task-
irrelevant information. Applied to our data, where we observe a 
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sustained increase in pupil dilation in the rewarded blocks compared to 
the non-rewarded blocks, this could mean that the larger posterior 
negativity in response to the distracter is a direct reflection of this broad 
attentional focus and hence increased attentional processing of the 
irrelevant information. Furthermore, this could in theory also explain 
the lack of behavioral benefit in the rewarded contexts since the 
increase in attentional allocation to the distracters might have 
increased the reaction time for incongruent trials, counteracting a 
possible enhanced processing of the target feature associated with 
monetary incentives. However, since most studies on reward find strong 
facilitating effects of reward and we do not have a reason to assume this 
mechanism would only operate under these conditions, this explanation 
remains speculative.  
 Although we did not observe an increase in attentional allocation 
to the target arrows (the main effect of reward was not significant), we 
suspect that the target was not processed differently than the 
distracter. In other words, the rewarded context probably led to a 
sustained increase in attention throughout the trial. This is highly 
similar to what Schevernels, et al. (2015) found in a rewarded stop-
signal task: N1 amplitudes time-locked to the go-stimuli were 
significantly larger in a rewarded blocked compared to a non-rewarded 
block. Interestingly, although this heightened attentional state in a 
rewarded context did not lead to a greater stopping success (and see 
Langford, Schevernels, & Boehler, 2016, for similar findings), it 
indicated that attention-related reward modulations can be non-
instrumental to the actual performance. Given that we failed to find 
behavioral benefits of reward, the same phenomenon could be present in 
our data.  
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CONCLUSION 
Taken together, the results of this study indicate that reward can 
modulate attention-related ERP components and the size of the pupil 
without increasing task performance. The non-instrumentality of these 
processes is remarkable and further research with more optimized 
design is required to investigate when they do have an effect. 
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MARKER OR MECHANISM: COGNITION-RELATED 
PUPIL DILATION AND ITS POSSIBLE FUNCTIONAL 
ROLE1 
Research in the field of cognitive neuroscience frequently considers 
lighting-independent changes in pupil size as a marker of internal 
psychological processes such as attention, mental effort and arousal. The 
appeal of using pupil size in this way is very obvious, in that it provides 
a view into psychological processes that are not immediately apparent in 
behavioral data, and because empirical work has linked pupil size to 
psychological constructs that are otherwise notoriously difficult to infer 
(e.g., cognitive effort). Yet, it is striking how this measure is usually 
exclusively used as a marker of these processes, basically implying that 
the underlying process is in itself functionally irrelevant. In contrast to 
this view, we argue here that psychologically-driven variations in pupil 
size can in fact play a functional role by tipping the scale of an inherent 
optical trade-off between visual acuity and peripheral sensitivity. As 
such, we argue that the role of pupil-size modulation that is driven by 
psychological processes are likely not a pure epiphenomenon of an 
evolutionary preserved process that has lost its function, but that 
particularly under natural conditions (i.e., outside of the controlled 
context of a computer-based laboratory task), the resulting effects are 
especially likely functionally relevant.  
                                                     
1Bombeke, K., Braem, S. & Boehler, C. N. Marker or mechanism: cognition-
related pupil dilation and its possible functional role. Manuscript in 
preparation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The pupil is highly responsive to incoming light, getting wider in 
the dark, but narrower in light. The diameter of the pupil therefore has 
a wide range varying approximately between 1.5 and 9 mm, with an 
average size of roughly 3 mm under normal lighting conditions 
(Loewenfeld & Lowenstein, 1999; Sirois & Brisson, 2014). However, 
even under controlled luminance conditions, pupil size is not constant, 
and it has been shown frequently to vary as a function of psychological 
processes that show no direct link to light regulation. Interestingly, 
most of these studies considered pupil size only as a by-product, 
epiphenomenon or indirect marker of phenomena related to the 
autonomic nervous system (for reviews, see Eckstein, Guerra-Carrillo, 
Miller Singley, & Bunge, 2016; Laeng, Sirois, & Gredeback, 2012; Sirois 
& Brisson, 2014). For example, pupil dilation increases as function of 
short-term memory load in a digit-span task, in which participants had 
to recall 3 to 8 digits (Klingner, Tversky, & Hanrahan, 2011), or as a 
function of difficulty in a visual search task (Geng, Blumenfeld, Tyson, 
& Minzenberg, 2015). Because pupil dilation covaries with a wide range 
of cognitive phenomena and eye trackers have become cheaper and 
more sophisticated, it is not a surprise that pupil size measurements 
are growing in popularity every year. Many of these psychological 
processes are related to activity in the locus coeruleus-norepinephrine 
system (LC-NE system; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Aston-Jones, 
Rajkowski, Kubiak, & Alexinsky, 1994; Eckstein et al., 2016; Gilzenrat, 
Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, & Cohen, 2010; Rajkowski, Kubiak, & Aston-
Jones, 1994), which has been shown to be closely related to pupil size 
adjustments (Costa & Rudebeck, 2016; Eldar, Cohen, & Niv, 2013; 
Joshi, Li, Kalwani, & Gold, 2016).  
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 Here, we want to consider pupil dilation from a different point of 
view and take into account evidence showing that pupil size 
adjustments themselves change perception. As will be argued below, 
changes in perception due to pupil size could serve a functional role in 
optimizing sensory information gathering by either increasing the 
visual acuity or the peripheral sensitivity. As such, the pupil could be 
compared to the aperture of a camera lens, constantly automatically 
regulating the incoming light in order to get the most balanced picture 
in terms of sharpness and brightness.  
 Considering a possible functional role of pupil size, evolution 
usually leads to physiological adaptations in an organism that increase 
the chance of survival and reproduction, at least at some point in the 
history of a species. From wrinkly fingers after contact with water 
(improving grip; e.g. Changizi, Weber, Kotecha, & Palazzo, 2011) to 
having a short and wide body form when living in arctic climates 
(conserving heat; e.g. Weinstein, 2005), it is highly likely there was an 
underlying functional explanation at some point. At the same time, one 
needs to avoid what is called teleology, wherein each adaptation would 
be considered a development towards a specific goal (Hanke, 2004). In 
addition, some adaptations have lost their functionality when they 
stopped being an advantage for natural selection, but don’t necessarily 
disappear as long as they do not represent an evolutionary 
disadvantage, a phenomenon usually referred to as “vestigiality”. In this 
paper, we will try to discern whether a functional (or vestigial) role 
exists for psychologically-triggered pupil-size adaptations.   
 To set the stage, we will first discuss the different contexts that 
are known to influence pupil size, including both its primary role in 
reacting to changing lighting conditions, as well as its responsiveness to 
different psychological processes. In doing so, we will detail how 
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research on the latter mainly considered pupil size as a by-product of 
these cognitive processes without considering a possible functional role. 
Next, we will briefly review evidence that luminance-driven changes in 
pupil size also changes our perception and, more importantly, recent 
evidence suggesting that also psychologically driven variations in pupil 
size can affect sensory processes. Finally, we will suggest that these 
sensory changes might indeed play a functional role (as opposed to 
vestigial) in the context of the psychological processes that trigger them. 
WHAT INFLUENCES PUPIL SIZE? 
Light regulation 
The pupil’s most basic and best-known function is light regulation, 
referred to as the pupillary light reflex (PLR). Visual perception starts 
with light being reflected off objects in our surroundings, which is 
projected onto the retinal cells of the human eye. The narrow bands of 
electromagnetic waves to which our eyes are adapted define our visible 
light and the perceived color spectrum. The sheer amount of light falling 
onto the retina is controlled by two antagonistic muscles adjusting the 
size of the pupil to the current lighting conditions, called the sphincter 
pupillae and the dilator pupillae (Diamond, 2001; Eckstein et al., 2016; 
Loewenfeld & Lowenstein, 1999). Considering the underlying 
mechanism, the PLR is a rather simple brainstem circuit in which 
increased lighting is detected by the pretectal area (part of the 
subcortical visual system), triggering the sphincter pupillae to constrict 
by sending a signal via the Edinger-Westphal nucleus  (Ebitz & Moore, 
2017; Loewenfeld & Lowenstein, 1999). Although the consensus used to 
be that this local reflexive pathway could not be modulated by 
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psychological processes,  there is some recent evidence for PLR 
modulations coming from gaze control areas like the frontal eye field in 
prefrontal cortex (Ebitz & Moore, 2017). 
Psychological processes 
Besides the simple brainstem circuit for basic light regulation, 
pupil size is also controlled by the autonomic nervous system. Pupillary 
constriction is driven by parasympathetic innervation, whereas 
pupillary dilation is driven by sympathetic innervation (Loewenfeld & 
Lowenstein, 1999). Furthermore, it has been shown that both increased 
activity in the sympathetic ‘fight-or-flight’ branch and inhibition of the 
parasympathetic ‘rest-and-digest’ branch lead to pupil dilation (Bradley, 
Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008; Steinhauer, Siegle, Condray, & Pless, 
2004). Because of its connections to the autonomic nervous system, 
pupil size has also been shown to be susceptible to top-down influences 
of psychological processes like attention, cognitive control and emotion 
(for a review, see Eckstein et al., 2016; Sirois & Brisson, 2014). It has 
been demonstrated that the interplay between activity in the autonomic 
nervous system and changes in pupil size can often be related to the 
dynamics of locus coeruleus (LC) that is the main source region of 
norepinephrine (NE) throughout the brain (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; 
Sara, 2009). It goes beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on this 
system (for a review, see Eckstein et al., 2016), but it is important to 
highlight two profound regularities. The first one is that the temporal 
coupling between LC activity and changes in pupil diameter is 
remarkably high (Costa & Rudebeck, 2016; Joshi et al., 2016). The 
second one relates to the fact that the LC-NE system is involved in 
many different cognitive processes (Sara, 2009). For these reasons, 
researchers from different fields have used pupil size as an indirect 
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marker of activity in higher-order cognition like attention, emotion, 
language, memory or decision making (for a review, see Eckstein et al., 
2016; Sirois & Brisson, 2014). In the following paragraphs, we will 
roughly distinguish between two main sources of fluctuations in 
autonomic nervous system activity, namely mental effort and emotional 
arousal, and their effect on pupil dilation. 
Mental effort 
Mental effort (or cognitive effort) can be defined as the amount of 
cognitive resources an individual invests in order to perform a task 
successfully (Westbrook & Braver, 2015). It should be noted that mental 
effort is a complex concept that is not only driven by external factors 
like the difficulty of a task, but also by internal factors like motivation 
(e.g. when a participant simply decides not to invest effort in a difficult 
task). It is therefore not surprising that pupil dilation is often used as 
an indirect measure of mental effort, because it can lead to insights that 
are impossible to derive from other measures (Boehler et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, most psychological models of attention agree that 
attentional or working memory capacity is limited (for a review, see 
Coull, 1998) and mental effort therefore heavily depends on the 
resources left to meet task demands in a specific performance context 
(Alnaes et al., 2014). A simple example is the number of stimuli in a 
visual search task: as the number increases, more effort or attentional 
capacity is required to optimize performance. In this context, it has been 
found that brain regions known for top-down attentional control and 
executive functioning interact with the aforementioned LC-NE system 
(Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008; Sara, 2009; Sara & Bouret, 2012) 
and according to the seminal adaptive gain theory of Aston-Jones and 
Cohen (2005), there is an inverted-U relationship between tonic LC 
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activity and optimal performance with respect to attentional allocation 
(i.e. mental effort). In a manner that resembles the classic Yerkes-
Dodson arousal curve (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), high levels of tonic LC 
activity would be associated with distractibility and an explorative 
attentional state, whereas low levels of tonic LC activity would be 
associated with a drowsy and a more exploiting attentional state 
(Gilzenrat et al., 2010; Murphy, Robertson, Balsters, & O'Connell, 
2011). Similarly, task performance would be suboptimal for low and 
high levels of tonic LC activity, whereas it would be optimal for 
intermediate levels. Interestingly, the same inverted-U relationship was 
found between tonic pre-stimulus baseline pupil size and task 
performance (Gilzenrat et al., 2010; Hayes & Petrov, 2016; Jepma & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2011; Murphy et al., 2011). Given these findings and the 
observation of high temporal coupling between tonic pupil size and LC 
activity, it is not surprising that so many psychological studies measure 
pupil size as a dependent variable in order to better understand 
cognition-related brain mechanisms.   
 Since the list of psychological processes for which pupil size was 
used as a proxy of mental effort is too long to review here, we give a few 
examples. For example, it was found that the pupil increases with 
increasing difficulty in working memory tasks with mental arithmetic 
(Klingner, 2010). Since the difficultness of a task (i.e. cognitive load) 
determines how much mental effort is needed, it can be easily estimated 
by measuring the size of the pupil. Also overcoming cognitive conflict is 
reflected by the pupil, with increased pupil sizes after incongruent trials 
compared to congruent trials (Brown et al., 1999; Laeng, Orbo, 
Holmlund, & Miozzo, 2011; Siegle, Ichikawa, & Steinhauer, 2008; van 
Bochove, Van der Haegen, Notebaert, & Verguts, 2013; van Steenbergen 
& Band, 2013). Most models of cognitive control would consider this 
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pupil-size modulation as a consequence of increased mental effort 
during incongruent trials (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 
2001; Silvetti, Seurinck, & Verguts, 2013). 
Emotional arousal 
The role of the evolutionary old limbic system (with as central 
brain structure the amygdala) is to mobilize the organism for action in 
case of threatening events, which it does by increasing activity in the 
autonomic nervous system (for a review, see Lang, 2014). It is therefore 
unsurprising that previous research has repeatedly shown effects of 
emotional arousal on the size of the pupil. Pupillary dilation was not 
only observed during affective picture viewing (Hess & Polt, 1960; 
Libby, Lacey, & Lacey, 1973) or affective sound listening (Partala, 
Jokiniemi, & Surakka, 2000), but also during pain perception 
(Ellermeier & Westphal, 1995) or aversive learning (Wiemer, 
Muhlberger, & Pauli, 2014). In addition, pupillary changes related to 
motivational or rewarding stimuli have been shown to reflect arousal 
(Chiew & Braver, 2014; Granholm & Steinhauer, 2004), and reward-
related pupil dilation was observed in many motivational studies (Bayer 
et al., 2017; Manohar & Husain, 2015; Massar, Lim, Sasmita, & Chee, 
2016; Mitz, Chacko, Putnam, Rudebeck, & Murray, 2017). Also pupil-
size changes in response to unexpected events (i.e. cognitive surprise) 
likely fall into the category of arousal-induced pupillary changes. For 
example, increased pupil dilation was reported for detecting novel (or 
"oddball") targets in target detection or gambling tasks (Preuschoff, t 
Hart, & Einhauser, 2011) or for making unexpected errors in a control 
task (Braem, Coenen, Bombeke, van Bochove, & Notebaert, 2015).  
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 Taken together, countless studies have used pupil size 
measurements as indirect marker of activity in a wide range of cognitive 
processes (Eckstein et al., 2016; Sirois & Brisson, 2014), based on the 
knowledge that pupil size changes result from fluctuations in autonomic 
nervous system activity. However, these studies usually do not offer a 
functional explanation for these changes or at least refrained from 
discussing whether these changes could in turn affect the cognitive 
process of interest. In the next section, we will discuss an optical 
mechanism that has been shown to have an effect on perception and 
potentially higher-order cognition and that would be a likely candidate 
to offer a functional explanation for pupillary changes. 
WHAT DOES PUPIL SIZE INFLUENCE? 
Given the ubiquity with which pupil-size changes are observed in 
different psychological contexts, the question arises whether such 
adaptations indeed simply represent a marker of such central-nervous 
processes, without playing a functional role itself. Below, we will discuss 
in how far pupil size can, in fact, have a direct influence on visual 
processing, and speculate in how far such a process could be 
functionally relevant under the psychological contexts that trigger the 
pupil-size adaptation. We will dissociate between the well-investigated 
light-induced changes in pupil size and make the point that the same 
mechanisms can account for the effect of cognition-induced changes in 
pupil size. 
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Effects of light-induced changes in pupil size on perception 
Interestingly, light-induced adjustments in pupil size have been 
long known to have a direct influence on the so-called sensitivity-acuity 
trade-off (Loewenfeld & Lowenstein, 1999). Specifically, having more or 
less light on the retina entails an inverse relationship between visual 
sensitivity (i.e. the ability to detect the presence of dimly lit stimuli in 
the visual periphery) and visual acuity (i.e. the ability to see stimuli in 
sharp detail). When there is a lot of light and the pupil constricts, the 
image falling onto the retina is sharper because the light beams coming 
from different depths are less refracted and are projected on a smaller 
surface of the retinal plane, leading to a sharp perceptual image (upper 
part of Fig. 1). This visual acuity is sacrificed when there is little light 
and the pupil has to dilate to let in enough light to activate the retinal 
cells, since light beams are now projected on a larger surface of the 
retinal plane, resulting in a blurrier perceptual image (lower part of Fig. 
1). However, when the pupil is dilated, more light falls on the eccentric 
rod cells who are responsible for vision at low levels of light, leading to a 
larger sensitivity for weak stimuli in peripheral parts of the visual field. 
When the pupil is constricted, mostly the cone cells (responsible for 
color vision) are activated and the sensitivity decreases (Campbell & 
Green, 1965; Hirata, Yamaji, Sakai, & Usui, 2003; Laughlin, 1992; 
Loewenfeld & Lowenstein, 1999).  
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 Fig1. Pupillary light regulation and the sensitivity-acuity trade-off. 
Effects of cognition-induced changes in pupil size on perception 
To determine whether psychologically-induced changes in pupil 
size could have a similar effect on perception, the literature is in need of 
systematic ways to influence pupil size in a top-down manner that does 
not involve (1) changes in light, but also (2) changes in psychological 
states that could change perception in other ways as well (e.g., 
differential attentional load). Interestingly, some recent studies have 
identified such a way in which higher-order cognition can control the 
size of the pupil, without involving mental effort or emotion inducing 
processes (Binda, Pereverzeva, & Murray, 2013, 2014; Ebitz & Moore, 
2017; Laeng & Endestad, 2012; Mathot & Van der Stigchel, 2015).   
 First, it was found that covertly attending a dark stimulus leads to 
pupil dilation, whereas covertly attending a bright stimulus results in 
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pupil constriction, despite having identical overall physical luminance 
and mental effort allocation (Binda et al., 2013; Mathot & Van der 
Stigchel, 2015). Second, a similar effect was found with visual illusion 
stimuli that elicited an illusory brightness or darkness perception 
despite equal physical stimulation (Laeng & Endestad, 2012). Mathot 
and Van der Stigchel (2015) convincingly interpreted the effect in both 
cases as a prospective top-down retinal protection mechanism: when an 
ocular movement towards a brighter or darker visual object is 
imminent, the systems already prepares for a pupil-size change in order 
to avoid over- or under-stimulation of the retinal cells.   
 While identifying a centrally-driven mechanism of pupil-size 
change that could be directly linked to a functional mechanism 
(adjusting the level of light falling into the eye already prospectively), it 
does not speculate on additional consequences in the central visual 
system. In order to probe for such processes, we recently made use of 
the mentioned paradigms, and showed that pupil size directly 
influences the feedforward response in the visual system, showing an 
inverse relationship between pupil size and early primary visual cortex 
(V1) activity (Bombeke, Duthoo, Mueller, Hopf, & Boehler, 2016; 
Bombeke, Hopf and Boehler, under revision). We did this by analyzing 
the C1 ERP component, which is a central occipito-parietal component 
showing up between 50 and 90 ms after the onset of a visual stimulus 
and is considered the electrophysiological neural marker of V1 activity. 
More specifically, we found evidence for a smaller C1 response 
associated with upper-visual-field stimulation for large pupils compared 
to small pupils. We interpreted this effect of pupil size on early visual 
processing in terms of the aforementioned sensitivity-acuity trade-off. 
Taking into account that an important characteristic of V1 is its 
sensitivity for sharp edges and high luminance contrast (Nothdurft, 
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Gallant, & Van Essen, 2000), and the fact that, in order to elicit a clear 
C1, the C1-eliciting probe stimuli in our study had a high spatial 
frequency, decreased visual resolution could indeed be a plausible 
explanation for the observed effect. Moreover, our finding was in line 
with a study by Daniels, Nichols, Seifert, and Hock (2012), who showed 
a more blurred retinal image for dilated pupils and a more sharpened 
image for constricted pupils (i.e. sensitivity-acuity trade-off) in an 
attentional spread paradigm. Importantly, we did not show that the 
inverse relationship between pupil size and early primary visual cortex 
(V1) activity is perfectly linear, since we found comparable C1 effects for 
rather different pupil-size modulations in our previous work. However, 
in an attempt to support our claim further that even these small pupil-
size modulations are sufficient to have a measurable effect in the visual 
system, we replicated the effect and additionally showed that the effect 
could not be explained in terms of attentional confounds (Bombeke, 
Hopf, and Boehler, in review). 
TOWARDS A FUNCTIONAL ROLE FOR PUPIL SIZE IN 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES? 
Based on this recent evidence in favor of top-down driven 
pupillary effects on perception that are likely based on the principle of 
the sensitivity-acuity trade-off, it seems critical to consider in how far 
such effects might in fact be functionally relevant in the psychological 
context under which they arise. Since in many cognitive paradigms 
trials are presented in quick succession, resulting in slow pupillary 
changes on trial n-1 still lingering on in trial n, the possibility exists 
that even slightly altered perception affects the behavioral performance 
and hence the effects of interest. For example, on a more speculative 
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note, it might be not a coincidence that low levels of sustained LC 
activity and hence a drowsy, exploitative attentional state go together 
with a decreased baseline pupil size and that high levels of sustained 
LC activity and hence a distractible, explorative attentional state  go 
together with an increased baseline pupil size. It is not unlikely that a 
moderate sized pupil, reflecting the sweet spot between visual 
sensitivity and acuity, is  optimally tuned in order to achieve the 
optimal behavioral performance usually found for moderate levels of LC 
activity (Gilzenrat et al., 2010; Murphy et al., 2011).  
 Furthermore, studies on the effects of other physiological eye 
mechanisms than pupil size might provide interesting analogies to how 
pupil dilation and constriction can play a functional role in perception. 
For example, Lee, Mirza, Flanagan, and Anderson (2014) found that 
emotional expressions can directly change the way our eyes gather and 
focus light because facial muscles and the position of the eyelid change 
the refractive power of the cornea (Duke-Elder & Abrams, 1970). They 
argue that emotional expressions like fear (widening eyes) and disgust 
(narrowing eyes) therefore have a functional role in enhancing either 
sensitivity or acuity, rather than communicating internal states (or at 
least not exclusively). Indeed, it was already found that eye widening 
following fear results in a wider visual field (Susskind et al., 2008) and 
enhances stimulus discrimination in the visual periphery (Lee, 
Susskind, & Anderson, 2013) compared to eye narrowing following 
disgust. Although these studies did not report the respective results, it 
is highly likely these studies involved differences in pupil size since eye 
widening leads to increased exposure of the iris (Hedger, Adams, & 
Garner, 2015; Stamp Dawkins, 1998). It would therefore be interesting 
to discriminate between the effects of changes in corneal refraction and 
changes in pupil size during facial expressions and determine their 
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relative effects on visual processing.  
 Nevertheless, the question now arises if cognition-related pupil 
size changes are large enough to have any functional significance or 
performance benefit for more general cognitive processes. It is a fact 
that light-related pupil-size changes are much larger than cognition-
related pupil size changes (between 2 and 8 mm vs. between 0.1 and 1 
mm) and that the few studies showing effects of pupil size on visual 
acuity only report modest effect sizes (Binda & Murray, 2015; Campbell 
& Green, 1965). In fact, this made Binda and Murray (2015) predict 
rather un-measurable effects on visual performance and argue that 
cognition-related pupil size changes are “vestigial”, meaning that they 
might have lost their original ancestral functionality in humans.   
 Finally, one possible explanation for why the possible functionality 
of psychologically-driven pupil-size changes has rarely been considered 
might relate the limited ecological validity of laboratory tasks. 
Specifically, it is not unlikely that a heavily controlled laboratory 
context creates an artificial situation in which the functional effects of 
pupil size adjustments are underestimated. For example, when an 
affective picture triggers an emotional arousal response, the pupil will 
dilate and could in fact have a negative effect on the performance in a 
perceptual discrimination task in the lab. However, when an emotional 
event occurs in real life, like hearing the sound of an approaching bear, 
the dilated pupil will maybe positively affect your chance to detect its 
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CONCLUSION 
Taken together, it is remarkable how frequently pupil-size 
modulations are used as a marker of psychological processes without 
much speculation whether they represent a functionally relevant 
process. Given this central role it is playing in various psychological 
domains, we have tried to systematize the different mechanisms that 
modulate pupil size and have reviewed the effects that such 
modulations have on perception. Here we have tried to argue that 
cognition-related pupil-size changes still play a functional role in 
human information processing, indirectly affecting perception and 
subsequent cognitive processes via low-level visual processes like the 
sensitivity-acuity trade-off. This notion is supported by recent empirical 
work, but is at this point still somewhat speculative and in need of 
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   "Science works on the frontier of knowledge and ignorance. 
We’re not afraid to admit what we don’t know. There’s no shame in that. The 
only shame is to pretend that we have all the answers."  
        Neil deGrasse Tyson 
 
Although there is a common theme in this dissertation related to 
early sensory attention and pupil size within the context of cognitive 
control, a distinction could be made between two main research topics. 
On the one hand, we were interested in the underlying attentional 
mechanisms of cognitive control, focusing on the conflict adaptation 
effect (Chapter 2) and reward-modulated conflict processing (Chapter 
5). On the other hand, we were interested in the effect of pupil size on 
visual processing and the primary visual cortex (Chapter 3 & 4). 
Furthermore, inspired by our pupil size findings, we wrote a 
review/opinion paper on the functional role of cognition-induced 
pupillary changes and its underlying optical mechanisms (Chapter 6).
 In this general discussion, we will summarize the studies we 
performed and highlight their main conclusions, while making a 
distinction between the two aforementioned research topics. Next, we 
will try to relate them to each other and make some suggestions for 
future research.  
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THE UNDERLYING ATTENTIONAL MECHANISMS OF COGNITIVE 
CONTROL 
Conclusion 1. "An adaptive mechanism based on relative spatial 
attentional inhibition can be related to conflict adaptation in a context of 
temporal predictability" 
In chapter 2, we focused on the attentional mechanisms of 
potentially underlying the conflict adaptation effect. This effect 
describes the phenomenon that the congruency effect (i.e. reaction time 
or error rate of incongruent minus congruent trials) becomes smaller 
when the previous trial was incongruent compared to when the previous 
trial was congruent (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). This effect has 
always been a hallmark of cognitive control research, because it is a 
prime example of the adaptive and flexible nature of the human control 
system, primarily involving the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dLPFC). Different theoretical accounts 
were able to explain this effect (for a review, see Duthoo, Abrahamse, 
Braem, Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014; Egner, 2007), although the majority 
of researchers were particularly appealed to the conflict monitoring 
theory by Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, and Cohen (2001). This 
theory explains the conflict adaptation effect as a monitoring operation 
wherein the detection of conflict (operationalized as co-activation of 
different motor responses) triggers a transient increase in selective 
attention, reducing the amount of conflict experienced in the next trial.
 However, in the past decades, surprisingly few studies were able 
to deliver concrete evidence for these attentional modulations (but see 
Scerif, Worden, Davidson, Seiger, & Casey, 2006; Suzuki & Shinoda, 
2015). Most researche that did study this question used fMRI and found 
both evidence for enhanced processing of the relevant stimulus 
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information (e.g. ink color or target arrow) and inhibition of the 
irrelevant stimulus information (e.g. color word or distracter arrows) 
(Egner & Hirsch, 2005; King, Korb, von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2010; 
Polk, Drake, Jonides, Smith, & Smith, 2008).  Unfortunately, fMRI has 
a very low temporal resolution and the possibility exists that the 
simultaneous enhancement of relevant and suppression of irrelevant 
information in a cognitive control task might have camouflaged each 
other in signals with higher temporal but lower spatial resolution, like 
the EEG signal. For these reasons, we adopted the EEG-based 
paradigm of Appelbaum, Boehler, Won, Davis, and Woldorff (2012) in 
which irrelevant information was presented 200 ms before, at the same 
time or 200 ms after the presentation of the relevant information. We 
reasoned that this 200 ms time window would allow for an in-depth 
analysis of "isolated" markers of sensory processing or attention to the 
relevant or irrelevant stimulus dimension. We performed two 
experiments using the Stroop task, and later extended our approach 
also to the Flanker task. For each type of conflict task, we had one 
experiment in which the irrelevant stimulus dimension was randomly 
presented before, after, or simultaneous with the relevant stimulus (ink 
color or target arrow), and one experiment in which the irrelevant 
information was always presented before the relevant stimulus. 
 Hence, the objective of the different experiments was basically to 
investigate whether an attentional EEG marker of conflict adaptation 
could be observed in different conflict paradigms optimized for this 
question. Our main hypothesis was that after an incongruent trial less 
attention would be deployed to the irrelevant stimulus dimension when 
presented shortly before the relevant dimension, whereas more 
attention would be deployed in case the relevant dimension was 
presented before the irrelevant dimension. Surprisingly, we only found 
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such a modulation in one out of four experiments, namely in a Flanker 
task with a predictable irrelevant-first temporal arrangement. More 
specifically, in that experiment we observed a posterior modulation 
presumably reflecting a decreased negativity starting around 150 ms 
that could be viewed as a decreased visual N1 component based on 
timing and topography or a (conceptually related) selection negativity 
(Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998). Additionally, this attentional 
modulation was accompanied by modulations in inter-trial mid-frontal 
theta power and a theta-power conflict adaptation effect. Therefore, we 
interpreted the results as evidence for an adaptive mechanism based on 
relative attentional inhibition under these specific conditions.   
         In line with the electrophysiological findings, we only found a 
significant behavioral conflict adaptation effect for trials in which the 
irrelevant flanker distractors or word names were presented 200 ms 
before the relevant target. This was very much in line with the studies 
by Weisman and colleagues (Weissman, Egner, Hawks, & Link, 2015; 
Weissman, Jiang, & Egner, 2014) who also found that conflict 
adaptation is the largest when irrelevant distracter information is 
always presented before the target information. With respect to the lack 
of conflict adaptation in relevant-first and simultaneous trials, it is 
possible that participants simply ended up experiencing very little 
cognitive conflict on trial n, leading to an absence of conflict adaptation 
effects. This would be in line with the findings of Appelbaum and 
colleagues (Appelbaum, Meyerhoff, & Woldorff, 2009), showing much 
larger congruency effects for trials in which irrelevant information was 
presented first (but see Roelofs, 2010, for alternative findings).   
 Since theoretical accounts of cognitive control characterized the 
underlying attentional mechanism of conflict adaptation as a rather 
general process (Egner, 2007), we did not expect that the attentional 
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modulation would only show up in the Flanker experiment. One 
possible explanation relates to the fact that Stroop conflict might mostly 
rely on feature attention whereas Flanker conflict also involves spatial 
attention (Luck & Kappenman, 2012). Therefore, it might be the case 
that the modulation we found is only related to spatial filtering of the 
visual field (after conflict, less attention is allocated to the visual field 
on the left and right of the target location), which can explain its 
absence in the Stroop task. In line with this, the only previous studies 
investigating the underlying electrophysiological mechanisms of conflict 
adaptation did report P1 (Scerif et al., 2006) and N1 (Suzuki & Shinoda, 
2015) modulations in a sequential Flanker and not a Stroop task. Scerif 
et al. (Scerif et al., 2006) showed a selective enhancement of the visual 
P1 component for incongruent trials when preceded by incongruent 
trials in a flanker task with simultaneously presented distractor and 
target arrows. No-target flanker trials following incongruent trials were 
accompanied by a smaller P1 component, which they interpreted as 
more focused spatial attention. In sum, both our data and the data of 
the latter study suggest a role for spatial attention in conflict 
adaptation. 
 With respect to timing, it can be argued that the experiments with 
predictable context (i.e. participants knew that the irrelevant dimension 
would be presented first) probed for proactive control, whereas the 
experiment with unpredictable context emphasized reactive control 
adjustments. The fact that we only found a modulation in the 
predictable context might seem logical, because it would be a 
disadvantage to employ an attentional filter in the unpredictable 
context when the subsequent trial would start with the relevant 
dimension. However, when attentional adjustments would also occur 
reactively, we hypothesized that such mechanisms would be visible in 
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the task variants with unpredictable timing, which, however, we did not 
observe.  
 Although we believe the four experiments were quite 
comprehensive, it can be argued that the generalizability of this study is 
somewhat limited. First, since we only found the modulation for a 
Flanker task in a predictable context, it is unlikely that this mechanism 
reflects conflict adaptation in general. Second, with hindsight, we 
should have probably performed an additional experiment with a 
predictable context in which the relevant dimension would always be 
presented first. Based on the current data, we would predict an 
enhanced N1 after incongruent trials, reflecting more attention to the 
relevant information. However, presenting task-relevant information 
always first might have resulted in the absence of congruency effects 
(and hence conflict adaptation effects), because the participant does not 
experience any cognitive conflict anymore. Nevertheless, finding a 
modulation for predictable relevant-first trials would indicate that 
conflict adaptation is based on a mechanism that both enhances 
relevant and inhibits irrelevant processing, which would be in line with 
previously performed fMRI studies (Egner & Hirsch, 2005; King et al., 
2010; Polk et al., 2008). Third, although we conducted four completely 
independent experiments with on average 20 participants, it would 
have been interesting to perform additional correlational analyses. A 
correlation between the amplitude difference of the N1 component after 
incongruent trials compared to congruent trials and the behavioral 
conflict adaptation effect would be strong evidence that the observed 
modulation drives conflict adaptation. The same goes for a correlation 
between the N1 difference and the magnitude of the theta power 
adaptation effect. Unfortunately, just 20 data points are insufficient to 
perform reliable correlation analyses on, especially when controlling for 
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multiple comparisons and correcting for alpha inflation when comparing 
so many variables. Finally, we did not control for feature integration 
(Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004) and contingency learning (Schmidt & De 
Houwer, 2011) processes, which makes it impossible for us to 
disambiguate between these accounts and to interpret the attentional 
ERP modulation according to the top-down control or bottom-up 
learning account. We chose not to do this because such measures would 
likely decrease the magnitude of the conflict adaptation effect in the 
different experiment, decreasing the chance to observe ERP 
modulations in the first place. Furthermore, it is still debated if the 
distinction between control and learning is as strict as previously 
assumed, because some authors have argued that learning itself is a 
control mechanism (Abrahamse, Braem, Notebaert, & Verguts, 2016; 
Egner, 2014).  
 
Conclusion 2. "Attentional modulations and sustained pupil 
dilation hinting at increased effort in a rewarded context do not 
guarantee behavioral pay-off" 
In chapter 5 we described an experiment on blocked reward effects 
and their effects on pupil dilation and attention-related ERP 
components. Blocked reward effects have been found to increase task 
performance and to enhance control-related brain activity, in particular 
in prefrontal cortex (e.g. Jimura, Locke, & Braver, 2010). In this study, 
we wanted to extend the findings on sustained effects of rewarded 
contexts to conflict processing in a an Eriksen Flanker task, with a 
special focus on early attentional modulations and pupil dilation. 
Specifically, we wanted to relate behavioral and electrophysiological 
markers of attention (P1 & N1 components) to reward-related 
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differences in pupil size, since many studies have found a tight 
interplay between pupil dilation and the attention-modulating LC-NE 
system (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Aston-Jones, Rajkowski, Kubiak, & 
Alexinsky, 1994; Eckstein, Guerra-Carrillo, Miller Singley, & Bunge, 
2016; Gilzenrat, Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, & Cohen, 2010; Rajkowski, 
Kubiak, & Aston-Jones, 1994). Just like in chapter 2, we wanted to take 
advantage of the high temporal resolution of EEG and discriminate 
between the processing of the relevant and irrelevant stimulus 
dimensions (Appelbaum et al., 2012). Therefore, we let participants 
perform a four-choice Flanker task in which they received monetary 
rewards for fast and accurate responses in 2 out of 4 blocks of trials (i.e. 
rewarded blocks or rewarded contexts). Based on the results of the work 
presented in chapter 2 and in order to increase the amount of cognitive 
conflict (and the size of the congruency effects), we decided to make the 
onset of the irrelevant dimension predictable and presented the 
irrelevant distracters always 200 ms before the relevant target arrows. 
We hypothesized that in a rewarding context, less attention would be 
allocated to the distracter arrows and that this would be reflected in a 
decreased attention-related N1 component time-locked to the onset of 
the distracter. In contrast, we expected a larger N1 time-locked to the 
target arrow in the reward context compared to the non-rewarded 
context, as far as this could be measured given the overlap of the 
preceding distracter processing. With respect to pupil dilation, we 
expected that a rewarded context would be associated with a sustained 
increase in pupil dilation, reflected in increased baseline pupil size, 
likely relating to increased cognitive effort invested by the participants 
to maximize their monetary reward (Alnaes et al., 2014; Massar, Lim, 
Sasmita, & Chee, 2016). Additionally, we were interested in whether 
the difference in pupil size between rewarded and non-rewarded blocks 
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could be a marker of the amount of mental effort or attentional 
allocation, predicting the success of attentional inhibition and 
potentially the size of the N1 component.  
 First, in contrast to our expectations, we failed to find the 
behavioral benefits that are usually observed when reward is a block-
wise fashion (Chiew & Braver, 2014; Jimura et al., 2010; Langford, 
Krebs, Talsma, Woldorff, & Boehler, 2016; Massar et al., 2016; Paschke 
et al., 2015; Schevernels et al., 2015; Small et al., 2005; Soutschek, 
Stelzel, Paschke, Walter, & Schubert, 2015; Soutschek, Strobach, & 
Schubert, 2014). In line with this, we also failed to find reward 
modulations of the conflict-related N2 component. However, although 
the reward manipulation did not seem to have an effect on behavior, we 
did find highly significant effects for the attention-related components 
and the size of the pupil. More specifically, there was a significantly 
larger posterior negativity in the rewarded context between 150 and 200 
ms after the presentation of the distracter arrows (i.e. before the target 
arrow was presented), which we could be related to the visual attention-
related N1 because of timing and topography. However, surprisingly, 
this negativity was more pronounced at midline electrodes than at 
lateralized locations, making it possible that the classic N1 component 
related to selective attention was not modulated by reward context and 
our finding in fact reflected a more general sensory gating mechanism 
in which an increase in attentional allocation resulted in a boost of the 
signal-to-noise ratio of incoming sensory information (Eckstein et al., 
2016; Foote, Freedman, & Oliver, 1975; Waterhouse, Moises, & 
Woodward, 1980). This finding was contrary to our expectations, since 
we expected to observe reward-related strategic inhibition of the 
distracter. In addition, although we did not observe an increase in 
attentional allocation to the target arrows, which might have been 
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because of overlap from distracter processing, we assume that the target 
was not processed differently from the distracter. Therefore, we 
concluded that the rewarded context led to a sustained increase in 
attention throughout the trial, and suggest that it might not be possible 
for participants to differentially deploy attention to different stimulus 
dimensions that arise in such rapid succession.   
 However, besides the lack of behavioral reward effect, our study 
had some more limitations. First, the simple design of the experiment 
(only distracter-first trials in a rewarded or non-rewarded block) did not 
allow for an analysis of transient reward effects, which would have been 
interesting with respect to within-block transient pupil size changes. 
Previous research has shown that there is a transfer of reward effects to 
non-rewarded trials in a rewarded block (Jimura et al., 2010) and it 
would therefore have been interesting to compare N1 components 
related to distracter processing in rewarded and non-rewarded trials 
within a rewarded context. Manipulating reward availability on the 
trial level would also have allowed us to compare sustained and 
transient pupil responses, which is rather uninformative in the present 
study. However, in this context, it is interesting to note that when we 
accounted for the block effects by baseline correction, we did not observe 
transient effects of pupil dilation. Second, when analyzing the target-
related attentional ERP components, baseline correction because of the 
overlap from the components evoked by the distracters. We tried to 
solve this by choosing the baseline in the 200 ms interval before 
distracter processing, but it is still problematic to compare the P1 and 
N1 components related to the distracter arrows to those related to the 
target arrow due to likely overlap from distracter processing. Future 
work could for example include distracter-only trials to counteract this 
problem by subtracting the estimated overlap. 
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Theoretical implications for cognitive control 
research 
In both the study on conflict adaptation and the study on 
sustained reward processing, we were able to identify an 
electrophysiological marker of distracter processing in the context of 
cognitive control. More precisely, we found negative-going posterior 
modulations at the time the N1 is usually observed (but note that their 
exact nature might be different because they were most prominent at 
different electrode locations). When framing these findings within the 
aforementioned DMC or “dual mechanisms of control” framework, 
which proposes a proactive and reactive operating mode of cognitive 
control (Braver, 2012; Braver, 2015), it can be argued that both 
modulations reflect proactive control processes. In the conflict 
adaptation study, the proactive nature was reflected in the fact that we 
only observed it in a predictable condition (i.e. irrelevant will be 
presented first). In the reward study, the combination of a predictable 
trial course and a context of potential reward created the proactive urge 
to optimize attention during distracter processing. Nevertheless, the 
efficiency or functionality of the modulation with the goal of optimizing 
task performance was contradictory: whereas the attentional 
modulation increased the chance of not being distracted by the 
distracter arrows in the conflict adaptation experiment, the opposite 
was true for the sustained reward experiment. Although it is rather 
artificial to directly compare both experiments, it highlights that reward 
can also have non-instrumental effects. This is in line with research of 
Schevernels et al. (2015) and Langford, Schevernels, & Boehler (2016), 
for example, who reported larger N1 amplitudes for go-stimuli in a 
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rewarded blocked compared to a non-rewarded block in a rewarded stop-
signal task that did not lead to a greater stopping success. 
THE EFFECT OF PUPIL SIZE ON THE PRIMARY VISUAL CORTEX 
Conclusion 3. " Pupil size can have a direct effect on the 
feedforward response in V1: a large pupil leads to decreased activity" 
While studying the neural mechanisms underlying the conflict 
adaptation effect, we realized that previous congruency is just one factor 
affecting the current trial. Because pupil dilation related to mental 
effort (or related processes) is also observed in conflict paradigms 
(Laeng, Orbo, Holmlund, & Miozzo, 2011), we hypothesized that a 
dilated pupil on trial n-1 could potentially affect the processing of trial n 
and affect control adjustments like the conflict adaption effect. Hence, 
although chapter 3 is not a direct follow-up on the work in chapter 2, it 
acted as a source of inspiration. Before looking at higher-order cognitive 
processes like cognitive control, we decided to study the effect of mere 
pupil size on low-level visual processing first, focusing on the primary 
visual cortex located in the occipital lobe of the posterior brain. The 
primary visual cortex can be considered the first main stage of cortical 
visual processing, primarily reflecting bottom-up processing of visual 
input (e.g. Engel et al., 1994; Zhang, Zhaoping, Zhou, & Fang, 2012). 
Within the visual cortex, an anatomical and functional distinction can 
be made between the striate visual cortex (primary visual cortex or V1) 
and the extrastriate visual cortex (V2, V3, V4, V5). Although many 
researchers agree that top-down processes can modulate relatively early 
stages of the extrastriate visual processing (Boehler, Schoenfeld, 
Heinze, & Hopf, 2008; Clark & Hillyard, 1996; Martinez et al., 1999; 
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Noesselt et al., 2002), other researchers have found that also striate 
cortex (i.e. V1) can be modulated by showing effects of attention (Rauss, 
Pourtois, Vuilleumier, & Schwartz, 2012; Rauss, Pourtois, Vuilleumier, 
& Schwartz, 2009) or emotions (Pourtois, Grandjean, Sander, & 
Vuilleumier, 2004; Rossi & Pourtois, 2013; Vanlessen, Rossi, De Raedt, 
& Pourtois, 2014). Such work on striate cortex effects has been mostly 
studied by looking at the C1 component (i.e. the first visually evoked 
potential) as index of V1 processing (Jeffreys & Axford, 1972).  
 In order to investigate possible bottom-up effects of pupil size on 
visual processing, we experimentally manipulated pupil size using 
validated procedures that did not involve differences in luminance or 
other basic sensory confounds. In a first experiment, we used the 
procedure of on Binda, Pereverzeva, and Murray (2013) in which 
participants had to covertly attend either a black or white disk (i.e. 
central fixation), which has been shown to dilate and constrict the 
pupils. In a second experiment, we used visual illusions of perceived 
brightness in order to evoke pupil dilation and constriction (Laeng & 
Endestad, 2012). In both experiments, we presented a typical C1-
eliciting probe (Rossi & Pourtois, 2012) after some delay (i.e. 1800, 2200 
or 2600 ms) to allow for the pupil to change size. First, we successfully 
obtained the intended pupil response: covertly attending a black disk or 
fixating the dark illusion made the pupils dilate, whereas covertly 
attending the white disk or fixating the bright illusion made the pupils 
constrict. Second, we did not observe significant differences in detecting 
faint color changes in a subset of trials in the experiment based on 
Binda et al. (2013), indicating equal allocation of attentional effort 
between conditions. Third, and most interestingly, the results showed 
that pupil size directly affected the C1 response. More precisely, we 
found that the response to a C1-eliciting probe in the upper visual field 
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elicited a smaller C1-amplitude when the pupil was large compared to 
when the pupil was small. We interpreted this effect of pupil size on the 
C1 response in terms of the sensitivity-acuity trade-off. This trade-off 
refers to the fact that having more or less light on the retina entails an 
inverse relationship between visual sensitivity (i.e. the ability to detect 
the presence of dimly lit stimuli in the visual periphery) and visual 
acuity (i.e. the ability to see stimuli in detail). When there is a lot of 
light and the pupil constricts, the image falling onto the retina is 
sharper because the light beams coming from different depths are less 
refracted and are projected on a smaller surface of the retinal plane, 
leading to a sharp perceptual image. This visual acuity is sacrificed 
when there is little light and the pupil has to dilate to let in enough 
light to activate the retinal cells, since light beams are now projected on 
a larger surface of the retinal plane, resulting in a blurrier perceptual 
image (Loewenfeld & Lowenstein, 1999), a process that at its extreme 
end means that you are not allowed to drive your car when an 
ophthalmologist used pupil-dilating eye-drops on you. Taking into 
account that an important characteristic of V1 is its sensitivity for 
sharp edges and high luminance contrast (Nothdurft, Gallant, & Van 
Essen, 2000), and the fact that, in order to elicit a clear C1, the C1-
eliciting probe stimuli in our study had a high spatial frequency, 
decreased visual resolution could indeed be a plausible explanation for 
the observed effect.   
Conclusion 4. " It is unlikely that the effect of pupil size on the 
feedforward response is confounded with attention or mental effort" 
 Since the effect of pupil size on the C1 response was a highly 
novel finding with potentially far-reaching implications for studies 
involving concomitant pupil size changes, we decided to do a follow-up 
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study. Hence, in chapter 4, we tried to replicate the effect and to 
distinguish it further from possible alternative explanations related to 
the attentional manipulation (attending a dark or bright stimulus in the 
lateral periphery) that triggered the pupil-size change in experiment 1 
of the first study. Although physical stimulation did not differ between 
conditions (because participants were always fixating the middle of the 
screen) and the side of presentation was counterbalanced across left and 
right, one could argue that “attention to a bright surface” or “attention 
to a dark surface” would result in some kind of a central cognitive state 
explaining the C1 effect.  
 Because this alternative explanation for our effect was not 
applicable to experiment 2 of chapter 3 (centrally attending brightness 
illusions), we decided to only redo the first experiment. In order to 
approach this question, we made use of the slow response characteristic 
of the pupil to present a C1-eliciting probe stimulus at a time point that 
briefly preceded the pupil response (T1; 400 ms after disk onset) and a 
time point that followed it (T2: 2200 ms after disk onset). In addition, 
we looked at EEG alpha-lateralization as an index for attentional 
deployment and again compared the behavioral performance on a 
subset of catch trials. The results showed a replication of the effect of an 
inverse relationship between pupil size and C1 amplitude for probes 
presented at a time-point where the pupil shows a size difference (T2). 
Crucially, we did no find such modulation at an earlier time-point (T1) 
at which pupil size was not modulated yet. Additionally, significant 
alpha-power lateralization showed that attention was already shifted to 
the cued side at T1, supporting an explanation in terms of mere pupil 
size and not attentional state or allocation. 
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Conclusion 5. " Psychologically-driven variations in pupil size can 
probably play a functional role by tipping the scale of an inherent optical 
trade-off between visual acuity and peripheral sensitivity." 
 Our work presented in chapters 3 and 4 showed that mere 
pupil size can in all likelihood have an effect on early sensory processes 
in the visual cortex. This inspired us to write an opinion paper/review 
on the often-ignored possible functional role of pupil size in studies 
considering lighting-independent changes in pupil size as a marker of 
internal psychological processes such as attention, mental effort and 
arousal. The appeal of using pupil size relates to the fact that it 
provides a view into psychological processes that are not immediately 
apparent in behavioral data, and because empirical work has linked 
pupil size to psychological constructs that are otherwise really difficult 
to operationalize (e.g. cognitive or mental effort; Alnaes et al., 2014; 
Massar et al., 2016). We thought it is striking how this measure is 
usually exclusively used as a marker of these processes, implying that 
the underlying process itself carries important information but is in 
itself functionally irrelevant. In contrast, we argued that the role of 
psychologically-driven pupil-size modulation relates to a mechanism 
called the sensitivity-acuity trade-off, in which the size of the pupil 
determines both the sharpness or visual resolution of the retinal image 
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A case for simultaneous EEG and pupil data 
acquisition in cognitive control research 
The work in this dissertation has hopefully illustrated that there 
can be an interesting interplay between pupillary adjustments and 
visual evoked potentials. Therefore, we think that future research 
should continue to measure both simultaneously in order to better 
understand the subtle effects of optical characteristics of the eye on the 
ERP component (or EEG frequency) of interest. Because cognitive 
control research usually entails a typical trial structure in which a 
temporary discrimination can be made between the pre-stimulus 
baseline, the stimulus onset, the stimulus-response interval and the 
inter-trial interval, there are many possibilities to investigate the inter-
related dynamics of behavioral, pupillary or EEG-related markers of 
perception, attention, memory or decision making (see Fig 1 for a visual 
illustration). Hong, Walz & Sajda (2014), for example, conducted an 
auditory oddball task and found that baseline pupil diameter correlated 
with early and late variability in EEG components, supporting evidence 
for a linear relationship between baseline LC-NE activity and evoked 
EEG. Moreover, they showed that pre-stimulus alpha activity showed a 
negative linear relationship with evoked pupil dilation, likely showing 
that more attentional involvement (i.e. decreased alpha) before the trial 
starts leads to increased post-stimulus LC activation. A similar 
approach could be extended to cognitive control research when 
investigating sequential effects like the conflict adaptation effect. Of 
course, in order to successfully perform such an analysis, a data-driven 
approach with single-trial variability is imperative. In this dissertation, 
we stuck to the traditional approach of averaging across trials and 
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running ANOVA models, but it would have been interesting to analyze 
the data with these more advanced models as well.     
 
Fig 1. Illustration of possible relationships between measures of 
behavioral task performance, pupil size measurements and EEG.  
 
Possible future research 
Given the lack of studies looking at how psychology-related 
changes in pupil size affect perception and higher-order cognitive 
processes, there is still a lot of research that can and should be done. 
First, it would be interesting to follow-up on our findings and find even 
better ways to manipulate the size of the pupil. Although we were quite 
successful in artificially dilating and constricting the size of the pupil, 
we stuck to a factorial logic in which we compared conditions for which 
the pupil was large with conditions for which the pupil was small. If it 
would be possible to decide on the exact size of the pupil beforehand, it 
would be easier to study the precise underlying optical mechanisms 
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behind the effects we reported and compare the results with data from 
previous research. Once could for example try to dilate the pupil with 
eye drops or use pupil-covering  lenses to keep the amount of incoming 
light constant, although there might be issues related to severe loss of 
vision or other optical side-effects. Next, independently from the way 
pupil size is manipulated, researchers could extend the approach to 
other task domains to get closer to an understanding of the functionality 
of pupil size changes. An example could be visual search or the ability to 
detect a simple or complex target feature among a small or large set of 
distracters (cfr. the feature-integration theory of  Treisman & Gelade, 
1980). Taking into account that a dilated pupil is associated with 
decreased visual resolution but increased sensitivity for peripheral 
stimuli, it can be hypothesized that a large pupil leads to faster target 
detection times in a search trial with a large set of distracters compared 
to a small set of distracters (assuming that in a large set, more target 
stimuli will be presented in the periphery of the visual field). Also the 
actual location of the target among distracters might be affected by the 
size of the pupil, since a small pupil will likely be associated with 
decreased reaction times for finding a target projected on the fovea. 
Moreover, since we argued that pupil size changes initiated by 
psychological process most likely still play a functional role, one could 
even explore if a dilated pupil because of increased mental effort during 
visual search (Porter, Troscianko, & Gilchrist, 2007) affects the 
performance on the next trial.   
 Another example relates to cognitive conflict processing, where, 
after dilating or constricting the pupil, one could present flanker trials 
with various distances between the target and distractor arrows. Based 
on the same sensitivity-acuity trade-off mechanism, it can be expected 
that participants are more distracted in trials with large distances when 
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the pupil is large compared to when the pupil is small. Of course, it can 
be argued that these two examples only study effects of visual 
deterioration (or loss of vision) and should therefore not be studied by 
cognitive neuroscientists. However, since the pupil size change stems 
from a psychological process, we tend to disagree.  
CONCLUSION 
 Taken together, the experiments presented in this 
dissertation investigated the underlying attentional mechanisms of 
cognitive control and showed that there is more to pupil size 
adjustments than previously assumed. We think our main contribution 
to the field lies in making researchers aware that  psychology-related 
pupil size changes can have a functional role and that future research 
should take this into account. 
REFERENCES 
Abrahamse, E., Braem, S., Notebaert, W., & Verguts, T. (2016). Grounding 
Cognitive Control in Associative Learning. Psychological Bulletin, 
142(7). 
 
Alnaes, D., Sneve, M. H., Espeseth, T., Endestad, T., van de Pavert, S. H., & 
Laeng, B. (2014). Pupil size signals mental effort deployed during 
multiple object tracking and predicts brain activity in the dorsal 
attention network and the locus coeruleus. Journal of Vision, 14(4). 
 
Appelbaum, L. G., Boehler, C. N., Won, R., Davis, L., & Woldorff, M. G. (2012). 
Strategic Allocation of Attention Reduces Temporally Predictable 
Stimulus Conflict. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 24(9), 1834-1848.  
 
Appelbaum, L. G., Meyerhoff, K. L., & Woldorff, M. G. (2009). Priming and 
Backward Influences in the Human Brain: Processing Interactions 
during the Stroop Interference Effect. Cerebral Cortex, 19(11), 2508-
2521.  
 
CHAPTER 7 226 
 
Aston-Jones, G., & Cohen, J. D. (2005). An integrative theory of locus 
coeruleus-norepinephrine function: adaptive gain and optimal 
performance. Annual Review Neuroscience, 28, 403-450.   
 
Aston-Jones, G., Rajkowski, J., Kubiak, P., & Alexinsky, T. (1994). Locus 
coeruleus neurons in monkey are selectively activated by attended cues 
in a vigilance task. Journal of Neuroscience, 14(7), 4467-4480.   
 
Binda, P., Pereverzeva, M., & Murray, S. O. (2013). Attention to bright surfaces 
enhances the pupillary light reflex. Journal of Neuroscience, 33(5), 
2199-2204.  
 
Boehler, C. N., Schoenfeld, M. A., Heinze, H. J., & Hopf, J. M. (2008). Rapid 
recurrent processing. gates awareness in primary visual cortex. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 105(25), 8742-8747.  
 
Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D. 
(2001). Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychological Review, 
108(3), 624-652.  
 
Braver, T. S. (2012). The variable nature of cognitive control: a dual 
mechanisms framework. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(2), 106-113.  
 
Braver, T. S. (2015). Motivation and Cognitive Control: Taylor & Francis.  
 
Chiew, K. S., & Braver, T. S. (2014). Dissociable influences of reward 
motivation and positive emotion on cognitive control. Cognitive, 
Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 14(2), 509-529.  
 
Clark, V. P., & Hillyard, S. A. (1996). Spatial selective attention affects early 
extrastriate but not striate components of the visual evoked potential. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 8(5), 387-402.  
 
Duthoo, W., Abrahamse, E. L., Braem, S., Boehler, C. N., & Notebaert, W. 
(2014). The heterogeneous world of congruency sequence effects: an 
update. Frontiers in Psychology, 5.  
Eckstein, M. K., Guerra-Carrillo, B., Miller Singley, A. T., & Bunge, S. A. 
(2017). Beyond eye gaze: What else can eyetracking reveal about 
cognition and cognitive development? Developmental Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 25, 69-91.  
 
Egner, T. (2007). Congruency sequence effects and cognitive control. Cognitive 
Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 7(4), 380-390.  
 
 
CHAPTER 7 227 
Egner, T. (2014). Creatures of habit (and control): a multi-level learning 
perspective on the modulation of congruency effects. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 5(1247). 
 
Egner, T., & Hirsch, J. (2005). Cognitive control mechanisms resolve conflict 
through cortical amplification of task-relevant information. Nature 
Neuroscience, 8(12), 1784-1790.  
 
Engel, S. A., Rumelhart, D. E., Wandell, B. A., Lee, A. T., Glover, G. H., 
Chichilnisky, E. J., & Shadlen, M. N. (1994). fMRI of human visual 
cortex. Nature, 369(6481), 525.  
 
Foote, S. L., Freedman, R., & Oliver, A. P. (1975). Effects of putative 
neurotransmitters on neuronal activity in monkey auditory cortex. 
Brain Research, 86(2), 229-242.  
 
Gilzenrat, M. S., Nieuwenhuis, S., Jepma, M., & Cohen, J. D. (2010). Pupil 
diameter tracks changes in control state predicted by the adaptive gain 
theory of locus coeruleus function.. Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 10(2), 252-269.  
Gratton, G., Coles, M. G. H., & Donchin, E. (1992). Optimizing the Use of 
Information - Strategic Control of Activation of Responses. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology-General, 121(4), 480-506.  
 
Hillyard, S. A., & Anllo-Vento, L. (1998). Event-related brain potentials in the 
study of visual selective attention. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences of the United States of America, 95(3), 781-787.  
 
Hommel, B., Proctor, R. W., & Vu, K. P. (2004). A feature-integration account of 
sequential effects in the Simon task. Psychological Research, 68(1), 1-
17.  
 
Jeffreys, & Axford, J. G. (1972). Source locations of pattern-specific components 
of human visual evoked potentials. I. Component of striate cortical 
origin. Experimental Brain Research, 16(1), 1-21.  
 
Jimura, K., Locke, H. S., & Braver, T. S. (2010). Prefrontal cortex mediation of 
cognitive enhancement in rewarding motivational contexts. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
107(19), 8871-8876.  
King, J. A., Korb, F. M., von Cramon, D. Y., & Ullsperger, M. (2010). Post-Error 
Behavioral Adjustments Are Facilitated by Activation and Suppression 
of Task-Relevant and Task-Irrelevant Information Processing. Journal 
of Neuroscience, 30(38), 12759-12769.  
 
 
CHAPTER 7 228 
Laeng, B., & Endestad, T. (2012). Bright illusions reduce the eye's pupil. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 109(6), 2162-2167.  
 
Laeng, B., Orbo, M., Holmlund, T., & Miozzo, M. (2011). Pupillary Stroop 
effects. Cognitive Processing, 12(1), 13-21.  
 
Langford, Z. D., Krebs, R. M., Talsma, D., Woldorff, M. G., & Boehler, C. N. 
(2016). Strategic down-regulation of attentional resources as a 
mechanism of proactive response inhibition. European Journal of 
Neuroscience, 44(4), 2095-2103.  
 
Loewenfeld, I. E., & Lowenstein, O. (1999). The pupil : anatomy, physiology, 
and clinical applications. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
 
Luck, S. J., & Kappenman, E. S. (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Event-Related 
Potential Components: Oxford University Press, USA. 
 
Martinez, A., Anllo-Vento, L., Sereno, M. I., Frank, L. R., Buxton, R. B., 
Dubowitz, D. J., & Hillyard, S. A. (1999). Involvement of striate and 
extrastriate visual cortical areas in spatial attention. Nature 
Neuroscience, 2(4), 364-369.  
Massar, S. A. A., Lim, J., Sasmita, K., & Chee, M. W. L. (2016). Rewards boost 
sustained attention through higher effort: A value-based decision 
making approach. Biological Psychology, 120, 21-27.  
 
Noesselt, T., Hillyard, S. A., Woldorff, M. G., Schoenfeld, A., Hagner, T., 
Jancke, L., & Heinze, H. J. (2002). Delayed striate cortical activation 
during spatial attention. Neuron, 35(3), 575-587.   
 
Nothdurft, H. C., Gallant, J. L., & Van Essen, D. C. (2000). Response profiles to 
texture border patterns in area V1. Visual Neuroscience, 17(3), 421-436 
 
Paschke, L. M., Walter, H., Steimke, R., Ludwig, V. U., Gaschler, R., Schubert, 
T., & Stelzel, C. (2015). Motivation by potential gains and losses affects 
control processes via different mechanisms in the attentional network. 
Neuroimage, 111, 549-561.  
 
Polk, T. A., Drake, R. M., Jonides, J. J., Smith, M. R., & Smith, E. E. (2008). 
Attention Enhances the Neural Processing of Relevant Features and 
Suppresses the Processing of Irrelevant Features in Humans: A 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study of the Stroop Task. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 28(51), 13786-13792.  
 
 
CHAPTER 7 229 
Pourtois, G., Grandjean, D., Sander, D., & Vuilleumier, P. (2004). 
Electrophysiological correlates of rapid spatial orienting towards 
fearful faces. Cerebral Cortex, 14(6), 619-633.  
 
Rajkowski, J., Kubiak, P., & Aston-Jones, G. (1994). Locus coeruleus activity in 
monkey: phasic and tonic changes are associated with altered vigilance. 
Brain Research Bulletin, 35(5-6), 607-616.  
 
Rauss, K., Pourtois, G., Vuilleumier, P., & Schwartz, S. (2012). Voluntary 
attention reliably influences visual processing at the level of the C1 
component: a commentary on Fu, Fedota, Greenwood, and Parasuram 
(2010). Biological Psychology, 91(2), 325-327; author reply 321-324.  
Rauss, K. S., Pourtois, G., Vuilleumier, P., & Schwartz, S. (2009). Attentional 
load modifies early activity in human primary visual cortex. Human 
Brain Mapping, 30(5), 1723-1733.  
 
Roelofs, A. (2010). Attention, temporal predictability, and the time course of 
context effects in naming performance. Acta Psychologica, 133(2), 146-
153.  
 
Rossi, V., & Pourtois, G. (2012). State-dependent attention modulation of 
human primary visual cortex: A high density ERP study. Neuroimage, 
60(4), 2365-2378.  
 
Rossi, V., & Pourtois, G. (2013). Negative affective state mimics effects of 
perceptual load on spatial perception. Emotion, 13(3), 485-496.  
 
Scerif, G., Worden, M. S., Davidson, M., Seiger, L., & Casey, B. J. (2006). 
Context modulates early stimulus processing when resolving stimulus-
response conflict. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18(5), 781-792.  
 
Schevernels, H., Bombeke, K., Van der Borght, L., Hopf, J. M., Krebs, R. M., & 
Boehler, C. N. (2015). Electrophysiological evidence for the involvement 
of proactive and reactive control in a rewarded stop-signal task. 
Neuroimage, 121, 115-125.  
 
Schmidt, J. R., & De Houwer, J. (2011). Now you see it, now you don't: 
controlling for contingencies and stimulus repetitions eliminates the 
Gratton effect. Acta Psychologica, 138(1), 176-186.  
 
Small, D. M., Gitelman, D., Simmons, K., Bloise, S. M., Parrish, T., & 
Mesulam, M. M. (2005). Monetary incentives enhance processing in 
brain regions mediating top-down control of attention. Cerebral Cortex, 
15(12), 1855-1865.  
 
 
CHAPTER 7 230 
Soutschek, A., Stelzel, C., Paschke, L., Walter, H., & Schubert, T. (2015). 
Dissociable effects of motivation and expectancy on conflict processing: 
an fMRI study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 27(2), 409-423.  
 
Soutschek, A., Strobach, T., & Schubert, T. (2014). Motivational and cognitive 
determinants of control during conflict processing. Cognition & 
Emotion, 28(6), 1076-1089.  
 
Suzuki, K., & Shinoda, H. (2015). Transition from reactive control to proactive 
control across conflict adaptation: An sLORETA study. Brain and 
Cognition, 100, 7-14.  
 
Vanlessen, N., Rossi, V., De Raedt, R., & Pourtois, G. (2014). Feeling happy 
enhances early spatial encoding of peripheral information 
automatically: electrophysiological time-course and neural sources. 
Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 14(3), 951-969.  
 
Waterhouse, B. D., Moises, H. C., & Woodward, D. J. (1980). Noradrenergic 
modulation of somatosensory cortical neuronal responses to 
iontophoretically applied putative neurotransmitters. Experimental 
Neurology, 69(1), 30-49.  
Weissman, D. H., Egner, T., Hawks, Z., & Link, J. (2015). The congruency 
sequence effect emerges when the distracter precedes the target. Acta 
Psychologica, 156, 8-21.  
 
Weissman, D. H., Jiang, J. F., & Egner, T. (2014). Determinants of Congruency 
Sequence Effects Without Learning and Memory Confounds. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology-Human Perception and Performance, 40(5), 
2022-2037.  
 
Zhang, X., Zhaoping, L., Zhou, T., & Fang, F. (2012). Neural activities in v1 




Als mensen staan we zelden stil bij de complexiteit van de meest 
triviale dingen die we doen in het dagelijkse leven. We vinden het 
normaal dat we wakker worden wanneer de wekker gaat en we zijn niet 
verrast dat we tegelijkertijd kunnen ontbijten, de krant lezen en emails 
checken. Cognitieve neurowetenschappers denken wel na over al deze 
"simpele" vaardigheden en trachten ze op een wetenschappelijke manier 
te bestuderen. Onderzoek binnen de cognitieve neurowetenschappen 
focust daarom op de onderliggende mechanismen van zogenaamde 
"hogere-orde cognitie" en probeert te begrijpen hoe verschillende 
neurale processen samenwerken om gedrag te bekomen. In deze 
doctoraatsthesis presenteren we onderzoek naar vroege sensorische 
aandacht en veranderingen in pupilgrootte die gerelateerd zijn aan 
cognitieve controle. In de komende paragrafen introduceren we eerst 
kort de belangrijkste concepten in verband met aandacht, cognitieve 
controle, pupildilatatie en vroege visuele verwerking. Daarna geven we 
per hoofdstuk een overzicht van de onderzoeksvragen, de methodes, de 
resultaten en de interpretatie ervan.  
Een van de oudste en meest fundamentele vragen in cognitieve 
neurowetenschappen gaat over hoe mensen omgaan met de gigantische 
hoeveelheid informatie die constant wordt opgepikt door de zintuigen. 
Wanneer je deze dissertatie leest, moet je je volledig concentreren op het 
boek en tegelijkertijd alles in je omgeving proberen te negeren. Van pop-
up venstertjes op je computerscherm tot een bureaugenoot die aan het 
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telefoneren is, je zal al je aandacht aan het boek moeten wijden.  
Wanneer dezelfde bureaugenoot echter plotseling je naam vermeldt 
tijdens zijn telefoongesprek zal je waarschijnlijk opkijken. Dit 
zogenaamde "cocktail party effect" is een goede illustratie van de 
complexiteit van menselijke aandacht: zelfs wanneer je denkt dat je niet 
aan het luisteren bent, kan sommige (voor jou belangrijke) informatie 
doordringen tot het bewustzijn. Er werden verschillende theoretische 
modellen voor aandacht voorgesteld in het verleden. Het filter model 
van Donald Broadbent (Broadbent, 1958) stelde een filtermechanisme 
voor dat beslist welke inkomende sensorische signalen verder mogen 
verwerkt worden. Dit model kon helaas het bovengenoemde cocktail 
pary effect niet verklaren en werd vervangen door late-selectie modellen 
die voorstelden dat alle simuli non-selectief worden verwerkt (e.g. 
Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963). Deze modellen konden op hun beurt niet om 
met de gelimiteerde aandachtscapaciteit en werden vervangen door het 
attenuatie model van Anne Treisman (Treisman, 1964). Dit model stelde 
voor dat irrelevante stimuli worden geattenueerd (maar niet gefilterd) 
en dat stimuli geassocieerd met arousal (door semantische betekenis of 
intensiteit) een lagere drempel zouden hebben om het bewustzijn te 
bereiken en verder verwerkt te worden.  
Pioniers in aandachtsonderzoek onderzochten niet alleen wanneer 
aandachtsselectie plaatsvindt, maar ook hoe dit precies in zijn werk 
gaat. Een belangrijk onderscheid kan hierbij gemaakt worden tussen 
spatiale aandacht enerzijds en feature aandacht anderzijds (voor een 
vergelijking, zie Soto & Blanco, 2004). Spatiale aandacht betekent dat 
de aandacht gericht wordt naar een specifieke locatie in het visuele 
veld, terwijl feature aandacht inhoudt dat de aandacht gericht is op een 
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bepaalde niet-spatiale eigenschap van de stimulus (bvb. de kleur). 
Aandacht wordt vaak onderzocht aan de hand van ERP componenten, 
die worden bekomen door het gemiddelde EEG signaal te nemen over 
verschillende trials of "beurten" in een vooraf bepaald tijdsinterval dat 
de presentatie van de stimulus omvat. Wat betreft spatiale aandacht, 
hebben zowel de P1 (posterieure positieve component die ongeveer 100 
ms post-stimulus verschijnt) als de N1 (posterieure negatieve 
component die ongeveer 150-200 post-stimulus optreedt) een grotere 
amplitude wanneer de aandacht gericht is op de locatie waar de 
stimulus verschijnt. Wanneer de aandacht gericht is op een bepaalde 
eigenschap van een stimulus (zoals kleur of vorm), wordt de SN 
(selection negativity) component geobserveerd tussen 140 en 180 ms na 
het verschijnen van de stimulus.   
Aandacht kan gezien worden als één van de belangrijkste 
mechanismen achter het meer algemene cognitieve controle construct en 
er wordt zelfs over gedebatteerd of er een verschil is tussen de twee 
(Cohen, 2017). Desalniettemin kan cognitieve controle worden 
gedefinieerd als de flexibele en adaptieve regulatie van gedrag in de 
aanwezigheid van conflicterende stimuli of responses (Cohen, 2017). 
Wanneer je bijvoorbeeld met je auto rijdt en bij een kruispunt aankomt, 
moet je stoppen wanneer de verkeerslichten op rood staan. Indien de 
bestuurder in de wagen voor jou echter doorrijdt, kan je bij onvoldoende 
aandachtscontrole geneigd zijn hem te volgen. Het is in een dergelijke 
situatie dus noodzakelijk jouw gedrag aan te passen aan de situatie en 
automatische of prepotente gedragingen te overkomen. Cognitieve 
controle wordt in het lab typisch onderzocht aan de hand van controle- 
of congruentietaken. In deze congruentietaken moeten proefpersonen 
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reageren op taak-relevante informatie en tegelijke taak-irrelevante 
informatie negeren. In de Stroop taak  (Stroop, 1992) bijvoorbeeld, 
moeten participanten de inktkleur benoemen van woorden die 
semantisch ook voor een woordkleur staan (bvb., het woord "rood" in 
groene inkt). Omdat woordlezen de dominante, automatische respons is, 
gaan proefpersonen trager en minder accuraat antwoorden op 
incongruente trials (het woord "rood" in groene inkt) dan op congruente 
trials (het woord "groen" in groene inkt). Het verschil in reactietijd en 
accuraatheid tussen een congruente en incongruente trial wordt het 
congruentie-effect genoemd.  
Onderzoek naar cognitieve controle heeft aangetoond dat het 
congruentie-effect kan gemoduleerd worden door de congruentie van de 
vorige trial. Meer bepaald wordt het congruentie-effect kleiner wanneer 
de voorgaande trial een incongruente trial was dan wanneer de vorige 
trial een congruente trial was. Dit effect staat ook bekend als het 
Gratton effect, het conflict-adaptatie effect of het congruentie-sequentie 
effect (voor reviews, zie Duthoo, Abrahamse, Braem, Boehler, & 
Notebaert, 2014; Egner, 2007). Het conflict-monitoring model van 
Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, and Cohen (2001) gaf een theoretische 
verklaring voor dit effect door te stellen dat wanneer het cognitieve 
controle systeem conflict detecteert tussen taak-relevante en taak-
irrelevante informatie, er meer aandacht wordt besteed aan de taak-
relevante informatie. Deze detectie van conflict zou plaatsvinden in de 
dorsale anterieure cingulate cortex en deze regulatie van aandacht zou 
worden gestuurd door de dorsolaterale prefrontale cortex  (e.g. 
Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Kerns et al., 2004). 
Wanneer de trial na een incongruente trial incongruent is, zal de 
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proefpersoon sneller en accurater antwoorden doordat hij de taak-
irrelevante informatie beter kan negeren. Wanneer de volgende trial 
echter congruent is, valt het faciliterende effect van dezelfde informatie 
in de irrelevante dimensie te hebben weg, waardoor de reactie trager zal 
zijn en de accuraatheid lager.   
Cognitieve controle wordt uiteraard heel sterk beïnvloed door 
motivationele factoren (Krebs & Woldorff, 2017) die zowel intrinsiek 
(e.g. persoonlijk doel) als extrinsiek (e.g. geld) kunnen zijn (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000). In het lab wordt vooral de interactie tussen extrinsieke 
beloning en cognitieve controle onderzocht. Krebs en Woldorff (2017) 
maakten recentelijk een onderscheid tussen pre-taak beloningscues en 
stimulus-beloning associaties. Bij het eerste type is er altijd een cue of 
stimulus die aangeeft dat een beloning kan verkregen worden op wat 
volgt. Proefpersonen worden bijvoorbeeld ingelicht dat ze 10 eurocent 
krijgen bij een correcte en snelle respons op de volgende trial. Bij het 
tweede type, stimulus-beloning associaties, kan de proefpersoon zich 
niet voorbereiden en wordt de mogelijkheid tot het verkrijgen van 
beloning aangegeven door de stimulus zelf. Onderzoek naar beide 
processen leidde tot de identificatie van een neuraal beloningssysteem 
waarbij het ventrale striatum, mediale midbrain structuren en andere 
dopaminerge gebieden interageren met de regio's die verantwoordelijk 
zijn voor een bepaalde taak (Braver, 2015; Schmidt, Lebreton, Cléry-
Melin, Daunizeau, & Pessiglione, 2012).  
Een interessante bevinding in het onderzoek naar cognitieve 
controle was dat incongruente trials geassocieerd zijn met gedilateerde 
pupillen (Brown et al., 1999; Laeng & Endestad, 2012; Siegle, Ichikawa, 
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& Steinhauer, 2008; Steinhauer, Siegle, Condray, & Pless, 2004). Deze 
gedilateerde pupil reflecteert waarschijnlijk de mentale inspanning en 
arousal die gepaard gaat met de verhoogde aandachtscontrole bij 
incongruente trials (Siegle et al., 2008). Het gebruik van de pupil als 
indirecte meting van latente hersenprocessen zoals aandacht of controle 
is niet nieuw, sinds Hess en Pold al in de jaren '60 aantoonden dat de 
pupil niet enkel reageert op veranderingen in omgevingslicht (i.e. 
automatische lichtreflex van de pupil), maar ook op de emotionele 
valentie van een afbeelding. Deze bevinding leidde tot een exponentiële 
toename van studies die pupilgrootte rapporteerden als proxy van 
cognitieve activiteit. De meeste cognitie-gerelateerde veranderingen in 
pupilgrootte kunnen verklaard worden door de hoge temporele 
samenhang met activiteit in het locus coeruleus-norepinephrine 
systeem (LC-NE systeem; Costa & Rudebeck, 2016; Joshi, Li, Kalwani, 
& Gold, 2016). Dit systeem bestaat uit een subcorticale locus coeruleus 
(LC) die norepineprhine (NE) verspreidt in het brein, wat een 
belangrijke rol speelt bij aandachtsregulatie. 
Nu we meest belangrijke concepten kort geïntroduceerd hebben 
waardoor het onderzoek in deze dissertatie beter gekaderd kan worden 
(voor een meer uitgebreide introductie verwijzen we graag naar 
hoofdstuk 1), is het tijd om de specifieke onderzoeksvragen te 
presenteren die we in deze doctoraatsthesis gesteld hebben en de 
belangrijkste bevindingen en conclusie toe te lichten. In de grijze kaders 
presenteren we de belangrijkste bevinding uit elk hoofdstuk, gevolgd 
door een meer gedetailleerde uitleg. 
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"Een adaptief mechanisme gebaseerd op relatieve spatiale 
inhibitie is een onderliggend mechanisme van het conflict 
adaptatie effect in een context van temporele 
voorspelbaarheid." 
 In hoofdstuk 2 ligt de focus op de onderliggende 
aandachtsmechanismen van het conflict adaptatie effect. Zoals 
hierboven uitgelegd, voorspellen cognitieve controle theorieën zoals de 
conflict monitoring theorie verhoogde aandachtsallocatie na 
incongruente trials, die op hun beurt het congruentie-effect verkleinen. 
Voorgaand onderzoek heeft voornamelijk fMRI gebruikt om deze 
mechanismen te bestuderen, maar deze methode heeft helaas een zeer 
lage temporele resolutie en kan moeilijk discrimeren tussen toegenomen 
aandacht voor taakrelevante informatie en verminderde aandacht voor 
taakirrelevante informatie. Daarom kozen we ervoor om het op EEG 
gebaseerde paradigma van Appelbaum, Boehler, Won, Davis, en 
Woldorff (2012) te gebruiken waarbij de taakirrelevante informatie (i.e. 
het kleurwoord in de Stroop taak) 200 ms voor, op hetzelfde moment, of 
na de presentatie van de taakrelevante inktkleur werd gepresenteerd. 
Het idee was dat dit tijdsvenster van 200 ms ons zou toelaten om de 
aandachtsallocatie voor de relevante en irrelevante informatie 
afzonderlijk te kunnen bekijken en beter het effect na te kunnen gaan 
van de voorgaande congruentie. We begonnen met twee Stroop 
experimenten, maar breidden achteraf onze benadering uit naar de 
Flanker taak. Waar Stroop conflict zowel spatiale als non-spatiale 
aandacht meet, gaat Flanker conflict voornamelijk spatiale aandacht 
meten (Luck & Kappenman, 2012). Voor elk type conflict hadden we één 
experiment waarbij de irrelevante informatie random gepresenteerd 
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werd voor, na of op hetzelfde moment als de relevante dimensie en één 
experiment waarbij de irrelevante informatie altijd voor de relevante 
kwam. Onze hypothese was dat na een incongruente trial minder 
aandacht zou worden toebedeeld aan de irrelevante informatie wanneer 
deze gepresenteerd werd kort voor de relevante, terwijl er meer 
aandacht zou worden gegeven wanneer de relevante voor de irrelevante 
zou komen, sinds voorgaand fMRI onderzoek evidentie had getoond voor 
beide mechanismen (Egner & Hirsch, 2005; King, Korb, von Cramon, & 
Ullsperger, 2010; Polk, Drake, Jonides, Smith, & Smith, 2008). We 
vonden evidentie voor deze hypothese in een van de vier experimenten, 
namelijk in het Flanker experiment waarbij proefpersonen konden 
voorspellen dat in de volgende trial irrelevante informatie eerst zou 
worden gepresenteerd. Ongeveer 150 ms na de presentatie van de 
distracter observeerden we een aandachtsgerelateerde N1 component 
die een kleinere amplitude had na incongruente trials dan na 
congruente trials. Deze modulatie ging gepaard met een modulatie van 
inter-trial mid-frontale thetha power en een theta-power conflict 
adaptatie effect. Daarnaast was er in deze specifieke conditie ook een 
significant conflict adaptatie effect in de gedragsdata. We 
interpreteerden deze resultaten als  evidentie voor een adaptief 
mechanisme gebaseerd op relatieve aandachtsinhibitie na de ervaring 
van cognitief conflict. Het feit dat deze modulatie niet werd gevonden in 
trials waarbij de relevante dimensie eerst of op hetzelfde moment werd 
aangeboden, kwam waarschijnlijk door dat proefpersonen te weinig 
conflict ervaarden bij deze trials (i.e. ze waren te gemakkelijk voor de 
proefpersoon). Wanneer er weinig conflict wordt gedetecteerd, zal het 
controlesysteem uiteraard minder de neiging hebben controle bij te 
 
CHAPTER 8     239 
sturen. Daarnaast kan het feit dat de modulatie enkel werd gevonden in 
de Flanker taak  te maken hebben met het type aandacht. De Stroop 
taak meet voornamelijk feature aandacht, terwijl de Flanker taak ook 
spatiale aandacht meet. Het kan dus zijn dat onze modulatie een 
spatiaal aandachtsmechanisme reflecteert (na conflict wordt er minder 
aandacht toebedeeld aan het linker- en rechter visueel veld waar de 
distracters zich bevinden). Ten slotte denken we dat de modulatie enkel 
optrad in de voorspelbare context omdat het om een proactief controle 
mechanisme gaat. Wanneer de proefpersoon niet kan inschatten of de 
volgende trial met taak-irrelevante of taak-relevante informatie begint 
(onvoorspelbare context), zou het een nadeel zijn om een automatische 
aandachtsfilter te hanteren, alhoewel dat net hetgene is wat op basis 
van reactive controle kan verwacht worden.   
 Samengevat kunnen we dus stellen dat we een klein stukje van de 
puzzel oplossen door één bepaald mechanisme van aandachtsregulatie 
tijdens het conflict adaptatie effect uit te klaren. Verder onderzoek is 
nodig om duidelijkheid te scheppen over meer algemene mechanismen. 
 
" Pupilgrootte heeft een direct effect op V1: een grote pupil 
leidt tot verminderde activatie" 
Alhoewel hoofdstuk 3 inhoudelijk niet rechtstreeks verder bouwt 
op bevindingen in hoofdstuk 2, was het er wel door geïnspireerd. Laeng, 
Orbo, Holmlund, and Miozzo (2011) stelden vast dat de verhoogde 
mentale inspanning tijdens incongruente trials de grootte van de pupil 
deed toenemen. We redeneerden dat het daarom niet ondenkbaar is dat 
pupilgrootte ook een rol speelt in een proces als conflict adaptatie, 
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waarbij de gedilateerde pupil in trial n-1 een effect heeft op trial n. 
Maar vooraleer naar hogere-orde of psychologische processen te kijken, 
besloten we te beginnen met het effect van pupilgrootte op zogenaamde 
"low-level" visuele processen te onderzoeken. De primaire visuele cortex 
(V1) die zich in de posterieure occipitale lob bevindt, is het eerste 
stadium van corticale visuele verwerking en wordt in het EEG 
gereflecteerd door de C1 component. Deze C1 component is een positieve 
of negatieve ERP component (afhankelijk van de positie van de stimulus 
in het visuele veld) die tussen de 50 en 100 ms na de presentatie van 
een visuele stimulus verschijnt.  
 In een eerste experiment maakten we gebruik van de procedure 
van Binda, Pereverzeva, and Murray (2013) om de grootte van de pupil 
artificeel klein of groot te maken. Proefpersonen moesten coverte 
aandacht geven aan een witte of zwarte cirkel die links en rechts van 
het fixatiepunt werden gepresenteerd. Bij coverte aandacht blijft de 
proefpersonen het fixatiepunt fixeren, waardoor de fysieke stimulatie 
van de stimuli exact hetzelfde was. Door deze procedure werd de pupil 
groot wanneer proefpersonen naar de zwarte cirkel staarden en klein 
wanneer ze naar de witte cirkel keken. 1800, 2200 en 2600 ms nadat de 
cirkels verschenen, werd een C1-opwekkende stimulus gepresenteerd 
die bestond uit een groot aantal korte, witte, horizontale lijntjes op een 
zwarte achtergrond. Op een subset van trials moesten proefpersonen 
een kleurswijziging van blauw naar geel in het middelpunt van een 
cirkel detecteren, wat ons toeliet na te gaan of proefpersonen de taak 
correct uitvoerden of niet. In een tweede experiment manipuleerden we 
de grootte van de pupil aan de hand van een paradigma van Laeng and 
Endestad (2012). Proefpersonen fixeerden twee verschillende visuele 
 
CHAPTER 8     241 
illusies die uit exact dezelfde elementen bestonden (en dus niet 
verschilden in fysieke stimulatie). De ene illusie gaf de impressie weinig 
licht uit te stralen (grote pupil), terwijl de andere illusie als heel helder 
werd gepercipieerd (kleine pupil). Opnieuw presenteerden we een C1-
opwekkende stimulus na een bepaald interval.  
 De resultaten van beide experimenten gaven aan dat de 
amplitudegrootte van de C1 component kleiner was wanneer de pupil 
groot was vergeleken met wanneer de pupil klein was. Er was geen 
significant verschil in prestatie op de catch trials in experiment 1, wat 
aangaf dat mensen evenveel mentale inspanning leverden in beide 
condities. We interpreteerden dit effect van pupilgrootte op de C1 
component volgens de zogenaamde sensitivity-acuity trade-off 
(Loewenfeld & Lowenstein, 1999). Deze trade-off verwijst naar het feit 
dat meer of minder licht op de retina een inverse relatie inhoudt tussen 
visuele resolutie (iets in detail kunnen zien) en visuale sensitiviteit (de 
aanwezigheid van een vage stimulus in de visuele periferie kunnen 
detecteren). Als er veel licht is en de pupil vernauwt, zal het beeld op de 
retina scherper zijn doordat lichtstralen die van verschillende dieptes 
komen minder gebroken worden en dus op een kleiner gebied op de 
retina worden geprojecteerd. Deze verhoogde visuele resolutie gaat 
verloren bij weinig licht waarbij de pupil moet vergroten en er dus een 
groter gebied van de retina wordt geactiveerd (wazig beeld). Aangezien 
het detecteren van contrasten in luminatie (bvb. de scheiding tussen 
een wit en zwart vlak) grotendeels in V1 plaatsvindt en we gebruik 
hebben gemaakt van C1-opwekkende stimuli met een hoge spatiale 
frequentie, is een verlaagde visuele resolutie inderdaad een plausibele 
verklaring voor het effect dat we observeerden. 
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" Het is onwaarschijnlijk dat het effect van pupilgrootte op 
activiteit in V1 verklaard kan worden door aandacht of mentale 
inspanning" 
Hoofdstuk 4 was een rechtstreekse vervolgstudie op de 
experimenten beschreven in experiment 3. Aangezien het effect van 
pupilgrootte op de C1 respons belangrijke implicaties heeft voor een 
groot aantal studies die pupildilatatie hebben gemeten, wouden we dit 
effect repliceren en eventuele alternatieve verklaringen uitsluiten. 
Alternatieve verklaringen hebben vooral te maken met de manier 
waarop we de pupil artificieel kleiner en groter hebben gemaakt in 
experiment 1 van hoofdstuk 3: aangezien proefpersonen steeds het 
middelpunt fixeerden, was er geen verschil in fysieke stimulatie (i.e. de 
luminantie was exact gelijk) mogelijk, maar men kan nog steeds 
argumenteren dat het indirect aandacht geven aan een zwarte of witte 
cirkel tot een bepaalde "cognitieve staat" kan leiden die de C1 
component beïnvloedt. Deze alternatieve verklaring geldt niet voor 
experiment 2 in hoofdstuk 3, aangezien proefpersonen daar steeds 
dezelfde figuur (in een andere configuratie) centraal fixeerden. 
 In een nieuw experiment maakten we gebruik van de relatief 
trage respons van de pupil om een C1-uitlokkende stimulus te 
presenteren voor en na de pupil een verschil vertoonde (T1: 400 ms na 
de presentatie van de cirkels; T2: 2200 ms na de presentatie van de 
cirkels). Daarnaast waren we geïnteresseerd in alpha-power 
lateralisatie als een index van aandachtsallocatie. Alpha power daalt bij 
verhoogde aandacht, wat het interessant maakt om na te gaan of er een 
verschil was tussen de condities. Net zoals in het vorige hoofdstuk 
waren er ook catch trials om gedragsmatig na te gaan of proefpersoon 
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dezelfde inspanning leverden in de verschillende condities. De 
resultaten toonden aan dat het effect van pupilgrootte op de C1 
component kon gerepliceerd worden voor de T2 trials (de trials waarbij 
er een verschillende pupilgrootte was). Opnieuw resulteerde een grotere 
pupil in een kleinere amplitude. Voor T1 trials vonden we geen verschil 
in C1-amplitude, wat in de lijn van onze verwachtingen lag. Wat betreft 
de alpha-power lateralisatie konden we aantonen dat proefpersonen 
reeds hun aandacht hadden verlegd naar de linker-of rechterkant op het 
moment van T1 presentatie. Dit toonde aan dat de alternatieve 
verklaring voor het pupileffect via een aandachtsafhankelijke 
"cognitieve staat" kon verworpen worden, aangezien we geen verschil 
vonden bij T1.   
" Toegenomen aandacht en een langdurige toename in 
pupilgrootte is geen garantie voor een beter prestatie in een 
belonende context" 
In hoofstuk 5 onderzochten we de relatie tussen aandacht, 
cogntitieve controle en pupildilatatie door middel van een gecombineerd 
EEG-eyetracking experiment. Meer bepaald waren we geïnteresseerd in 
langdurige effecten van beloning op de onderliggende 
aandachtsmechanismen van cognitieve controle. Het is immers 
aangetoond dat langdurige beloningseffecten de taakprestatie ten 
voordele komen en tot verhoogde activiteit in controle-gerelateerde pre-
frontale hersengebieden leiden (e.g. Jimura, Locke, & Braver, 2010). In 
ons experiment wouden we deze bevindingen uitbreiden naar een 
typische controletaak zoals de Eriksen Flanker taak en gedragsmatige 
en elektrofysiologische markers van aandacht (P1 en N1 componenten) 
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met beloningsgerelateerde verschillen in pupilgrootte in verband 
brengen. Dit verband kan verwacht worden op basis van voorgaand 
onderzoek, aangezien vele onderzoekers een nauwe koppeling hebben 
vastgesteld tussen pupildilatatie en het aandachtsmodulerende LC-NE 
systeem (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Aston-Jones, Rajkowski, Kubiak, 
& Alexinsky, 1994; Eckstein, Guerra-Carrillo, Miller Singley, & Bunge, 
2016; Gilzenrat, Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, & Cohen, 2010; Rajkowski, 
Kubiak, & Aston-Jones, 1994). Net zoals in hoofdstuk 2 wouden we 
gebruik maken van de hoge temporele resolutie van EEG en kunnen 
discrimeren tussen de relevante en irrelevante stimulusdimensies 
(Appelbaum et al., 2012). We lieten proefpersonen een Flanker taak 
uitvoeren met 4 responsmogelijkheden waarbij ze geldbeloningen 
kregen voor snelle en accurate responsen in 2 van 4 blokken. Om te 
zorgen dat het congruentie-effect groot genoeg was om verschillen 
tussen belonende en niet-belonende blokken te kunnen vinden, 
presenteerden we de irrelevante dimensie steeds 200 ms voor de 
relevante dimensie. Onze hypothese was dat in een belonende context, 
minder aandacht zou worden toebedeeld aan de distracter pijlen en dat 
dit zou worden gereflecteerd in een kleinere aandachtsgerelateerde N1 
component (gerelateerd aan de distracter verwerking). Daarentegen 
verwachtten we een grotere N1 component gerelateerd aan de target. 
Met betrekking tot pupildilatatie verwachtten we dat een belonende 
context zou geassocieerd zijn met een langdurige toename in baseline 
pupilgrootte (i.e. duur van het blok). Daarenboven wouden we nagaan of 
het verschil in pupilgrootte tussen de belonende en niet-belonende 
blokken een marker zou kunnen zijn van de hoeveelheid mentale 
inspanning of aandachtsallocatie proefpersonen investeerden en of dit 
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verschil de grootte van de N1 component zou kunnen voorspellen. 
 In tegenstelling tot onze verwachtingen waren we niet in staat de 
typische beloningseffecten terug te vinden die normaal worden 
vastgesteld in experimenten met belonende blokken (Chiew & Braver, 
2014; Jimura et al., 2010; Langford, Krebs, Talsma, Woldorff, & 
Boehler, 2016; Massar, Lim, Sasmita, & Chee, 2016; Paschke et al., 
2015; Schevernels et al., 2015; Small et al., 2005; Soutschek, Stelzel, 
Paschke, Walter, & Schubert, 2015; Soutschek, Strobach, & Schubert, 
2014). We vonden echter wel een significant verschil in de posterieure 
negatieve ERP component van 150 tot 200 ms na de presentatie van de 
distracter (dus voor de target pijl werd gepresenteerd), die we eerst 
identificeerden als de aandachtsgerelateerde N1 component door zijn 
timing en topografie. Deze negatieve component was echt meer 
uitgesproken bij midline electrodes dan bij gelateraliseerde electrodes, 
wat het mogelijk maakt dat onze bevinding een meer algemeen 
sensorisch "gating" mechanisme reflecteert waarbij een toename in 
aandachtsallocatie tot een boost in de signal-to-noise ratio leidt. Deze 
bevinding was dus ook tegengesteld aan onze verwachtingen, aangezien 
we een beloningsgerelateerde strategische inhibitie van distracter 
verwerking hadden verwacht. Daarboven observeerden we geen 
toename in aandachtsallocatie voor de target pijlen, maar dit kan te 
wijten zijn aan de overlap in het EEG signaal door de respons op de 
distracter verwerking.   
 Kortom, we denken dat deze bevindingen evidentie bieden voor 
het feit dat een belonende context tot een langdurige toename in 
aandacht zorgt en geen ruimte laat voor strategische inhibitie, ook al 
levert dit niet altijd een voordeel voor de taakprestatie op. Dit is ook in 
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lijn met onderzoek van Schevernels et al. (2015), die hetzelfde 
observeerde in belonende stop-signaal taak. 
" Variaties in pupilgrootte die gedreven zijn door 
psychologische processen kunnen een functionele rol spelen 
door de balans tussen visuele resolutie en perifere sensitiviteit 
te wijzigen" 
Het onderzoek beschreven in hoofdstukken 3 en 4 toont aan dat 
pupilgrootte een effect kan hebben op vroege visuele processen in de 
visuele cortex. Dit inspireerde ons om een opinie/review paper te 
schrijven over de vaak genegeerde functionele rol van pupilgrootte in 
studies die licht-onafhankelijke veranderingen in pupilgrootte 
gebruiken als indirecte marker van interne psychologische processen 
zoals aandacht, mentale inspanning en arousal. De motivatie om 
pupilgrootte te meten heeft te maken met het feit dat het tot inzichten 
kan leiden in psychologische processen die niet onmiddelijk duidelijk 
kunnen zijn in gedragsdata of die anders heel moeilijk te 
operationaliseren zijn (zoals bvb. cognitieve inspanning). Wij vonden het 
echter opvallend dat pupilgrootte enkel beschouwd wordt als een 
indirecte marker, en ervan uitgegaan wordt dat de verandering in 
grootte zelf functioneel irrelevant is en een enkel een "uitkomst" van 
een ander proces betreft. Daarom beargumenteren we dat 
veranderingen in pupilgrootte, gedreven door psychologische processen, 
wel een functionele rol kunnen hebben door het te relateren aan de 
hierboven vermelde sensitivity-acuity trade-off. Verder onderzoek is 
echter nodig om uit te klaren bij welke psychologische processen het 
functioneel is dat de visuele resolutie verhoogt (door een constrictie van 
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de pupil) en bij welke processen het functioneel is dat de sensitiviteit 
voor perifere stimuli verhoogt (door een dilatatie van de pupil).  
 
 Samenvattend, de experimenten die we in deze dissertatie hebben 
gepresenteerd onderzochten de onderliggende aandachtsmechanismen 
van cognitieve controle en toonden aan dat wijzigingen in pupilgrootte 
meer kunnen betekenen dan vooralsnog werd aangenomen. Psychologie-
gerelateerde veranderingen in pupilgrootte hebben waarschijnlijk een 
functionele rol en we denken dat toekomstig onderzoek hier steeds 
rekening mee zou moeten houden. 
REFERENTIES 
Appelbaum, L. G., Boehler, C. N., Won, R., Davis, L., & Woldorff, M. G. (2012). 
Strategic Allocation of Attention Reduces Temporally Predictable 
Stimulus Conflict. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 24(9), 1834-1848.  
 
Aston-Jones, G., & Cohen, J. D. (2005). An integrative theory of locus 
coeruleus-norepinephrine function: adaptive gain and optimal 
performance. Annual Review Neuroscience, 28, 403-450.  
Aston-Jones, G., Rajkowski, J., Kubiak, P., & Alexinsky, T. (1994). Locus 
coeruleus neurons in monkey are selectively activated by attended cues 
in a vigilance task. Journal of Neuroscience, 14(7), 4467-4480.  
 
Binda, P., Pereverzeva, M., & Murray, S. O. (2013). Attention to bright surfaces 
enhances the pupillary light reflex. Journal of Neuroscience, 33(5), 
2199-2204.  
 
Botvinick, Nystrom, L. E., Fissell, K., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D. (1999). 
Conflict monitoring versus selection-for-action in anterior cingulate 
cortex. Nature, 402(6758), 179-181.  
Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D. 
(2001). Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychological Review, 
108(3), 624-652.  
 
 
CHAPTER 8     248 
Braver, T. S. (2015). Motivation and Cognitive Control: Taylor & Francis. 
 
Broadbent, D. E. (1958). Information-Theory and Its Applications in 
Psychology. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society(34), 53-53.  
 
Brown, G. G., Kindermann, S. S., Siegle, G. J., Granholm, E., Wong, E. C., & 
Buxton, R. B. (1999). Brain activation and pupil response during covert 
performance of the Stroop Color Word task. Journal of the 
International Neuropsychological Society, 5(4), 308-319.  
Chiew, K. S., & Braver, T. S. (2014). Dissociable influences of reward 
motivation and positive emotion on cognitive control. Cognitive, 
Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 14(2), 509-529. 
 
Cohen, J. D. (2017). Cognitive Control The Wiley Handbook of Cognitive 
Control (pp. 1-28): John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
 
Costa, V. D., & Rudebeck, P. H. (2016). More than Meets the Eye: the 
Relationship between Pupil Size and Locus Coeruleus Activity. Neuron, 
89(1), 8-10.  
 
Deutsch, J. A., & Deutsch, D. (1963). Attention: Some Theoretical 
Considerations. Psychological Review, 70(1), 80-90.  
 
Duthoo, W., Abrahamse, E. L., Braem, S., Boehler, C. N., & Notebaert, W. 
(2014). The heterogeneous world of congruency sequence effects: an 
update. Frontiers in Psychology, 5. 
Eckstein, M. K., Guerra-Carrillo, B., Miller Singley, A. T., & Bunge, S. A. 
(2016). Beyond eye gaze: What else can eyetracking reveal about 
cognition and cognitive development? Developmental Cognitive 
Neuroscience. 
 
Egner, T. (2007). Congruency sequence effects and cognitive control. Cognitive 
Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 7(4), 380-390.  
 
Egner, T., & Hirsch, J. (2005). Cognitive control mechanisms resolve conflict 
through cortical amplification of task-relevant information. Nature 
Neuroscience, 8(12), 1784-1790.  
 
Gilzenrat, M. S., Nieuwenhuis, S., Jepma, M., & Cohen, J. D. (2010). Pupil 
diameter tracks changes in control state predicted by the adaptive gain 
theory of locus coeruleus function. Cognitive, Affective, Behavioral 
Neuroscencei, 10(2), 252-269.  
 
CHAPTER 8     249 
Jimura, K., Locke, H. S., & Braver, T. S. (2010). Prefrontal cortex mediation of 
cognitive enhancement in rewarding motivational contexts. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
107(19), 8871-8876.  
Joshi, S., Li, Y., Kalwani, R. M., & Gold, J. I. (2016). Relationships between 
Pupil Diameter and Neuronal Activity in the Locus Coeruleus, 
Colliculi, and Cingulate Cortex. Neuron, 89(1), 221-234.  
 
Kerns, J. G., Cohen, J. D., MacDonald, A. W., Cho, R. Y., Stenger, V. A., & 
Carter, C. S. (2004). Anterior Cingulate conflict monitoring and 
adjustments in control. Science, 303(5660), 1023-1026.  
 
King, J. A., Korb, F. M., von Cramon, D. Y., & Ullsperger, M. (2010). Post-Error 
Behavioral Adjustments Are Facilitated by Activation and Suppression 
of Task-Relevant and Task-Irrelevant Information Processing. Journal 
of Neuroscience, 30(38), 12759-12769.  
 
Krebs, R. M., & Woldorff, M. G. (2017). Cognitive Control and Reward The 
Wiley Handbook of Cognitive Control (pp. 422-439): John Wiley & Sons, 
Ltd. 
 
Laeng, B., & Endestad, T. (2012). Bright illusions reduce the eye's pupil. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 109(6), 2162-2167.  
 
Laeng, B., Orbo, M., Holmlund, T., & Miozzo, M. (2011). Pupillary Stroop 
effects. Cognitive Processing, 12(1), 13-21.  
 
Langford, Z. D., Krebs, R. M., Talsma, D., Woldorff, M. G., & Boehler, C. N. 
(2016). Strategic down-regulation of attentional resources as a 
mechanism of proactive response inhibition. European Journal of 
Neuroscience, 44(4), 2095-2103.  
 
Loewenfeld, I. E., & Lowenstein, O. (1999). The pupil : anatomy, physiology, 
and clinical applications. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
 
Luck, S. J., & Kappenman, E. S. (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Event-Related 
Potential Components: Oxford University Press, USA. 
 
Massar, S. A. A., Lim, J., Sasmita, K., & Chee, M. W. L. (2016). Rewards boost 
sustained attention through higher effort: A value-based decision 
making approach. Biological Psychology, 120, 21-27.  
 
 
CHAPTER 8     250 
Paschke, L. M., Walter, H., Steimke, R., Ludwig, V. U., Gaschler, R., Schubert, 
T., & Stelzel, C. (2015). Motivation by potential gains and losses affects 
control processes via different mechanisms in the attentional network.  
Neuroimage, 111, 549-561.   
 
Polk, T. A., Drake, R. M., Jonides, J. J., Smith, M. R., & Smith, E. E. (2008). 
Attention Enhances the Neural Processing of Relevant Features and 
Suppresses the Processing of Irrelevant Features in Humans: A 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study of the Stroop Task. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 28(51), 13786-13792.  
 
Rajkowski, J., Kubiak, P., & Aston-Jones, G. (1994). Locus coeruleus activity in 
monkey: phasic and tonic changes are associated with altered vigilance. 
Brain Research Bulletin, 35(5-6), 607-616.  
 
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation 
of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American 
Psychologist, 55(1), 68-78.  
 
Schevernels, H., Bombeke, K., Van der Borght, L., Hopf, J. M., Krebs, R. M., & 
Boehler, C. N. (2015). Electrophysiological evidence for the involvement 
of proactive and reactive control in a rewarded stop-signal task. 
Neuroimage, 121, 115-125.  
 
Schmidt, L., Lebreton, M., Cléry-Melin, M.-L., Daunizeau, J., & Pessiglione, M. 
(2012). Neural Mechanisms Underlying Motivation of Mental Versus 
Physical Effort. PLOS Biology, 10(2), e1001266.  
 
Siegle, G. J., Ichikawa, N., & Steinhauer, S. (2008). Blink before and after you 
think: Blinks occur prior to and following cognitive load indexed by 
pupillary responses. Psychophysiology, 45(5), 679-687.  
 
Small, D. M., Gitelman, D., Simmons, K., Bloise, S. M., Parrish, T., & 
Mesulam, M. M. (2005). Monetary incentives enhance processing in 
brain regions mediating top-down control of attention. Cerebral Cortex, 
15(12), 1855-1865.  
 
Soto, D., & Blanco, M. J. (2004). Spatial attention and object-based attention: a 
comparison within a single task. Vision Research, 44(1), 69-81.  
 
Soutschek, A., Stelzel, C., Paschke, L., Walter, H., & Schubert, T. (2015). 
Dissociable effects of motivation and expectancy on conflict processing: 
an fMRI study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 27(2), 409-423.  
 
 
CHAPTER 8     251 
Soutschek, A., Strobach, T., & Schubert, T. (2014). Motivational and cognitive 
determinants of control during conflict processing. Cognition & 
Emotion, 28(6), 1076-1089.   
 
Steinhauer, S. R., Siegle, G. J., Condray, R., & Pless, M. (2004). Sympathetic 
and parasympathetic innervation of pupillary dilation during sustained 
processing. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 52(1), 77-86.  
Stroop, J. R. (1992). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: General, 121(1), 15-23.  
 
Treisman, A. (1964). Monitoring and storage of irrelevant messages in selective 








DATA STORAGE FACT SHEETS 
In compliance with the UGent standard for research 
accountability, transparacy and reproducibility, the location of the 
datasets used in this dissertation are added below. For each of the 
empirical chapters (i.e., chapters 2 to 5) a separate Data Storage Fact 
Sheet is completed, detailing which data and analysis files are stored, 
where they are stored, who has access to the files and who can be 
contacted in order to request access to the files. In addition, the Data 
Storage Fact Sheets have been added to my public UGent Biblio 
account. 
DATA STORAGE FACT SHEET FOR CHAPTER 2 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet  
 
% Name/identifier study 
% Author: Klaas Bombeke 
% Date: 01-06-2017 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Klaas Bombeke 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: bombeke.klaas@gmail.com 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Nico Boehler 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2 9000 Gent 
 
DATA STORAGE FACT SHEETS     254 
- e-mail: Nico.boehler@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of 




2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
 
Bombeke, K., Langford, Z. D., Notebaert, W., & Boehler, C. N. (2017). The role 
of temporal predictability for early attentional adjustments after conflict. 
PlosOne, 12(4). 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
 
Dataset for experiment 1,2,3 and 4 
 
 




3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other (specify): External hard drive owned by the lab 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
 
DATA STORAGE FACT SHEETS     255 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify:  
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: following each step in the data 
processing a new version of the datafile was stored. The data was also saved for 
RT analysis and accuracy analysis separately. 
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: SPPS and Matlab scripts for the 
analysis  
  - [x] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content 
should be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other: External hard drive owned by the lab   
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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DATA STORAGE FACT SHEET FOR CHAPTER 3 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet  
 
% Name/identifier study 
% Author: Klaas Bombeke 
% Date: 01-06-2017 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Klaas Bombeke 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: bombeke.klaas@gmail.com 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Nico Boehler 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: Nico.boehler@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of 




2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
 
Bombeke, K., Duthoo, W., Mueller, S., Hopf, J-.M., & Boehler, C. N. (2016). 
Pupil size directly modulates the feedforward response in human primary 
visual cortex independently of attention. Neuroimage, 127, 67-73. 
 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
 
Dataset for experiment 1 and 2 
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3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other (specify): External hard drive owned by the lab 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify:  
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: following each step in the data 
processing a new version of the datafile was stored. The data was also saved for 
RT analysis and accuracy analysis separately. 
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: SPPS and Matlab scripts for the 
analysis  
  - [x] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content 
should be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
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  - [x] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other: External hard drive owned by the lab   
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
 
DATA STORAGE FACT SHEET FOR CHAPTER 4 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet  
 
% Name/identifier study 
% Author: Klaas Bombeke 
% Date: 01-06-2017 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Klaas Bombeke 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: bombeke.klaas@gmail.com 
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1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Nico Boehler 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: Nico.boehler@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of 




2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
 
Bombeke, K., Hopf, J-.M., & Boehler, C. N. (under review). Revisiting the 
influence of the pupil on feedforward primary visual cortex actvity: 
discriminating effects of attentional state and pupil size. Psychophysiology. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
 
Dataset for experiment 1 
 
 




3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other (specify): External hard drive owned by the lab 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
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  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify:  
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: following each step in the data 
processing a new version of the datafile was stored. The data was also saved for 
RT analysis and accuracy analysis separately. 
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: SPPS and Matlab scripts for the 
analysis  
  - [x] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content 
should be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other: External hard drive owned by the lab   
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
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   - e-mail:  
 
DATA STORAGE FACT SHEET FOR CHAPTER 5 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet  
 
% Name/identifier study 
% Author: Klaas Bombeke 
% Date: 01-06-2017 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Klaas Bombeke 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: bombeke.klaas@gmail.com 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Nico Boehler 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2 9000 Gent 
- e-mail: Nico.boehler@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of 




2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
 
Bombeke, K., Kostandyan, M., Notebaert, W., & Boehler, C. N. Increased effort 
without behavioral pay-off: Sustained pupil dilation and increased attentional 
processing in a rewarded context. Manuscript in preparation 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
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Dataset for experiment 1 
 
 




3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [x] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other (specify): External hard drive owned by the lab 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify:  
  - [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: following each step in the data 
processing a new version of the datafile was stored. The data was also saved for 
RT analysis and accuracy analysis separately. 
  - [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: SPPS and Matlab scripts for the 
analysis  
  - [x] files(s) containing information about informed consent  
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content 
should be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
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* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [x] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [x] other: External hard drive owned by the lab   
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [x] main researcher 
  - [x] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
 
